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O it is a living, busy, active, mighty thing this faith. 
Luther, "Preface to the Epistle of 
St. Paul to the Romans" 
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INTRODUCTION 
The purpose of this study is to examine and organize 
some of the current contrasting methodologies of theological 
ethics in an attempt to determine the Biblical method of 
choosing the moral option. This will be done in two 
different ways. 
In the first part, two common methods in moral 
philosophy, the deontological method and the teleological 
method, will be defined and illustrated. It will be 
demonstrated that Scriptural ethics has elements in common 
with both rule deontology and rule teleology. 
In the second part, the Scriptural method of moral 
reasoning will be examined more closely by comparing three 
different ways that numerous absolute prescriptive commands 
are used in theological ethics. Of the three methods 
discussed it will be shown that two contradict the moral 
methodology of the Holy Scriptures. Only the method of 
conflicting absolutism will prove to be satisfactory. This 
is the only method that contains elements in common with both 
rule deontology and rule teleology. 
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The conclusion reached will stress that the Scriptural 
method of theological ethics not only emphasizes characteris-
tics of both deontology and teleology, but it also emphasizes 
that these characteristics are to be used in a very precise 
and specific way. The Scriptural method is similar to rule 
deontology; however, when there is a conflict of duties the 
rule teleological element serves as the arbitrator to deter-
mine the lesser evil. When this is understood one can begin 
to have a prolegomenon for theological ethics that properly 
incorporates the usus didacticus of God's law. 
This investigation also assumes three basic presuppo-
sitions which, while not directly discussed, nevertheless, 
need to be underscored since they form an essential back-
ground for the method proposed herein. The first presupposi-
tion of this dissertation is that the Holy Scriptures are the 
inspired Word of God and inerrant in the autograph manu-
scripts. It is assumed that Moses is the author of the 
Pentateuch, the four gospels each bear the name of their one 
and only author, and St. Paul is the author of the pastoral 
epistles. Since the Holy Spirit is the divine author of the 
entire Holy Scriptures, the numerous human authors inspired 
by the Holy Spirit do not conflict with, or contradict one 
another, but rather, confirm and complement one another. 
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This is the case not only with respect to theological content 
but also with references to history as well as with the 
method and content of all moral teaching. 
The second presupposition of this dissertation is the 
Pauline emphasis that one's salvation precedes any good 
works. In this way any type of synergism or works righteous-
ness which understands good works to precede, contribute to, 
or result in one's salvation is necessarily precluded. 
St. Paul taught, and Luther reemphasized, that salvation has 
already been freely and completely earned for all by the 
gracious work of Christ. It is only after one receives this 
salvation by faith that one is then motivated, inspired, and 
strengthened to live the Christian life (that is, do good 
works). In this way it is the gospel alone that provides the 
motivation and strength for good works. A truly good work 
can only be performed by the "new man" in Christ. 
The third presupposition is the continuing necessity 
of the third use of the law in the life of the regenerate. 
The first problem in living a moral life, incentive and 
power, is solved by the gospel. The second problem becomes 
one of moral knowledge. This is solved by the third use of 
the law. While the "new man" in Christ no longer needs the 
direction and guidance of God's moral law, the "old man," who 
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is with us to the grave, nevertheless, needs to be instructed 
and admonished by the law. Thus as far as the "new man" is 
concerned the law is merely indicative-descriptive, but as 
far as the "old man" is concerned, the law is imperative-
prescriptive. As long as the regenerate life contains both 
the "new man" and the "old man" there will be conflict, 
confusion and struggle in making moral decisions. To help 
the Christian clarify and distinguish right from wrong God 
has revealed his divine will to mankind in the Holy 
Scriptures. The vast majority of this dissertation is 
referring to this imperative-prescriptive third use of the 
law which God uses to guide the regenerate in moral living. 
General normative ethics is that field of endeavor 
which seeks to discover the basic principles with which one 
can discern right from wrong. Applied normative ethics then 
seeks to apply these general principles to specific 
situations. The focus of this dissertation is solely on 
general normative ethics. 
PART ONE 
The Deontological and Teleological 
Elements in Theological Ethics  
Throughout the history of general normative ethics the moral 
option has often been determined either by a deontological 
method, which focuses on one's duty and obligation, or by a 
teleological method, which focuses on the end results of the 
act or rule in question.' These two methods are not 
'According to Peter Vallentyne, "The Teleological/ 
Deontological Distinction," The Journal of Value Inquiry 
21(1987):21-32, the first one to contrast deontology and 
teleology as two contradictory moral methodologies was 
Charles D. Broad, Five Types of Ethical Theory (London: 
Routledge and Kegan Paul Ltd., 1930), 206-16. For more 
information on the contrast between the deontological and the 
teleological methods of moral reasoning the reader may wish 
to consult one or more of the following: Heinrick Richard 
Niebuhr, The Responsible Self (1963) (San Francisco: Harper 
and Row, 1978), 47-54. William Frankena, "Love and Principle 
in Christian Ethics," chap. in Faith and Philosophy (Grand 
Rapids, MI: Eerdmans Publishing Co., 1964), 203-25. Richard 
Garner and Bernard Rosen, Moral Philosophy (New York: The 
Macmillan Co., 1967), 55-113. William Frankena, Ethics 2d 
ed. (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, 1973), 14-16. 
Ethel Albert, Theodore Denise and Sheldon Peterfreund, Great 
Traditions in Ethics (New York: D. Van Norstrand Co., 1975), 
5-6. James Childs, Christian Anthropology and Ethics 
(Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1978), 153-56. Samuel 
Gorovitz, Doctor's Dilemmas: Moral Conflict and Medical Care 
5 
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necessarily mutually exclusive. 
It is the purpose of this first chapter to give a 
fuller exposition of these two methods. It will be shown 
that Scripture does not choose one method to the complete 
exclusion of the other; rather, Scripture allows elements of 
both methods to be brought together and used in a very 
specific way. 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1982), 83-90. Tom 
Beauchamp and James Childress, Principles of Biomedical 
Ethics 3rd ed. (New York: Oxford University Press, 1983), 25 - 
47. Neil Brown, "Teleology or Deontology?" Irish Theological 
Quarterly 53(1987):36-51. Norman L. Geisler, Christian 
Ethics (Grand Rapids, MI: Baker Book House, 1989), 24-25. 
Thomas M. Garrett, Harold W. Baillie, and Rosellen M. 
Garrett, Health Care Ethics: Principles and Problems 
(Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall, 1989), 2-3. Franklin I. 
Gamwell, The Divine Good (New York: Harper Collins, 1990), 
19-84. John Klotz, Men, Medicine and Their Maker (Univeristy 
City, MO: Torelion Productions, 1991), 9-12. Frequently the 
distinction between deontology and teleology is made by 
authors who differentiate between the concepts of right 
(deontology) and good (teleology). For an example of this 
right (deontology)/good (teleology) distinction see Philip P. 
Wiener, ed. Dictionary of The History of Ideas 4 vols. (New 
York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1973), s.v. "Right and Good," 
by Abraham Edel. Elizabeth M. Pybus, "False Dichotomies: 
Right and Good," Philosophy 58(1983): 19-27. Ann Maclean, 
"Right and Good: False Dichotomy?" Philosophy 60(1985):129 - 
32. 
CHAPTER ONE 
The Deontological Method Defined and Illustrated 
The term deontology has been used in three different 
ways.' First, Jeremy Bentham seems to have coined this 
phrase as a synonymous, yet more descriptive term, for the 
word "ethics."2 However, it is seldom used in this sense 
today. Second, some Roman Catholic moralists use the term to 
describe ethics that is particularly associated with a 
special profession, such as business ethics or professional 
ethics. The third use of the term deontology is the most 
common. In this use 
"deontology" denotes a view of morality which takes as 
its fundamental categories the notion of "obligation" or 
"duty" and the "rightness" of acts. This deontological 
view of morality may be contrasted with the views which 
stress the end of action (the "good"), sometimes called 
"agatheology" or more often teleology . . . a deontolo-
gist in the third sense must hold that some acts are 
'James Childress and John Macquarrie, eds. The 
Westminster Dictionary of Christian Ethics (Philadelphia: 
Westminster Press, 1986), s.v. "Deontology," by John 
Macquarrie. 
2The Works of Jeremy Bentham, ed. John Bowring. 11 
vols. (New York: Russell and Russell, 1962), 8:93. 
7 
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obligatory, right, or wrong, independent of their ends 
and their consequences.3  
William Frankena explains this third use of deontology 
in this way: 
a deontologist contends that it is possible for an 
action or rule of action to be the morally right or 
obligatory one even if it does not promote the greatest 
possible balance of good over evil for self, society, or 
universe.4  
It is in this most frequently used sense that this 
term "deontology" is used in the present study. In this 
sense the main emphasis in deontology concerns the fulfill-
ment of duties and obligations. 
According to William Frankena the deontologists of 
this third sense may be divided into three categories depend-
ing upon how they use pre-established rules. Pure act deon-
tologists have no use for pre-established rules. Modified 
act deontologists accept the use of pre-established rules 
only to a certain qualified extent. Rule deontologists 
insist on the use of pre-established rules.5 Further 
3Childress and Macquarrie, 151. 
4William Frankena, Ethics, 15. 
5Frankena, "Love and Principle," 209-10. William 
Frankena was born in 1908. He received his Ph.D. from 
Harvard in 1937. He taught philosophy at the University of 
Michigan from 1937-1978. He was chairman of the department 
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examination and illustrations of these three categories will 
highlight their distinctive characteristics. 
Pure Act Deontolociy 
Pure act deontologists maintain that moral rules are 
unnecessary. They believe that the duty or obligation of the 
moral agent is to be determined anew in each particular 
situation. Frankena explains that 
Act-deontological theories maintain that the basic 
judgments of obligation are all purely particular ones 
like "In this situation I should do so and so," and that 
general ones like "We ought always to keep our promises" 
are unavailable . . . . Extreme act-deontologists 
maintain that we can and must see or somehow decide 
separately in each particular situation what is the 
right or obligatory thing to do, without appealing to 
any rules.6  
According to Richard Garner and Bernard Rosen, "If the 
act deontologist is asked how he can say 'A is right' on the 
basis of his knowing 'A has F, G, and H,' he might give the 
of philosophy at the University of Michigan from 1947 to 
1961. He was the author of over seventy-five articles which 
deal with various aspects of philosophical ethics. For a 
bibliography of William Frankena's works the reader may wish 
to see K. E. Goodpaster, ed., Perspectives on Morality (Notre 
Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1976), 235-9. This 
dissertation is greatly indebted to him for the development 
of the categories which clarify and distinguish the different 
forms of deontology and teleology. 
6Frankena, Ethics, 16. 
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reply that he 'knows directly' that A, which has F, G, and H 
is right."7  
For the purpose of this dissertation the method of 
pure act deontology will be illustrated by the three "Sermons 
on Human Nature" by Joseph Butler.8  
In his first sermon on human nature Joseph Butler 
emphasizes three distinct theses. In the first thesis Butler 
explains that there are two different natural principles at 
work in human morality, benevolence and self-love. "First, 
there is a natural principle of benevolence in man, which is 
7Garner and Rosen, 89. Examples of prominent pure act 
deontologists of the twentieth century include, E. F. Carritt 
(1876-1964) Theory of Morals (1928), H. A. Prichard (1872 - 
1947) "Does Moral Philosophy Rest on a Mistake?" (1912) and 
also "Duty and Ignorance of Fact" (1932). 
8"His 'Sermons on Human Nature,' which are his most 
important contribution to ethics, were delivered at the Rolls 
chapel, and were published in 1726 after he had resigned his 
preachership there." Charles D. Broad. Five Types of Ethical 
Theory (London: Routledge & Regan Paul Ltd., 1930), 5. 
"Joseph Butler, an Anglican clergyman who was a contemporary 
of George Berkeley and David Hume, a protégé of Samuel 
Butler, a favorite of Queen Caroline, Dean of St. Paul's, 
Clerk of the Closet to George II, Bishop of Bristol at the 
time John Wesley defected and Bishop of Durham, and who was 
not Archbishop of Canterbury because he rejected the office, 
was the most influential Anglican Theologian of the 
eighteenth century." Frank N. Magill, ed. World Philosophy 5 
vols. (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Salem Press, 1961), s.v. 
"Fifteen Sermons Preached at The Rolls Chapel," by Leonard 
Miller. 
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in some degree to society what self-love is to the 
individual."9 These two natural principles do not conflict 
with one another. One's concern for society at large (that 
is, benevolence) and one's concern for one's self (that is, 
self-love) work together and promote one another. 
The comparison will be between the nature of man as 
respecting self and tending to private good, his own 
preservation and happiness, and the nature of man as 
having respect for society and tending to promote public 
good, the happiness of that society. These ends do 
indeed perfectly coincide: and to aim at public and 
private good are so far from being inconsistent that 
they mutually promote each other.10  
The reference here to "ends" must not be taken to mean 
that Butler is using a form of teleological reasoning. He is 
merely stating that the nature of mankind strives for certain 
ends. Fulfilling one's moral duties may even accomplish 
those ends. However, contrary to the teleologists, Butler 
does not claim that the morality of a particular act is 
determined by the goal which a certain act may achieve. For 
Butler, and other deontologists, a moral act is moral in and 
of itself in spite of the end that is accomplished. Yet, 
this does not mean that no end can be accomplished. This 
9Joseph Butler, Five Sermons (Indianapolis, IN: 
Hackett Publishing Co., 1983), 26. 
10Ibid. 
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illustrates that a moral methodology does not have to be 
pointless or aimless in order to avoid being classified as 
teleological.11 It must not be presupposed that anytime an 
author mentions the words "end" "goal" or "aim" that he is 
using the teleological method of moral reasoning. It is only 
teleological if the morality of the act or rule is determined 
by the end. 
The second thesis Butler emphasized is that apart from 
the natural principles of benevolence and self-love humankind 
also has other tendencies which lead the moral agent to 
contribute to both the public and the private good. 
"Secondly . . . men have various appetites, passions, and 
particular affections, quite distinct both from self-love and 
from benevolence - all of these have a tendency to promote 
both public and private good."12 Such affections or passions 
would include the "desire of esteem from others" and 
"indignation against successful vice."13  
The third thesis of Butler stresses that it is the 
role of the human conscience to determine whether or not the 




moral agent approves or disapproves of specific actions. 
Thirdly, there is a principle of reflection in men by 
which they distinguish between, approve and disapprove, 
their own actions. We are plainly constituted such sort 
of creatures as to reflect upon our own nature. The 
mind can take a view of what passes within itself, its 
propensions, aversions, passions, affections . . . . In 
this survey it approves of one, disapproves of another, 
and toward a third is affected in neither of these ways, 
but is quite indifferent. This principle in man by 
which he approves or disapproves his heart, temper and 
actions is conscience . . . . This faculty tends to 
restrain men from doing mischief to each other, and 
leads them to do good . . . . It cannot possibly be 
denied that there is this principle of reflection or 
conscience in human nature.14  
For Joseph Butler the use of conscience in his first 
sermon on human nature completely precludes any need for pre-
established rules. In his second sermon on human nature he 
carries out this point even further when he states, 
There is a superior principle of reflection or con-
science in every man which distinguishes between the 
internal principles of his heart as well as his external 
actions, which passes judgment upon himself and them, 
pronounces determinately some actions to be in them-
selves just right, good; others to be in themselves 
evil, wrong, unjust, which . . . magisterially exerts 
itself, and approves or condemns him the doer of them 
accordingly . . . . It is by this faculty, natural to 
man, that he is a moral agent, that he is a law to 




Butler's deontological emphasis is seen in his 
insistence that the conscience determines actions to be right 
or wrong in themselves, that is, without regard to the end 
they may or may not accomplish. Because of the role of 
conscience any pre-established rules are completely unneces-
sary. "Every man is naturally a law to himself . . . • 
Everyone may find within himself the rule of right, and 
obligations to follow it."16 Thus it is evident that Joseph 
Butler uses a form of pure act deontology. It is deontologi-
cal in that the morality of the act is determined in the act 
itself, that is, without regard for the end that is accom-
plished. It is "pure act" in that the magisterial function 
of the conscience precludes the need for any pre-established 
rules. Without the use of rules the conscience has the 
authority to pronounce judgment on each individual act. In 
the third sermon Butler writes, 
Yet let any plain honest man, before he engages in any 
course of action, ask himself, "Is this I am going about 
right, or is it wrong? Is it good, or is it evil?" I 
do not in the least doubt that this question would be 
answered agreeably to truth and virtue, by almost any 




Butler concludes that, 
Conscience does not only offer itself to show us the way 
we should walk in, but it likewise carries its own 
authority with it; that it is our natural guide, the 
guide assigned us by the Author of our nature; it there-
fore belongs to our condition of being, it is our duty 
to walk in that path and follow this guide.18  
The verdict of the conscience is its own authority. It does 
not need to resort to rules nor to consequences. Thus 
Butler's use of conscience is a good example of pure act 
deontology. 
Modified Act Deontoloqv 
Modified act deontologists do not completely reject 
the use of all pre-established rules as do the pure act 
deontologists. Modified act deontologists accept a qualified 
use of pre-established rules. For the modified act deontolo-
gists rules are not absolutely binding, as they are for the 
rule deontologist; however, they may still serve an important 
function either as rules of thumb, (that is, summary rules), 
or as prima facie rules. 
For the modified act deontologists a rule that serves 
as a rule of thumb (or summary rule) is useful insofar as it 
summarizes the wisdom of the ages. Such a rule may be used 
18Ibid., 43. 
16 
by the moral agent if it helps him to determine his duty in a 
particular situation. 
One of the most prominent ethists of the twentieth 
century to emphasize a form of modified act deontology is 
William David Ross. He emphasizes that moral duties arise 
from the numerous relationships that exist in society, "of 
promisee to promiser, of creditor to debtor, of wife to 
husband, of child to parent, of friend to friend, of fellow 
countryman to fellow countryman . . ."19  
These relationships impose duties upon the moral 
agent. However, these duties, and the rules that express 
these duties, are not absolute. They are merely prima facie. 
"Each of these relations is the foundation of a prima facie 
duty, which is more or less incumbent on me according to the 
circumstances of the case."20  
Ross continues by explaining that there are at least 
six types of prima facie duties that are self evident to 
mankind. 
(1) Some duties rest on previous acts of my own [such as 
promise keeping] . . . . (2) Some rest on previous acts 
of other men [such as duties of gratitude] . . . . (3) 
19William David Ross, The Right and the Good (Oxford: 
Clarendon Press, 1930), 19. 
20Ibid. 
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Some rest on the fact or possibility of a distribution 
of pleasure or happiness [such as duties of 
justice] . . . . (4) Some rest on the mere fact that 
there are other beings in the world whose condition we 
can make better [such as duties of beneficence] . . . . 
(5) Some rest on the fact that we can improve our own 
condition in respect of virtue or of intelligence [such 
as duties of self improvement]. (6) [There are also] 
duties that may be summed up under the title of "not 
injuring others," [such as the duty of non-malefi-
cence].21  
In any particular situation two or more of these 
duties may conflict with each other. In such a conflict 
situation the moral agent must determine which duty outweighs 
the others. Ross explains, 
When I am in a situation, as perhaps I always am, in 
which more than one of these prima facie duties is 
incumbent on me, what I have to do is to study the 
situation as fully as I can until I form the considered 
opinion (it is never more) that in the circumstances one 
21Ibid., 21. Even though several types of these prima 
facie duties emphasize the consequences of one's action, 
these consequences or results do not determine the moral 
import and do not constitute a form of teleological 
reasoning. Ross explains, "That his act will produce the 
best possible consequences is not his reason for calling it 
right . . . . Our duty, then, is not to do certain things 
which will produce certain results. Our acts, at any rate 
our acts of special obligation, are not right because they 
will produce certain results . . . . An act . . . is right 
because it is itself the production of a certain state of 
affairs. Such production is right in itself, apart from any 
consequences." Ibid., 17, 46. (See also footnotes 12, 47, 
and 50.) 
18 
of them is more incumbent that any other; then I am duty 
bound to think that to do this prima facie duty is my 
duty sans phrase in this situation.22  
In this way the six self evident duties, and the rules 
that express these duties, are not all absolute at the same 
time. The only duty that becomes absolute is the actual duty 
that outweighs the others. Thus there is an important 
distinction between prima facie duties and actual or absolute 
duties. In a conflict situation only one prima facie duty can 
become absolute or actual. This is then the duty for which 
the moral agent becomes responsible. According to Ross, the 
moral agent is not responsible for the failure to fulfill a 
lesser prima facie duty when it is outweighed by a higher 
one. He writes, 
It must be maintained that there is a difference between 
prima facie duty and actual or absolute duty. When we 
think ourselves justified in breaking, and indeed 
morally obliged to break, a promise in order to relieve 
some one's distress, we do not for a moment cease to 
recognize a prima facie duty to keep our promise, and 
this leads us to feel, not indeed shame or repentance, 
but certainly compunction, for behaving as we do.23  
When the moral agent fails to fulfill a prima facie duty Ross 




compunction or uneasiness. The prima facie obligation 
continues to exert itself even in a conflict situation. Ross 
continues saying that if we are morally obligated to break a 
promise "it is our duty to make up somehow to the promisee 
for the breaking of the promise."24  
However, even though the prima facie duty continues to 
exert itself, it is still not the same as the higher duty 
that becomes actual or absolute. In this way prima facie 
duties, and the rules which express them, do not specifically 
show the moral agent what the actual absolute duty is in a 
particular situation. They merely illustrate a range or a 
variety of what obligations tend to be. Ross observes: 
We have to distinguish from the characteristic of being 
our duty that of tending to be our duty . . . . Tendency 
to be one's duty may be called a parti-resultant 
attribute, i.e., one which belongs to an act in virtue 
of some one component in its nature. Being one's duty 
is a toti-resultant attribute, one which belongs to an 
act in virtue of its whole nature and of nothing less 
than this.25  
24Ibid. 
25Ibid. Ross explains this distinction further by 
showing that it is analogous to the natural forces of 
gravitation. "Qua subject to the force of gravitation 
towards some other body, each body tends to move in a 
particular direction with a particular velocity; but its 
actual movement depends on all the forces to which it is 
subject. It is only by recognizing this distinction that we 
20 
Ross recognizes that it is extremely difficult for the 
moral agent to choose the actual absolute duty from conflict-
ing prima facie duties. The moral agent can never be certain 
that the right decision has been made. The actual absolute 
duty is not self evident as are the prima facie duties. 
Our judgments about our actual duty in concrete situa-
tions have none of the certainty that attaches to our 
recognition of the general principles of duty. A state-
ment is certain, i.e. is an expression of knowledge, 
only in one or other of two cases: when it is self-
evident, or a valid conclusion from self-evident 
premises. And our judgments about our particular duties 
have neither of these characters.26  
There is no formula or strategy that the moral agent 
can use to determine the actual duty in a specific situation. 
For the estimation of the comparative stringency of 
these prima facie obligations no general rules can, so 
far as I can see, be laid down. We can only say that a 
great deal of stringency belongs to the duties of 
"perfect obligation" - the duties of keeping our 
promises, of repairing wrongs we have done, and of 
returning the equivalent of services we have received. 
For the rest, iv Tt alaerjoet h Kpiatg. This sense of our 
particular duty in particular circumstances, preceded 
and informed by the fullest reflection we can bestow on 
the act in all its bearings, is highly fallible, but it 
can preserve the absoluteness of laws of nature, and only by 
recognizing a corresponding distinction that we can preserve 




is the only guide we have to our duty.27  
Even though Ross admits that his ethical theory 
contains "no principle upon which to discern what is our 
actual duty in particular circumstances; n28 he, nevertheless, 
insists that his method is sufficient because it adequately 
aids the moral agent in choosing the moral option. Ross 
writes, 
We are more likely to do our duty if we reflect to the 
best of our ability on the prima facie rightness . . . 
of various possible acts in virtue of the characteris- 
tics we perceive them to have, than if we act without 
reflection.29  
27Ibid., 41-42. Duties of "perfect obligation" refer 
to the Kantain "perfect duties" which relate to corresponding 
rights and therefore allow no exceptions. This is in 
contrast to "imperfect duties" which do not relate to 
corresponding rights and therefore allows exceptions. See 
Immanuel Kant, Grundlegung zur Metaphysik Der Sitten, in 
Immanuel Kant's Sammtliche Werke, ed. Karl Rosenkranz and F. 
W. Schubert, 12 vols. (Leipzig: Leopold Voss, 1838-1840), 
8:47 footnote. This has been translated into English in 
Immanuel Kant, Grounding for the Metaphysics of Morals, 
trans. James W. Ellington (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing 
Co., 1981) 30, footnote 12. 
Ross translates the Greek quote in the footnote on 
page forty-two as "The decision rests with perception." He 
also points out that it is a quote from Aristotle's 




Leonard Miller presents a succinct summary of Ross's 
modified act deontology. 
Each . . . moral principle . . . is a moral 
truth . . . . 
There will be many particular cases where these 
principles will clash, it cannot always be obligatory to 
keep a promise, or to rectify wrongs done to 
others . . . . For this reason, Ross says that promise 
keeping and other kinds of acts which are usually 
obligatory are prima facie right, meaning by this that 
if no stronger and contrary moral consideration is 
relevant to the case in point, promise keeping, or 
whatever it is, is morally obligatory . . . . This is 
Ross's way of maintaining the absoluteness of moral 
principles in the face of the obvious fact that they 
clash in particular cases. 
Ross does not think these principles can be 
arranged hierarchically in such a fashion that when any 
two clash we know beforehand which must take precedence 
over the other, and he does not believe there is any 
principle that enables us to resolve such conflicts. He 
maintains that our moral life is far more complex than 
the systematizers of ethics imply it is. We must 
consider cases as they come, weigh the relative 
strengths of the moral considerations as they occur in 
the individual cases, and reach our decisions accord-
ingly. As a result, we cannot be nearly as certain 
about the rightness of particular acts as we can be 
about the truth of the general principles, for while the 
latter is self-evident, the former can never be "known 
with certainty."30  
This form of modified act deontology is distinct from 
30Frank N. Magill, ed. World Philosophy 5 vols. 
(Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Salem Press, 1982), s.v. "The Right 
and The Good," by Leonard Miller. 
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pure act deontology. The pure act deontology, illustrated by 
Samuel Butler, has no use for any pre-established duties or 
for pre-established rules which express such duties; whereas, 
the modified act deontology, here illustrated by W. D. Ross, 
accepts and uses pre-established duties, and the pre-estab-
lished rules which express those duties, because as prima 
facie duties they can be helpful to the moral agent in deter-
mining the actual absolute duty in a particular situation. 
These two methods are also distinct from rule deontology. 
Rule Deontology 
The rule-deontologists maintain that the duty or 
obligation of the moral agent is completely determined by a 
set of pre-established rules. Frankena writes, 
Rule-deontologists hold that the standard of right and 
wrong consists of one or more rules - either fairly 
concrete ones like "We ought always to tell the truth" 
or very abstract ones like Henry Sidgwick's Principle of 
Justice: "It cannot be right for A to treat B in a 
manner in which it would be wrong for B to treat A, 
merely on the ground that they are two different 
individuals . . . ." Against the teleologists, they 
[the rule-deontologists] insist, of course, that these 
rules are valid independently of whether or not they 
promote the good . . . . They assert that judgments 
about what to do in particular cases are always to be 
determined in the light of these rules.31  
31Frankena, Ethics, 17. 
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Richard Garner and Bernard Rosen explain that there is 
an analogy between the use of moral rules in rule deontology 
and the use of rules in the game of chess. 
The rules of chess are not summary rules used to help 
one play the game; rather, they define the game. One can 
be said to be playing chess only if one plays according 
to the rules of chess . . . . It is true that changes 
have been made in the rules of chess, but they were not 
changed to keep pace with the evolution of chess: the 
changing of the rules was the evolution of the game. 
When rules stand in this kind of relation to some 
activity or practice, then the rules define the activity 
or practice. Such rules are often said to be constitu-
tive rules, for they constitute the activity. One who 
knows and understands the rules of chess knows what 
chess is. 
The rule deontologists claim that the justification 
of moral judgments ultimately depends upon the appeal 
not to summary rules [as modified act deontology does] 
but to constitutive rules. That is to say, the practice 
of morality is defined by the moral rules.32  
Tom Beauchamp and James Childress also emphasize the 
necessity of rules in rule deontology when they write, "For 
rule deontologists, the heart of morality is a set of binding 
principles and rules that classify acts as right, wrong, 
obligatory, or prohibited."33  
The rule deontologists are quite diverse in their 
opinion of how these rules are established. For instance, 
32Garner and Rosen, 87. 
33Beauchamp and Childress, 36. 
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Samuel Clarke (1675-1729) in "A Discourse Concerning the 
Unchangeable Obligations of Natural Religion (1705) and The 
Truth and Certainty of the Christian Revelation" (1706) held 
that moral rules are determined by reason and nature. Thomas 
Reid (1710-1796) in "Essays on the Active Powers of Man," 
(1788) held that moral rules are self-evident premises known 
by means of intuition. Richard Price (1723-1791) in "A 
Review of the Principle Questions in Morals" (1758) held that 
rules are determined by intellectual discernment along with 
feelings of the heart. 
The ethical analysis Socrates gives of his impending 
death, recorded by Plato in the Crito, will be the first 
illustration of rule deontology.34  
As the Crito opens, Socrates is in prison. It is the 
day before his execution. His good friend Crito arrives 
early in the morning in order to convince Socrates that he 
need not die. Arrangements have been made for an easy escape. 
However, Socrates is convinced that an unlawful escape would 
be morally wrong. For Socrates there are only two options. 
34The English edition of the Crito used for this paper 
is from The Dialogues of Plato, ed. and trans. B. Jowett, 4 
vols. (Oxford: Clarenden Press, 1871; Revised Fourth edition 
1964). For a Greek edition of the text of Crito the reader 
may wish to consult Ioannes Burnet, ed. Platonis Opera 
(Oxonii: E. Typographeo Clarendoniano, 1900), 43-54. 
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Either the law must be changed, or Socrates must go through 
with his execution. 
The reasoning Socrates gives is completely rule 
deontological. He tells Crito: 
I cannot repudiate my own doctrines, which seem to me as 
sound as ever: the principles which I have hitherto 
honoured and revered I still honour, and unless we can 
find other and better principles, I am certain not to 
agree with you; no, not even if the power of the 
multitude could let loose upon us many more imprison-
ments, confiscations, deaths, frightening us like 
children with hobgoblin terrors.35  
The quote shows that Socrates is going to base his decision 
on past "principles" and "doctrines," even if the end result 
is his death. 
Crito uses a teleological approach to moral reasoning. 
He points out to Socrates that the end result of his execu-
tion will be nothing but evil. The execution will make 
orphans of his children, who will then be forced to depend on 
others for their education. His death will also bring 
disgrace on his friends, because others will blame them for 
not helping Socrates in his time of need. Others will accuse 
the friends of Socrates of cowardice and ignorance. Thus, 
Crito emphasizes the end result saying, "See now, Socrates, 
35Plato Crito 46.c. 
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how discreditable as well as disastrous are the consequences, 
both to us and you."36  
Arguing rule deontologically Socrates reminds Crito of 
the principle that is at stake. "My first principle [is] 
that neither injury nor retaliation nor warding off evil by 
evil is ever right."37 This is the rule Socrates refuses to 
break. He knows that his execution is evil, but he refuses 
to ward off that evil by committing the evil of breaking the 
law by escaping from prison. Socrates emphasizes that the 
laws of Athens have been good to him; they have raised him 
from his youth. As a citizen of Athens he has freely agreed 
to abide by its laws. He could have moved to another city at 
any time had he chosen to do so. However, he decided to 
remain a citizen of Athens and that entailed obeying its 
laws. He will not break her laws, even if they are unjust, 
even if it means his death. He has often lectured on the 
importance of justice and virtue, so that now he is not about 
to play the role of a criminal. Socrates concludes by saying 
it is better to suffer injustice than to inflict it. Then 




Crito: "I have nothing to say." 
Socrates: "It is enough then, Crito. Let us fulfill the 
will of God, and follow whither He leads."38  
Thus, Socrates emphasizes that he will obey his 
principles, accept the law of Athens and thereby do his duty. 
He will fulfill his obligation as an Athenian. The 
consequences of his actions will be left up to divine 
providence. This is a very typical example of the rule 
deontological method of moral reasoning, which stresses the 
necessity of obeying pre-established rules. 
Another work which illustrates the rule deontological 
method of moral reasoning is the Grounding for the Meta-
physics of Morals by Immanuel Kant." 
38Ibid., 54.e. 
39lmmanuel Kant, Grundlegung zur Metaphysik der Sitten 
(Riga, 1785). The English edition used for this dissertation 
is Grounding for the Metaphysics of Morals, trans. James E. 
Ellington (Indianapolis and Cambridge: Hackett Publishing 
Co., 1981). References to a German edition are taken from 
Immanuel Kant's Sammtlich Werke, ed. Karl Rosenkranz and F. 
W. Schubert, 12 vols (Leipzig: Leopold Voss, 1838-1840), 8:1 - 
101, hereafter cited as K.S.W. For a more detailed 
explanation of Kant's moral philosophy the reader may wish to 
refer to Kritik Der Praktishen Vernunft, 8:103-318, 
translated into English as Critique of Practical Reason, 
trans. Lewis W. Beck (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 
1949; reprint, New York: Garland Publishing Co., 1976). 
Metaphysik Der Sitten, K.S.W., 9:1-336, translated into 
English as The Metaphysic of Morals, trans. John Ladd 
(Indianapolis: Hobbs -Merrill, 1965). The reader may also 
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Kant begins by explaining that, "There is no possibil-
ity of thinking of anything at all in the world, or even out 
of it, which can be regarded as good without qualification, 
except a good will (emphasis his)..40  Any virtue such as 
intelligence, courage, or perseverance cannot be good in and 
of itself because a criminal with an evil will could also use 
these virtues for an evil purpose. Therefore, only a good 
will is truly good in and of itself.41 "A good will is not 
good because of what it effects or accomplishes nor because 
of its fitness to attain some proposed end; it is good only 
through its willing, i.e., it is good of itself."42  
According to Kant, once this good will has been 
naturally established by reason, man has a natural duty to 
obey it. From this Kant derives his three basic propositions 
wish to consult Kant's lectures on ethics from the Konigsberg 
University, 1775-1781, Paul Mentzer, ed. Eine Vorlesung Kants 
fiber Ethik im Auftrage der Kantgesellschaft (Berlin: Pan 
Verlag R. Heise, 1924), translated into English as Immanuel 
Kant, Lectures on Ethics, trans. Louis Infield (London: 
Methum and Co., 1930; Harper Torchbook, 1963). 
40Grounding, 7. (Grundlegung, 11). 
41Ibid. 
42Ibid., "Der gute Wille ist nicht durch das, was er 
bewirkt, oder ausrichtet, nicht durch seine Tauglichkeit zu 
Erreichung irgend eines vorgesetzten Zweckes, sondern allein 
durch das Wollen, d.i. an sich, gut." Grundlegung, 12. 
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for morality. The first proposition is that only an action 
done from duty has any moral worth.43  
The second proposition is that, 
An action done from duty has its moral worth, not in the 
purpose that is to be attained by it but in the maxim 
according to which the action is determined. The moral 
worth depends, therefore, not on the realization of the 
object of the action, but merely on the principle of 
volition according to which, without regard to any 
objects of the faculty of desire, the action has been 
done.44  
The third proposition which Kant derives from the 
previous two propositions is that, "duty is the necessity of 
an action done out of respect for the law."45  
In these three principles the rule deontological 
element is clearly seen in Kant's emphasis on duty and law 
over consequences. Kant continues to explain that man's 
43Ibid., 10-12. (See especially his footnote 35). 
(Grundlegung, 17-19). 
44Ibid., 12-13. "Eine Handlung aus Pflicht hat ihren 
moralischen Werth nicht in der Absicht, welche dadurch 
erreicht werden soil, sondern in der Maxime, nach der sie 
beschlossen wird, hangt also nicht von der Wirklichkeit des 
Gegenstandes der Handlung ab, sondern blos von dem Princip 
des Wollens, nach welchem die Handlung, unangesehen aller 
Gegenstande des Begehrungsvermogens, geschehen ist." 
Grundlegung, 19. 
45Ibid., 13. "Pflicht ist die Nothwendigkeit einer 
Handlung aus Achtung Mrs Gesetz." Grundlegung, 20. 
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natural reason establishes the good will by imposing the law 
of the categorical imperative, that is, regardless of the 
consequences "I should never act except in such a way that I 
can also will that my maxim should be a universal law."" 
This categorical imperative is the one and only law which man 
has a natural duty to obey. This is the primary rule in 
Kant's rule deontology. All other imperatives of duty are 
derived from this one. Kant gives four illustrations, 
showing how this is done. 
First, Kant applies the categorical imperative to the 
question of suicide. A person considering suicide is 
operating under the following maxim: "From self-love I make 
as my principle to shorten my life when its continued 
duration threatens more evil than it promises satisfac- 
46Ibid., 14. "Ich soil niemals anders verfahren, als 
so, das ich auch wollen konne, meine Maxime solle ein 
allgemeines Gesetz werden." Grundlegung, 22. Here again (as 
in footnotes 21 and 49) one may note that the deontological 
method is not completely lacking any aim or goal. An act 
done to fulfill a deontological duty is performed by the 
moral agent with a goal or aim in mind (that is, to fulfill 
his duty). However, even though there is the future goal that 
the deontologist is striving to achieve, this future aspect 
of deontology is only a secondary orientation. The primary 
orientation of deontology is either in the past (if duties 
have been previously determined, as in rule-deontology) or in 
the present (if duties are immediately determined, as in act 
deontology). The moral import is determined by the primary 
orientation. 
32 
tion."47 Kant dismisses this maxim rather quickly. One 
could never will such a maxim to be a universal law because 
self-love is the principle which stimulates the continuation 
of life. It would be a contradiction to use that same 
principle (or feeling) to end life. Consequently, suicide is 
immoral. 
Second, Kant applies the categorical imperative to the 
question of keeping a promise. As an example Kant offers the 
following maxim: "When I believe myself to be in need of 
money, I will borrow money and promise to pay it back, 
although I know that I can never do so."48 One could never 
will this to be a universal law because it also is a self - 
contradiction. If this were to become a universal law, then 
anyone in a similar position could do the same thing. If 
many would do this it would undermine and contradict the very 
nature of making a promise, so that eventually no one would 
believe such promises. Rather, they "would merely laugh at 
all such utterances as being vain pretenses."49 In this way, 
47Ibid., 30. (Grundlegung, 48). 
48Ibid., 31. (Grundlegung, 48). 
49Ibid. (Grundlegung, 49). Here Kant is showing that 
"The ordinary reason of mankind in its practical judgements" 
(Grounding, 14. Grundlegung, 22) illustrates that there is a 
practical reason for being honest. However, the moral reason 
for honesty stands alone and is in no way derived from or 
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practical reason substantiates the necessity of telling the 
truth. 
Third, Kant applies the categorical imperative to the 
question of cultivating talents. Kant considers the 
following maxim: Since I am independently wealthy I do not 
need to work in order to support myself; therefore I will 
neither develop my natural gifts, nor improve my talents. I 
will simply pass my days in idle amusement and indulge myself 
in pleasure. This could never be a universal law because it 
is contrary to human nature. Kant writes, "But he cannot 
possibly will that this should become a universal law of 
nature. . . . For as a rational being he necessarily wills 
that all his faculties should be developed."" Therefore, 
that type of idleness is immoral. 
dependent on this practical reason. Kant explains "To be 
truthful from duty is, however, quite different from being 
truthful from fear of disadvantageous consequences; in the 
first case the concept of the action itself contains a law 
for me, while in the second I must first look around 
elsewhere to see what are the results for me that might be 
connected with the action." (Grounding, 15. Grundlegung, 
23). In the above example the moral agent should be honest 
solely because of the duty imposed by the categorical 
imperative. However, if the moral agent decides not to be 
honest, then, the results will be to his own disadvantage. 
This also illustrates that a deontologist and a teleologist 
may do the very same act for entirely different reasons. 
50Ibid. (Grundlegung, 49). 
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The fourth and final example Kant gives is in applying 
the categorical imperative to the question of helping others 
who are in need. Kant offers the following maxim: 
What does it matter to me? Let everybody be as happy as 
Heaven wills or as he can make himself; I shall take 
nothing from him nor envy him; but I have no desire to 
contribute anything to his well-being or to his assis-
tance when in need.51  
One could never will this to be a universal law 
because (like promise breaking in the second example) it is 
self-contradictory. The moral agent reciting this maxim 
certainly may not wish to help others in need; however, there 
may come a time when he himself will be in need. Then he 
would not want such a law to be in effect. Thus practical 
reason substantiates the necessity of beneficence, just as it 
substantiates the necessity of honesty in illustration number 
two above. 
Kant concludes this section with the following 
summary: 
These are some of the many actual duties . . . whose 
derivation from the single principle cited above is 
clear. We must be able to will that a maxim of our 
action become a universal law; this is the canon for 
morally estimating any of our actions . . . . By means 
of these examples there has been fully set forth how all 
duties depend as regards the kind of obligation (not the 
51Ibid., 32. (Grundlegung, 49-50). 
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object of their action) upon the one principle.52  
In this way Kant has clearly illustrated a rule deontological 
method of moral reasoning by emphasizing that the duty of the 
moral agent is determined by the rules that are derived from 
the categorical imperative. 
Even though the reasoning of Kant in his Grounding for 
the Metaphysics of Morals is more complex than Socrates in 
the Crito, they both illustrate the method of rule 
deontology. Both Kant and Socrates insist that pre-
established rules are absolutely necessary because rules 
determine one's actual moral duty. This is to be 
distinguished from the modified act deontologists who claim 
that pre-established rules are necessary only in so far as 
they are prima facie rules (that is, summary rules or rules 
of thumb) that help the moral agent to determine his actual 
duty. This must also be distinguished from the pure act 
52Ibid. "Dieses sind nun einige von den vielen 
wirklichen . . . deren Abtheilung aus dem einigen angefuhrten 
Princip Klar in die Augen fdllt. Man muss wollen Karmen, 
dass eine Maxime unserer Handlung eine allgemeines Gesetz 
werde: dies ist der Kanon der moralischen Beurtheilung 
derselben iiberhaupt . . . . Und so alle Pflichten, was die 
Art der Verbindlichkeit (nicht das Object ihrer Handlung) 
betrifft, durch diese Beispiele in ihrer Abhangigkeit von dem 
einigen Princip vollstandig aufgestellt worden." 
Grundlegung, 50-51. 
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deontologists who claim that pre-established rules are 
absolutely unnecessary because the actual duty of the moral 
agent can be immediately determined by other means such as 
the conscience. 
It will now be shown that of these three forms of 
deontology the Scriptures would emphasize the rule deontolog-
ical method with respect to God's absolute moral laws. 
Characteristics of Rule Deontologv In The Holy Scriptures  
In the Old Testament characteristics of the rule 
deontological method are evident in the Mosaic covenant, 
which God established with his people at Mount Sinai. When 
God established this Mosaic covenant, he listed specific 
moral, political and ceremonial duties the people were to 
fulfill." The rule deontological emphasis can be seen in 
530f course the ancient Hebrews made no distinction 
among the moral, ceremonial and political laws. They all fit 
together to form one body of duties for which they were 
responsible. However, the New Testament makes it very clear 
that the ceremonial and political laws are no longer 
applicable to New Testament Christians. See Appendix I: 
Biblical Testimony Concerning the Present Invalidity of the 
Old Testament Ceremonial and Political Laws. The term moral 
law is used throughout this dissertation to refer to all laws 
that are neither ceremonial nor political. Being used in 
this sense, the content of the moral law is identical to the 
content of the natural law that is explained in both tables 
of the Ten Commandments. Martin Chemnitz also used the term 
moral laws in this sense when he wrote, "There are also moral 
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the moral obligations of the Mosaic covenant on at least four 
different occasions. 
The most prominent example is the initial establish-
ment of the Mosaic covenant in Exodus 19-31.54 The basic 
outline of this covenant was summarized by God when he said 
to Moses, 
You yourselves have seen what I did to Egypt, and how I 
carried you on eagles' wings and brought you to myself. 
Now if you obey me fully and keep my covenant ( NIV1 
laws which give commands concerning the acknowledgement of 
God in our hearts and our obedience toward God [that is, the 
first table] and concerning good works toward men [that is, 
the second table] . . . It is common to call it the Decalog 
when we are referring to the moral law." Martin Chemnitz, 
Loci Theologici, 2 vols. trans. J. A. 0. Preus (St. Louis: 
Concordia Publishing House, 1989), 2:342. This is in keeping 
with a broad understanding of the term morality which 
includes our obligations to God as well as to other men. 
This is in contrast with the more narrow understanding which 
equates morality only with the good works of the second table 
of the law (directed toward men), which must be carefully 
distinguished from the faith of the first table of the law 
(directed toward God). This narrow sense is exemplified in 
David Scaer, "Article IV. Good Works," chap. in A 
Contemporary Look at the Formula of Concord (St. Louis: 
Concordia Publishing House, 1978), 167. 
54Unless otherwise noted the English translation of 
the Scriptures used for this dissertation is the New 
International Version. The Hebrew quotes are taken from the 
Biblia Hebraica Stuttgartensia (Stuttgart: Deutsche 
Bibelgesellschaft, 1984). The Greek quotes are taken from 
the Novum Testamentum Graece 26 edition (Stuttgart: Deutsch 
Bibelgesellschaft, 1979). 
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inpnti noinv vintrokt ), then out of all 
nations you will be my treasured possession (Exodus 
19:4-5).55  
Now that God had called the Israelites and empowered 
them with his grace he expected them to dutifully obey all 
his commandments. The people were willing to comply. 
So Moses went back and summoned the elders of the people 
and set before them all the words the Lord had commanded 
him to speak. The people all responded together, "We 
will do everything the Lord has said" (1grital 
TWi ninv). (Exodus 19:7-8) 
▪ -▪  r T 
Here the Israelites willingly confirm this covenant with God. 
55Walter Kaiser writes, "The most common misconception 
of the purpose of the law is that the Old Testament men and 
women were brought into a redeemed relationship with God by 
doing good works, that is, by obeying the commandments of the 
law, not through the grace of God. The truth of the matter 
is that this reading of the text will not fit the biblical 
evidence." Walter Kaiser, Jr., Toward Old Testament Ethics. 
(Grand Rapids: Zondervan Publishing House, 1983), 76. The 
quote from scripture in the text above illustrates the 
validity of Kaiser's point. First, God in his grace chose 
the people of Israel to be his special nation. He graciously 
delivered them from Egyptian bondage. Then he gave them the 
laws in this covenant which they were to obey. Clearly in 
this Mosaic covenant, obedience to God's law follows, and is 
the result of God's initial gracious action in his election 
and his deliverance. Obedience to these laws was not the 
prerequisite for God's grace. Nor does obedience maintain 
the covenant, as E. P. Sanders suggests in his understanding 
of covenantal nomism, see E. P. Sanders, Paul and Palestinian 
Judaism (Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1977), 94, 236, 513. 
Obedience is the faithful response of the "new man" in the 
covenant that is established and maintained by God. 
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Through the use of his law he will establish their duties and 
they will obey. 
Thus, three days later God met Moses on Mount Sinai to 
establish the specific obligations of the Israelites. Once 
again the opening words speak of God's initial grace. "I am 
the Lord your God who brought you out of Egypt out of the 
land of slavery" (Exodus 20:2). Immediately following this 
is the decalog, which enumerates the moral obligations of the 
people. Commandments one through three detail their obliga-
tions to God. Commandments four through ten detail their 
obligations to one another.56 Even though the commandments 
of the second table are not directed specifically toward God 
(as are the commandments of the first table) they are still 
obligations that are required by God and, therefore, part of 
the covenant. After the obligations of the decalog, the 
56Throughout this dissertation the Lutheran-Roman 
Catholic enumeration of the ten commandments will be used. 
For more information on the different numbering systems the 
reader may wish to see Paul L. Maier, "Enumerating the 
Decalogue: Do We Number the Ten Commandments Correctly?" 
Concordia Journal 16 (January 1990): 18-26, Nathan Jastram, 
"Should Lutherans Really Change How They Number the Ten 
Commandments?" Concordia Journal 16 (October 1990): 363-69. 
Paul L. Maier, "A Response to Nathan Jastram, "Concordia 
Journal 16 (October, 1990): 370-72, Horace D. Hummel, 
"Numbering the Ten 'Commandments,' A Response to Both Jastram 
and Maier," Concordia Journal 16 (October 1990): 373-83. 
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other obligations of the people follow, including those of a 
moral, ceremonial and political nature. 
The main characteristic of rule deontology is clearly 
seen in that the moral duties of the Israelites were estab-
lished by God in this covenant, by the commands of the 
decalog. Any moral option would be determined by their duty 
to keep the individual laws of the covenant.57  
57Blessings are the result of living in the covenant, 
and only curses will come from being outside the covenant 
(see Deut. 30:15-20); however, ". . .the covenant relationship 
does not rest on quid pro quo understanding. Israel is not 
commanded to keep these commandments in order that God may 
prosper her course; she is called to obedience without 
qualification." Interpreter's Dictionary of the Bible, s.v. 
"Law in the 0.T." by W. J. Harrelson. In other words God's 
continued blessings were not dependent on Israel's obedience. 
Their obedience was not done in order to coerce, or bribe 
God, or earn his favor. Rather, God's blessings were 
dependent on their life within the covenant, of which their 
obedience was an outward manifestation (as well as a 
necessary result). Where one found obedience one found God's 
continued blessing, not because of the obedience, but because 
of the covenant which created the obedience. On the other 
hand Israel could earn God's future curses by virtue of her 
disobedience. 
One can see how this could easily be misunderstood so 
that over time it became distorted. "In the intertestamental 
period a fundamental change occurred in the role of the Law 
in the life of the people. The importance of the Law 
overshadows the concept of the covenant and becomes the 
condition of membership in God's people. Even more 
importantly, observance of the Law becomes the basis of God's 
verdict upon the individual. Resurrection will be the reward 
of those who have been devoted to the Law (2 Macc. 7:9). The 
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Other examples in the Old Testament which also 
illustrate characteristics of the rule deontological method 
of moral reasoning come from several different occasions when 
the people reconfirmed their commitment to the Mosaic 
covenant. 
The first actual reemphasis of the initial Mosaic 
covenant was by Moses himself in Moab before the children of 
Israel crossed the Jordan to enter Canaan. The entire book 
of Deuteronomy records this recommitment to the covenant 
(except for the last chapter which records the death of 
Moses). Moses repeatedly emphasized all that God had done 
for them, for example, 
The Lord your God has blessed you in all the work of 
your hands. He has watched over your journey through 
this vast desert. These forty years the Lord your God 
has been with you, and you have not lacked anything. 
(Deuteronomy 2:7)58  
Law is the basis of the hope of the faithful (Test. Jud. 
26:1), of justification (Apoc. Bar. 57:6), of life (IV Ez. 
7:21; 9:31). Obedience to the Law will even bring God's 
Kingdom and transform the entire sin-cursed world (Jub. 23). 
Thus the Law attains the position of an intermediary between 
God and man. This new role of the Law characterizes rabbinic 
Judaism. . ." George E. Ladd, A Theology of the New Testament. 
(Grand Rapids: Eerdmans Publishing Co., 1974), 497. 
58Similar emphases are made in 2:31-33; 3:2-3,18; 
4:36-38; 10:15; 11:2-7; 26:5-11; 29:2-3. 
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He also explained that in view of the grace which God 
had given them they were to be dutifully obedient to all the 
laws of God, for example, 
Hear now, 0 Israel, the decrees and laws I am about to 
teach you ( VP?? / !t$ 101 trAy.urivr5t31 trptin- li 
tnntA). Follow them so that you may live and go 
in and take possession of the land that the Lord, the 
God of your fathers is giving you. Do not add to what I 
command you and do not subtract from it, but keep the 
commands of the Lord your God that I give you ( MDO 
lam 1171 innti rt v3k4i z ivr1r5v 
tnntt man 't!IA NI* LI7'1514 ) (Deuteronomy 4:1-2)59  
Once again rule deontology is emphasized because the moral 
option is to be determined by the individual covenant laws. 
The next recommitment(s) occurred with Joshua at 
Shechem. This is recorded in Joshua 8:30-35 and 24:1-27. It 
is difficult to determine from the texts if these are two 
different occasions or simply two different accounts of the 
same confirmation ceremony. However, the rule deontological 
emphasis is present in both texts. The passage from chapter 
59Similar emphases are made in 4:39-40,44-9:6; 7:11; 
8:1-2; 10:12-13; 11:1-18; 13; 19:1-28, 68; 29:9. This is 
also emphasized in the Lord's words to Joshua, "Be careful to 
obey all the law my servant Moses gave you; do not turn from 
it to the right or to the left . . . Do not let this Book of 
the Law depart from your mouth . . . be careful to do 
everything written in it" ( 101 rii(R5 -hap_ 
11111celn 14 :5 . . . 5wMtpa 1101 5t4 11;11 rngil 
it zunrri/Dt nitiv5 nbvim Ton min ) Joshua 1:7-8. 
T T 1 
43 
eight reads: 
Afterwards, Joshua read all the words of the law - the 
blessings and the curses - just as it is written in the 
Book of the Law. There was not a word of all that Moses 
had commanded that Joshua did not read to the whole 
assembly of Israel. (Joshua 8:34-35) 
If Joshua read "all that Moses had commanded," one can 
discern from the commands of Moses in Deuteronomy and in 
Exodus (exemplified in the two previous quotes) that once 
again the many laws of God's covenant and the importance of 
Israel's absolute dutiful obedience were emphasized. 
This emphasis is made even more clearly in Joshua 
24:1-27. Verses two through thirteen begin by reminding the 
people of God's gracious actions for them in the past. Then 
in verse fourteen Joshua explains their responsibilities. 
"Now fear the Lord and serve him with all faithfulness" 
(Joshua 24:14). 
Then the people answered, "Far be it from us to forsake 
the Lord to serve other gods! It was the Lord our God 
himself who brought us and our fathers up out of Egypt, 
from that land of slavery, and performed those great 
signs before our eyes. He protected us on our entire 
journey and among all the nations through which we 
traveled. And the Lord drove out before us all the 
nations, including the Amorites, who lived in the land. 
We too will serve the Lord, because he is our God . . . 
We will serve the Lord our God and obey him" ( rtrinitfi 
vbah -bv] arrii,m) 
T 3 • 
On that day Joshua made a covenant for the people, 
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and there at Shechem he drew up for them decrees and 
laws ( tVePi p1). And Joshua recorded these things in 
the Book of the Law of God. (Joshua 24:16-18, 24-26) 
Here, again, one can note the rule deontological emphasis on 
dutiful obedience to the "decrees and laws." 
The next reconfirmation of the covenant which makes 
this same emphasis is the reform of Josiah in 2 Kings 23. 
He [King Josiah] read in their hearing all the words of 
the Book of the Covenant, which had been found in the 
temple of the Lord. The king stood by the pillar and 
renewed the covenant in the presence of the Lord - to 
follow the Lord and keep his commands, regulations and 
decrees (mpTrmil rvtirmoniTtp nbtl) 
 with all his 
heart and all his soul, thus confirming the words of the 
covenant written in this book. Then all the people 
pledged themselves to the covenant. (2 Kings 23:2b -3) 
Here King Josiah and the people are pledging that they will 
do their duty in living according to all the laws of God. 
Right and wrong will be determined by the various "commands, 
regulations and decrees" of the Lord. 
The final example that illustrates significant 
features of the rule deontological method of moral reasoning 
is the covenant reconfirmation with Ezra, recorded in 
Nehemiah 9-10. The people are reminded of the sins of their 
fathers as well as the steadfast faithfulness of the Lord. 
You are the Lord God, who chose Abram . . . . You made a 
covenant with him to give to his descendants . . . . You 
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saw the suffering of our forefathers in Egypt; you heard 
their cry at the Red Sea . . . 
You came down on Mount Sinai; you spoke to them 
from heaven. You gave them regulations an laws that are 
just and right and decrees and commandments that are 
good . . . through your servant Moses . . . 
But they were disobedient and rebelled against you; 
they put your law behind their backs. . . . So you 
handed them over to their enemies, who oppressed 
them. . . . But in your great mercy you did not put an 
end to them or abandon them, for you are a gracious and 
merciful God. . . . In all that has happened to us, you 
have been just; you have acted faithfully. (Nehemiah 
9:7-33) 
The Lord has kept his covenant. He has continually 
been faithful. Israel, however was disobedient. She did not 
fulfill her obligations. She failed in her duty to keep all 
the covenant laws. Yet, because of the Lord's faithfulness 
the people are willing (and able) to reconfirm themselves to 
the covenant. 
All these now join their brothers the nobles, and bind 
themselves with a curse and an oath to follow the Law 
(nnln; of God given through Moses the servant of 
God and to obey carefully all the commands, regulations 
and decrees of the Lord our Lord (i1 nvot, 71? t#71 
171 arpm ni*?T :; ) (Nehemiah 10:29). 
In this example, as in all others given above, those 
pledging their faithfulness to the Lord are in effect saying, 
"Empowered by, and responding to your grace, we will 
dutifully obey all your laws. Any moral decision will be 
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based on our obligation to keep the laws of the covenant." 
Thus, this recurring emphasis on their duty to obey all the 
covenant laws illustrates that the ancient Israelites used a 
rule deontological method of moral reasoning. 
This same distinctive feature of rule deontology is 
also found in the New Testament. In the gospels one can note 
at least three different passages where Jesus himself 
illustrates characteristics of this rule deontological form 
of moral reasoning. Jesus says, 
Anyone who breaks one of the least of these commandments 
Toirrwv) and teaches others to do the same will 
be called least in the kingdom of heaven, but whoever 
practices and teaches (umajov at 6Wrt-(1) these commands 




60The question, "Does the phrase 'these commandments' 
(11Bvbrratilv TOljTWV) refer to the Old Testament law or to the 
commandments about to be given by Jesus?" is addressed by H. 
B. Green when he writes, "These commandments: the original 
force of this saying must have had in view the OT law as it 
stands; but the following verse, and the section it 
introduces, suggest rather that Mt. takes it to mean the law 
as reinterpreted by Jesus." H. B. Green, The Gospel 
According to Matthew (Oxford: Oxford university Press, 1975), 
81. However, such a separation is actually an artificial 
dichotomy as Johannes Ylvisaker explains, "Jesus does not in 
the Sermon on the Mount set up His own Word as a contrast to 
the testimony of the Old Testament, as some have asserted. 
For He says expressly that He has not come to destroy the Law 
or the Prophets (Mat. 5:17). . . . It must not be supposed 
that the morality of Jesus is not the moral philosophy of the 
47 
In this text Jesus is not only reemphasizing the enduring 
validity of the Old Testament moral law, but he is also 
Old Testament. It is a gross mistake to regard Jesus as a 
new lawgiver. . . . 
Through the Word of God's Son on the mountain, our 
thoughts revert naturally, then, to God's Word on Sinai." 
Johannes Ylvisaker, The Gospels, trans. The Board of 
Publication of The Norwegian Lutheran Church and Augsburg 
Publishing House (Minneapolis, MN: Augsburg Publishing House, 
1932), 251. 
Martin Chemnitz also discusses this same artificial 
dichotomy "For the fact that He [Christ] says, 'It has been 
said by them of old time . . . but I say unto you . . 
Matt. 5:21, does not mean that He is opposing His doctrine to 
Moses and is rejecting and condemning him, . . . or that he 
is trying to hand down commandments which are better, more 
perfect, or of greater (meliora, perfectora + grauiova) 
importance than those of Moses . . . . For Moses was clearly 
giving the same interpretation . . . . Christ brings back to 
mind the oldest interpretation which had been given by Moses 
and the prophets . . . . Therefore Christ is asserting by 
this mode of speaking ("I say to you") that He who 
promulgated the Decalog possesses the absolutely surest 
explanation of it." Martin Chemnitz, Loci Theologici, trans. 
J. A. 0. Preus 2 vols. (St. Louis, MO: Concordia Publishing 
House, 1989), 2:405. The Latin references are taken from 
Martin Chemnitz, Loci Theologici, 3 vols (Francoforti ad 
Moenum, 1591-1595), 2:81a. 
Harold Buls also comments on this chapter of Matthew 
writing "He [Christ] came not to do away with the OT 
teachings but to bring out their true, original 
meaning . . . . Jesus is not a new law giver, nor is He 
adding anything to what Moses said . . . . He was the author 
of this law and now is about to explain what He meant when He 
gave this law through Moses." Harold Buls, Exegetical Notes 
ILCW Gospel Texts Series A Festival Season Sundays (Fort 
Wayne, IN: Concordia Theological Seminary Press, 1980), 32, 
34. 
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stressing the enduring duty to obey and teach even "the least 
of these commandments" (gay T631,  iirraciiv TOUTWV TM; aa&TWV). 
Moral decisions are to be rule deontological because they are 
based on the obligation to obey all of God's moral command-
ments. 
A similar emphasis is made with Jesus' sermon in 
Matthew 23. 
The teachers of the law and the Pharisees sit in Moses' 
seat. So you must obey them and do everything they tell 
you (ncivTa obv o6a iav JIMMY tlµiv TronjaaTE Kai T1peiTE ) . But 
do not do what they do for they do not practice what 
they preach. (Matthew 23:2-3) 
In both of the above passages Jesus is stressing the 
importance of one's duty to obey the law. These passages 
show that for Jesus, an important element in ethics is one's 
obligation to obey the Old Testament laws. Insofar as Jesus 
emphasizes the duty and obligation to obey the laws of God, 
he is using a rule deontological method of moral reasoning. 61 
This same rule deontological method is also prevalent 
in the writings of St. Paul. This is noticeable both as a 
61One could also add that "Jesus recognizes the Law 
when He acts as the One who forgives sins. . . . Jesus 
validates the Law by the judgment implied in His pardon." 
Gerhard Rittel, ed. The Theological Dictionary of the New 
Testament (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans Publishing Co., 1967), s.v. 
"voitos" by Gutbrod. 
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broad principle which he explains, as well as in specific 
examples that he uses. 
St. Paul uses what has become rule deontology as a 
broad principle several times in his letter to the Romans. 
In chapter two of Romans Paul emphasizes the numerous 
individual moral obligations that are established by the law. 
You who preach against stealing, do you steal? You who 
say that people should not commit adultery, do you 
commit adultery? You who abhor idols, do you rob 
temples? You who brag about the law, do you dishonor 
God by breaking the law? (Romans 2:21b-23) 
In the next two chapters Paul reemphasizes this same 
theme (that is, the numerous obligations of the moral law) in 
yet another way. Because the moral law has established many 
duties, St. Paul knows that he has sinned when he fails to 
meet those duties. Paul's awareness of sin is related 
directly to the obligations established by the moral law. 
For this reason Paul writes, "Through the law we become 
conscious of sin" (Romans 3:20b). In chapter seven he again 
writes, "I would not have known what sin was except through 
the law" (Romans 7:7). In all three of these passages St. 
Paul is stressing the ongoing importance of the moral laws in 
setting the standard for human behavior. St. Paul also 
emphasizes that New Testament Christians still have a duty to 
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obey all the moral laws of the Old Testament when he writes, 
"Everything that was written in the past was written to teach 
us" (Romans 15:4). St. Paul emphasizes this again when he 
writes about the moral failings of the Old Testament 
Israelites. 
Now these things occurred as examples to us to keep us 
from setting our hearts on evil things as they did. Do 
not be idolaters, as some of them were; as it is 
written: "The people sat down to eat and drink and got 
up to indulge in pagan revelry." We should not commit 
sexual immorality, as some of them did - and in one day 
twenty-three thousand of them died. We should not test 
the Lord, as some of them did - and were killed by 
snakes. And do not grumble, as some of them did - and 
were killed by the destroying angel. 
These things happened to them as examples and were 
written down as warnings for us . . . (1 Corinthians 
10:6-11a) 
To the Corinthians St. Paul even goes so far as to 
say, "Keeping God's commands (E14Ta6w) is what counts" 
(1 Corinthians 7:19). In all of these passages Paul used 
what is now called the rule deontological method, which 
emphasizes the obligation to obey all of God's moral laws. 
One can also see how this principle is applied when 
St. Paul uses it in specific situations. St. Paul writes to 
the Romans, "Do not take revenge, my friends, but leave room 
for God's wrath, for it is written: 'It is mine to avenge; I 
will repay,' says the Lord" (Romans 12:19). Here Paul is 
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specifically saying that New Testament Christians still have 
an obligation to obey Deuteronomy 32:35. 
A similar emphasis can be noted in Paul's letter to 
the Ephesians. "Children, obey your parents in the Lord, for 
this is right. 'Honor your father and mother' — which is the 
first commandment with a promise" (Ephesians 6:1-2) .62 
 This 
emphasis is stressed again in his first letter to the 
Corinthians 
For it is written in the Law of Moses: "Do not muzzle an 
ox while it is treading out the grain." Is it about 
oxen that God is concerned? Surely he says this for us, 
doesn't he? Yes, this was written for us . . . . If we 
have sown spiritual seed among you, is it too much if we 
reap a material harvest from you? (1 Corinthians 9:9-11) 
In these last two passages Paul not only shows that 
Christians still have a moral duty to obey the fourth 
62Long life may be the result of obedience to the 
fourth commandment but it is not to be construed as the 
reason for obedience. For any reward from God, including 
longevity, is always a reward of grace. Francis Pieper 
explains, "Scripture teaches that the good works of 
Christians receive a reward (1 Cor.l 3:8), yea, a very great 
reward (µmAis no)* - Matt. 5:12; Luke 6:23, 35) . . . . 
But this reward . . . must be regarded strictly as a 
reward of grace. The kingdom of Christ is the Kingdom of 
Grace, and he who hands God a bill for his good works places 
himself outside the Kingdom of Grace." Francis Pieper, 
Christian Dogmatics 4 vols. (St. Louis: Concordia Publishing 
House, 1953), 3:52. Thus the fourth commandment, with its 
promise, is not an example of teleological morality. 
(Compare footnote 50 above). 
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commandment, but he even finds a moral implication in 
Deuteronomy 25:4 (concerning oxen treading grain), which he 
emphasizes as still being relevant for the New Testament 
Church. Therefore, Wolfgang Schrage, in reference to Paul's 
use of the Old Testament, writes: 
The Old Testament and its laws are presupposed and 
enforced as the criterion of Christian conduct. There 
are instances where Paul as it were instinctively and 
without further justification presupposes certain 
conclusions deriving from Jewish thought based on the 
Torah. [In] debating with gentile Christians [Paul] 
appeals explicitly (expressis verbis) and deliberately 
to the Old Testament and its Torah. 
. . . it follows that for Christians the Old 
Testament has "greater authority than the customs of 
everyday economic life" and a natural sense of what is 
just and proper." 
The distinctive feature of the rule deontological 
method of moral reasoning is noted in the Gospels as well as 
the Epistles in that both Jesus and St. Paul emphasized that 
Christians have a duty or an obligation to obey all the 
individual moral commandments of Scripture." 
63Wolfgang Schrage, The Ethics of the New Testament, 
trans. David Green (Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1988), 205. 
This also contains a quote from Heinz-Dieter Wendland, "Die 
Briefe an die Korinther," Das Neue Testament Deutsch. 
(Gottingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1946) 53. 
64The capability to be dutifully obedient comes only 
from God. Because of the grace that is received from him, 
his people are empowered to faithfully respond. On a 
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Characteristics of Rule Deontology 
in the Writings of Martin Luther65  
Luther appreciated the importance of the moral laws in 
the Old Testament just as Jesus and St. Paul. He consis-
tently uses the decalog in order to stress the moral duties 
and responsibilities for modern Christians. In this way 
Luther, too, used the rule deontological method of moral 
reasoning. This can be noted in both a negative and positive 
way. 
Luther illustrates the rule deontological method of 
rational level such dutiful obedience may be perceived as an 
expression of gratitude to God for the multitude of gracious 
blessings which he has bestowed upon the believer. The 
psalmist enjoins this gratitude when he writes "Give thanks 
to the Lord, for he is good; his love endures forever" Psalm 
107:1. (See also 1 Chronicles 16:8; Psalms 7:17; 28:7; 
30:12; 35:18; 75:1; 100:4; 118:28; 136:1; 1 Corinthians 
15:57; 2 Corinthians 2:14; 9:15; 1 Thessalonians 5:18; 
Revelation 4:9). 
However, on the spiritual level such dutiful obedience 
is more than a mere human expression of gratitude. It is 
also the very power of God working in and through the "new 
man" in Christ. St. Paul emphasizes this when he writes, "I 
have been crucified with Christ and I no longer live, but 
Christ lives in me" Galatians 2:20. (See also Romans 8:5-14; 
2 Corinthians 3:4; Ephesians 3:16). 
65It is not the purpose of this section to give a 
detailed account of every aspect of Luther's understanding of 
the law. The purpose here is much more modest. It is merely 
to illustrate that the rule deontological method of moral 
reasoning can also be found in the writings of Luther. 
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moral reasoning in a negative way with his explanation of the 
primary (that is, the accusatory or spiritual) function of 
the law. Luther writes, 
Therefore the true function and the chief and proper use 
of the Law is to reveal to man his sin, blindness, 
misery, wickedness, ignorance, hate and contempt of God, 
death, hell, judgment, and the well-deserved wrath of 
God . . . . For since, the reason becomes hauty with 
this human presumption of righteousness and imagines 
that account of this it is pleasing to God, therefore 
God has to send some Hercules, namely, the Law, to 
attack, subdue, and destroy his monster with full 
force.66  
This is the same negative use of the rule deontologi-
cal method of moral reasoning that was illustrated by St. 
Paul in Romans 3:20; and 7:7.67 This accusatory function of 
"Luther's Works, 55 vols., eds. J. Pelikan and H. T. 
Lehmann, American Edition in English Translation 
(Philadelphia: Fortress Press and St. Louis: Concordia 
Publishing House, 1958-1986), 26:309-10. Hereafter this work 
is abbreviated as L. W. In Epistolam S. Pauli ad Galatas 
Commentarius, [1531] 1535. "Itaque verum officium et 
principalis ac proprius usus legis est, quod revelat homini 
suum peccatum, caecitatem, miseriam, impietatem, ignorantiam, 
odium, contemptum Dei, mortem, infernum, iudicium et 
commeritam iram apud Deum . . . . Quia enim ratio humana 
opinione iustitiae insolescit et putat se propter eam placere 
Deo, Ideo oportet Deum mittere aliquem Herculem, scilicet 
Legem quae monstrum istud toto impetu adoriatur, prosternat 
et conficiat." D. Martin Luthers Werke, Kritisch 
Gesamtausgabe, 64 Bande (Weimar, 1883-), 40.1:481. Hereafter 
this work is abbreviated as W. A. 
67See page 49 above. 
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the law demonstrates the rule deontological method of moral 
reasoning in that it reveals to the sinner the failure to 
fulfill the numerous obligations or duties which God has 
commanded.68 Every accusation which the spiritual function 
of the law makes illustrates a presumption that the individ-
ual moral commandments of God are obligatory. When the law 
accuses the sinner of a particular sin it is emphasizing that 
a deontological duty has been left unfulfilled. In this way 
the accusatory function of the law illustrates the rule 
deontological method of moral reasoning in a negative way. 
Luther also illustrated the rule deontological method 
of moral reasoning in a positive way when the law was used to 
demand, coerce and drive the "old man" to good works. Luther 
explained in a homily on 1 Timothy 1:8-11, 
One must separate man into two parts and distinguish 
between them, namely between the old [part] and the new 
[part] as St. Paul has partitioned him. The new man 
should not be disturbed with laws; however, continually 
force the old man on with laws. Do not give him any 
relief from them . . . . 
The old man . . . who has no faith, has no pure 
heart and does not have Christ. He must have the law. 
68This negative function of the rule deontological 
method forms a part of the second use of the law mentioned in 
article six of the Thorough Declaration of the Formula of 
Concord, "The Law of God is useful . . . . that through it 
men are brought to a knowledge of their sins." Concordia 
Triglotta (St. Louis: Concordia Publishing House, 1921), 963. 
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He must be continually forced on with works . . . . Nor 
is he inclined to do anything that is good, even less 
can he actually do what is good. Rather he will have a 
immoral and wicked life.69  
To drive the "old man" on with works is a positive use 
of the rule deontological method because in this way the 
numerous commandments enumerate the duties which God 
demands." In a positive way the deontological duties are 
listed and commanded. Because of this positive use of the 
rule deontological method one can distinguish the good works 
which God commands (which are the only good works) from those 
69This is the author's own translation. "Diesen brauch 
recht zuverstehen mustu den menschen yn zwey stuck teilen und 
die beide wol scheiden, nemlich yn den alten und newen, wie 
yhn Pau[lus] geteilt hat. Den newen menschen las nur gar 
unverworren mit gesessen, Denn alten treibe on unterlas mit 
gesessen und las yhm nur kein ruge darvon . . . . 
Der alte mensch . . . der on glauben und nicht von 
reinem herssen ist und Christum nicht hat, mus das gesess 
haben und ymmer dar mit wercken getrieben werden . . . . er 
kan such zu keinem guten geneiget seyn, veil weniger gutes 
thuen, sondern eitel buberey und boscheit." Predigt Uber 1 
Timotheus 1:8-11. 18 Marz, 1525. W. A. 17.1:122-23. 
70This positive function of the rule deontological 
method constitutes one aspect of the third use of the law 
mentioned in article six of the Thorough Declaration of the 
Formula of Concord. "The Holy Ghost employs the Law so as to 
teach the regenerate from it, and to point out and show them 
in the Ten Commandments what is the [good and] acceptable 
will of God, Rom. 12,2, [and] in what good works God bath 
before ordained that they should walk, Eh. 2:10." Triglotta, 
965-69. 
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fictitious good works invented by man. Luther explains, 
The first thing to know is that there are no good works 
except those works God has commanded . . . . Therefore, 
whoever wants to know what good works are . . . needs 
to know nothing more than God's commandments.71  
As much as Luther emphasized the Gospel, the deonto-
logical emphasis in the ten commandments was no trifling 
matter. Luther made this point again in a letter to Peter 
Baskendorf concerning prayer. 
Out of each Commandment I make a garland of four 
strands. First of all, I take each commandment as a 
teaching, which is what it really is, and reflect on 
what our Lord God earnestly demands of me here. 
Secondly, I make a thanksgiving of it. Thirdly, a 
confession. Fourthly, a prayer . . . . 
These are the Ten Commandments treated in a 
fourfold way — as a doctrinal book, hymnbook, 
confessional book, and prayer book.72  
71L. W. 44:23. "Czum ersten ist zuwissen, das kein 
gutte werck sein, dan allein die got gebotenn hat . . . . 
Darumb, wer gute werck wissen . . . der darff nichts anders 
dan gottis gebot wissen." Von den Guten Werken, 1520. W. A. 
6:204. 
72Baillie, John; McNeill, John; Van Dusen, Henery, 
gen. eds. The Library of Christian Classics, 26 vols. 
Luther: Letters of Spiritual Counsel ed. and trans. Theodore 
Tappert (Philadelphia: Westminster Press, 1955), 18:129-30. 
"Und mache aus einem iglichen Gebot ein gevierdes oder ein 
vierfaches gedrehetes krensslin, Als: Ich neme ein iglich 
Gebot an zum ersten als eine lere, wie es denn an im selber 
ist, and dencke, was unser Herr Gott darinn so ernstlich von 
mir fordert, Zum andern mache ich eine dancksagung draus, Zum 
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Luther's reference to the "teaching" (lere) of the ten 
commandments that are "demands" (fordert) of God aptly 
illustrate what has become known as the rule deontological 
method of moral reasoning. 
The deontological method of moral reasoning has been 
defined and illustrated above. It has been suggested that of 
the three forms examined, pure act deontology, modified act 
deontology, and rule deontology, the inspired authors of the 
Holy Scriptures, as well as Martin Luther, used a method of 
moral reasoning that contained characteristics in common with 
rule deontology, which insisted on obedience to pre-
established rules. 
dritten eine beicht, Zum vierden ein gebot . . . . 
Das sind die Zehen gebot vierfeltiz gehandelt,nemlich 
als ein lerebuchlin, als ein sangbuchlin, als ein beicht 
buchlin, als ein Betbuchlin." Eine Einfaltige Weise zu Beten 
fiir Eine Guten Freund, 1535. W. A. 38:364-65, 372. 
CHAPTER TWO 
The Teleological Method Defined and Illustrated 
The teleological method of moral reasoning (often 
referred to as consequentialism and illustrated in utilitari-
anism) determines the moral option in view of the end result 
or goal that the moral agent seeks to achieve. William 
Frankena explains, 
A teleological theory says that the basic or ultimate 
criterion or standard of what is morally right, wrong, 
obligatory, etc., is the nonmoral value that is brought 
into being . . . . Thus an act is right if and only if 
it or the rule under which it falls, produces, will pro-
duce, or is intended to produce at least as great a 
balance of good over evil as any available alternative; 
an act is wrong if and only if it does not do so 
[emphasis his].1  
Tom Beuchamp and James Childress write that, 
Utilitarians maintain that the moral rightness of 
actions is determined by their consequences, in particu-
lar by the maximization of the nonmoral value produced 
1Frankena, Ethics, 14. Frankena continues by 
explaining that "Teleologists have often been hedonists, 
identifying the good with pleasure and evil with pain. . . . 
But they . . . have sometimes been non-hedonists, identifying 
the good with power, knowledge, self-realization, perfection, 
etc." Frankena, Ethics, 15. 
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by the action. The value produced-such as pleasure, 
friendship, knowledge, or health-is said to be nonmoral 
because it is the general goal of many human activities, 
such as art, athletics, and academics, and thus is not a 
distinctly moral value like fulfilling a moral obliga-
tion. A common feature of these theories is that stan-
dards of obligation and right conduct depend on and are 
subordinated to standards of the good.2  
Thomas Shannon affirms that, 
The ethical theory of consequentialism answers the 
question "What should I do?" by considering the 
consequences of various answers. That is, what is 
ethical is that consequence which brings about the 
greatest number of advantages over disadvantages or 
which brings about the greatest good for the greatest 
number of people. Basically, in this method, one looks 
to outcomes, to consequences, to the situation, and from 
that perspective, one decides what is ethical.3  
The main emphasis in teleological ethics is not 
whether an act or rule is consistent with a duty or obliga-
tion, as in deontology, but whether or not an act or a rule 
produces the desired end. The teleologists insist that 
morality is determined by the results of the action or rule, 
regardless of any predetermined duty. Teleological theories 
may use the terms duty or obligation, but such terms are 
always defined in light of the desired consequences.4  
2Beauchamp and Childress, 25. 
3Thomas Shannon, An Introduction to Bioethics, Second 
Edition Revised and Updated (New York: Paulist Press, 1978), 
20. 
4An example of this teleological use of the term duty 
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As with deontology above, William Frankena also 
divides teleology into three subcategories.5 Using 
utilitarianism as a form of teleology, Frankena explains that 
pure act utilitarianism rejects all rules, modified act 
utilitarianism uses rules only as helpful guides, and rule 
utilitarianism insists on the use of rules.6 In order to 
may be noted in the previous quote wherein Beauchamp and 
Childress write, "obligations and right conduct depend on and 
are subordinated to standards of the good." Beauchamp and 
Childress, 19. Another example is given by C. D. Broad when 
he writes that teleology is "the doctrine that it is the duty 
of each to aim at the maximum happiness of all, and to 
subordinate everything else to this end." C. D. Broad Five 
Types of Ethical Theory. (London: Routledge and Regan Paul 
Ltd., 1930), 183. Another example is given when G. E. Moore 
also explains that, "What is 'right' or what is our 'duty' 
must in any case be defined as what is a means to 
good . . . . Our 'duty' is merely that which will be a means 
to the best possible, and the expedient, if it is really 
expedient, must be the same. We cannot distinguish them by 
saying that the former is something we ought to do, whereas 
of the latter we cannot say we 'ought.' In short the two 
concepts are not, as is commonly assumed by all except 
Utilitarian moralists, simple concepts ultimately distinct. 
There is no such distinction in Ethics." George E. Moore, 
Principia Ethica (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1954), 167-68. Such a teleological usage of the term duty is 
rather rare. Generally speaking the terms "duty" and 
"obligation" are limited to deontology. 
5Frankena, "Love and Principle," 207-8. 
6Ibid., 207-8. The distinction between pure act 
utilitarianism and rule utilitarianism is also noted by 
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explain the teleological method of moral reasoning, each one 
of these three forms will be defined and illustrated. 
Pure Act Teleology 
William Frankena stresses that pure act teleology has 
absolutely no use for rules. 
Pure act-utilitarianism is the view which has no place 
whatsoever for such [that is, moral] rules, holding that 
one is to tell what is one's right or duty in a particu-
lar situation simply by an appeal to the principle of 
utility, that is, by looking to see what action will 
produce or probably produce the greatest general balance 
of good over evi1.7  
Beauchamp and Childress explain act teleology as 
follows: 
Controversy has arisen, however, over whether this prin-
ciple [that is, utilitarianism] is to be applied to 
particular acts in particular circumstances in order to 
determine which act is right or whether it is to be 
applied instead to rules of conduct that themselves 
determine which acts are right and wrong . . . . An act 
utilitarian simply skips . . . rules and justifies 
Beauchamp and Childress, 30-36, Garner and Rosen, 55-82, 
J. J. C. Smart, "Extreme and Restricted Utilitarianism," 
chap. in Contemporary Utilitarianism (Garden City, NY: 
Doubleday Co. Inc., 1968), 99-115. This is a revised version 
of an article originally published in The Philosophical 
Quarterly 6(1956) 344-54. See also the bibliography in J. J. 
C. Smart and Bernard Williams, Utilitarianism For and Against 
(Cambridge: University Press, 1973), 151-55. 
7Ibid., 207. 
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actions by appealing directly to the principle of 
utility. 
The act utilitarian considers the consequences of 
each particular act . . . . The act utilitarian asks, 
"What good and evil consequences will result from this 
action in this circumstance?"8  
Garner and Rosen write that, "The act utilitarian 
holds that the rightness or wrongness of an action is solely 
a function of its consequences."9  
John Klotz emphasizes that, 
Under act utilitarianism the rule level is skipped and 
the utilitarian principle leads directly to judgments 
regarding individual actions. The act utilitarian asks, 
for example, "What good or evil consequences will result 
from this action under these circumstances?"10  
For the purpose of illustrating the method of act 
teleology this dissertation will use Jeremy Bentham, 
Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation 
(1789) .11  Bentham discusses the act teleological method of 
8Beauchamp and Childress, 25-26. 
9Garner and Rosen, 55. 
'°John Klotz, Men, Medicine and Their Maker 
(University City, MO: Torelion Productions, 1991), 12. 
11Jeremy Bentham (1748-1832) was born in London. As a 
preschooler he studied both Latin and Greek. His father 
collected scraps of Latin which Jeremy wrote when he was 5. 
By the time he was 7 he could play several of Handel's 
sonatas on a miniature violin. He entered Queens College at 
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his entire system in the first five chapters. 
In his opening paragraph he explains that all actions 
and decisions, including those of morality, are to be deter-
mined solely on the basis of whether they produce pain or 
pleasure. 
Nature has placed mankind under the governance of two 
sovereign masters, pain and pleasure. It is for them 
alone to point out what we ought to do, as well as to 
determine . . . the standard of right and wrong. . . . 
They govern us in all we do, in all we say, in all we 
think. . . . The principle of utility recognizes this 
subjection.12  
Bentham's principle of utility seeks to organize all 
human action in such a way as to maximize pleasure and mini-
mize pain. 
By the principle of utility is meant that principle 
which approves or disapproves of every action whatso-
ever, according to the tendency which it appears to have 
to augment or diminish the happiness of the party whose 
interest is in question.13  
Oxford when he was 12. At 16 he received his Bachelor's 
degree. At 19 he was called to the bar. For more 
information on the life of Jeremy Bentham the reader may wish 
to see, Charles Everett, Jeremy Bentham (London: Wiedenfeld 
and Nicolson, 1966) or Charles M. Atkinson, Jeremy Bentham 
His Life and Work (Westport, Connecticut: Greenwood Press, 
1970). 
12The Works of Jeremy Bentham, ed. John Bowring, 11 
vols. (New York: Russell & Russell, 1962), 1:1. 
13Ibid., 1. The great stress on "every action 
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Bentham does not attempt to prove this principle of 
utility. It is an unprovable first principle. "That which 
is used to prove everything else, cannot itself be proved: a 
chain of proofs must have their commencement somewhere."14  
Pleasure, happiness, good, benefit or advantage are 
all synonyms for Bentham which refer to the end that is to be 
sought; whereas, evil, pain and mischief are all synonyms for 
the end that is to be avoided.15  
All our actions ought to be teleologically oriented 
toward the end of producing pleasure and avoiding pain. 
Bentham insists that this is the only sense in which the 
terms ought, right and wrong can be properly used. These 
moral terms of value have meaning only when they are used 
within a teleological context. "When thus interpreted the 
words 'ought,' and 'right' and 'wrong' and others of that 
stamp [for example, duty and obligation], have meaning, when 
otherwise, they have none.16  
Bentham explains that on the surface the principle of 
whatsoever" is intended to include both the private actions 






asceticism seems to oppose utility. For the ascetics do not 
seek that which augments their pleasure. Quite to the 
contrary, they insist on seeking those interests and activi-
ties that enhance their pain. However, they do not disprove 
the principle of utility by their actions, because their 
conflict with utilitarianism is only superficial. For the 
ascetics pain is their pleasure. They seek out their 
pleasure by means of pain. Thus, "Even this [asceticism] we 
see is at bottom but the principle of utility misapplied."17  
The other theory that occasionally conflicts with the 
principle of utility is "sympathy and antipathy." "By the 
principle of sympathy and antipathy, I mean that principle 
which approves or disapproves of certain actions, . . . 
merely because a man finds himself disposed to approve or 
disapprove of them."18 With the principle of sympathy and 
antipathy a judge would pronounce a punishment upon a 
criminal the severity of which would be in direct proportion 
to how much the judge disliked the crime. "If you hate much 
punish much: if you hate little punish little: punish as you 





Bentham explains that the problem with this principle 
of sympathy and antipathy is that there are so many different 
reasons (many of which are conflicting) why a person would 
hate a certain act. One might claim to have a "moral sense" 
that tells him what is wrong. Another might make the same 
claim using "common sense." Another might use "rational 
understanding." Still another might use an "eternal and 
immutable Rule of Right."20  
Many people also refer to the "Law of Nature" with 
such phrases as "Right Reason," "Natural Justice," "Natural 
Equity," or "Good Order."21 Yet, anyone can call anything 
they dislike "unnatural." Since they find a certain act 
repugnant, they believe it is against nature, consequently no 
one else should practice it.22 "The mischief common to all 
these ways of thinking and arguing . . . is their serving as 
a cloke, and pretense, . . . to despotism . . • "23 These 
arguments are used by people who simply want to get their own 
way. 
20Ibid., 8 fn.1 -4. 
21Ibid., 9 fn.7. 
22Ibid., 9 fn.9. 
23Ibid. "The principle of sympathy and antipathy is 
most apt to err on the side of severity." Bentham, 10. 
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For Bentham it is no different with the use of a 
theological principle. By a theological principle Bentham 
means a "principle which professes to recur for the standard 
of right and wrong to the will of God."24 Yet, the will of 
God cannot be determined by Scripture, according to Bentham. 
For Scripture does not help us to organize our political 
administration, 
and even before it can be applied to the details of 
private conduct, it is universally allowed, by the most 
eminent divines of all persuasions, to stand in need of 
pretty ample interpretations; else to what use are the 
works of those divines?25  
According to Bentham, when the theological principle 
uses the "will of God" for an argument it cannot be referring 
to God's revealed will in the Scriptures, which can be inter-
preted in so many diverse ways; it is rather referring to a 
presumptive will, "that is to say, that which is presumed to 
be his will on account of the conformity of its dictates to 
those of some other principle."26 This "other principle," 
then, is surely to be one of the previous three principles 





or the law of nature). 
According to Bentham, God's will cannot establish what 
is right and wrong even though the right is in conformity 
with God's will. One must first determine what is right (by 
means of the principle of utility); only then does one know 
God's will.27  
The act teleological thrust of Bentham's utilitarian-
ism is clearly evident not only in his insistence to deter-
mine all moral decisions in view of their consequences, but 
also in his complete rejection of any deontological concept 
of duty. Thus, he concludes his second chapter by writing, 
"The only right ground of action that can possibly subsist 
is, after all the consideration of utility . . . . The 
principle of utility neither requires nor admits of any other 
regulator than itself."28  
Bentham admitted that it is often important to repress 
some desires; however, this is only done in order to gratify 
those desires that are more important. The more important 
desires are determined by the amount of pleasure caused and 




number of people who benefit from the fulfillment of a 
certain desire. Bentham developed an elaborate system 
cataloging the various pains and pleasures. For the main 
emphasis, in the principle of utility, is to choose the 
action that leads to the greatest happiness for the greatest 
number of people. 
In order to determine which action would produce the 
greatest good for the greatest number Bentham developed a 
complex method of hedonic calculus. In chapter four of the 
Principles of Morals and Legislation Bentham explains the 
seven different categories with which the moral agent can 
measure the quality of both pain and pleasure. They are: 
1.intensity 2.duration 3.certainty or uncertainty 
4.propinquity or remoteness 5.fecundity (that is, the likeli-
hood that more of the same will follow) 6.purity (that is, 
the likelihood that it will not be followed by the opposite 
sensation) 7.extent (that is, the number of persons 
affected).29  
For a crude example suppose a Benthamite is trying to 
decide how to spend his recreational time on a particular 
afternoon. On the one hand, he may take his little boy 
fishing. The adult Benthamite despises this particular sport 
29Ibid., 16. 
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and estimates that the boredom he experiences spending such 
an afternoon at the lake is equivalent to 4 units of pain (or 
-4 units of pleasure). However, his son greatly enjoys 
fishing with his father at the lake. For the son such an 
afternoon would create at least 9 units of pleasure. Thus 
when the 4 units of pain are subtracted from the 9 units of 
pleasure, the Benthamite discovers that an afternoon of 
fishing with his son would create a total balance of 5 units 
of pleasure. 
On the other hand, the Benthamite may spend the after-
noon alone watching television. Such an afternoon, while 
relaxing, still would not thrill the Benthamite as much as 
fishing would thrill his son. Yet 4 units of pleasure could 
be expected. However, his son would be greatly disappointed. 
Such a disappointment could produce 9 units of pain (or -9 
units of pleasure). Thus when the 9 units of pain are 
subtracted from the 4 units of pleasure, the Benthamite 
discovers that an afternoon alone watching television would 
create a total balance of -5 units of pleasure (or 5 units of 
pain). 
Thus the choice is between fishing that produces 5 
units of pleasure or watching television that produces 5 
units of pain. Since the first option will produce more 
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pleasure, it will be preferred as the moral option by the 
Benthamite.30  
In Bentham's method any use of rules is conspicuous by 
its absence.31 Bentham's hedonic calculus precludes the use 
of rules as a means by which the end is to be achieved. Karl 
Britton writes, 
Bentham is untiring and unsparing in his denunciation of 
all codes or rules of morality. Their chief use, he 
held, was to bind men in obedience to their masters, 
whether lay or clerical/ some rules could perhaps be 
interpreted as extremely vague and confused expressions 
of the principle of utility; more often they expressed 
nothing more than sentiments, superstitions, and inter-
ests of different groups. As moral principles they were 
useless and inapplicable.32  
Thus Bentham's form of utilitarianism, with his hedonic 
30This fictitious example simplisticly illustrates the 
principles which Bentham explicates in An Introduction to the 
Principles of Morals and Legislation chapter 4 section 5. 
Ibid., 16. For a more thorough analysis of Bentham's hedonic 
calculus, and for a more complex example, the reader may wish 
to see Everett, 47-57. 
31"There is a sense in which the act utilitarian 
advises us to follow a rule, but this rule ('Do all and only 
those actions which lead to the greatest good for the 
greatest number') is not one which is justified by appeal to 
the principle of utility, for it is the principle of 
utility." Richard Garner and Bernard Rosen, 70. 
32Kar1 Britton, John Stuart Mill (New York: Dover 
Publications, 1969), 59-60. 
73 
calculus, serves as an excellent example of pure act teleol-
ogy. 
Modified Act Teleology 
Modified act teleology is a middle category which lies 
half way between the act teleologist (who have no use for 
rules) and the rule teleologists (who insist on the use of 
rules). Modified act teleologists accept a moderate use of 
rules as summary rules, rules of thumb, or prima facie rules. 
Often times the teleologists are only classified into 
two extreme categories: the act teleologists and the rule 
teleologists. When this is done the middle position of 
modified act teleology is forced onto one side or the other. 
For this reason the definition of act teleology is frequently 
broadened to include those teleologists who accept a modified 
use of rules.33 Other authors who classify the teleologists 
into only two parts find it more convenient to broaden the 
definition of rule teleology in order to incorporate the 
middle category of modified act teleologists.34  
33This type of arrangement may be noted in Beauchamp 
and Childress, 25-32, Garner and Rosen, 55-82, J. J. C. Smart 
"Extreme and Restricted Utilitarianism." 
34This type of arrangement may be noted in David 
Lyons, Forms and Limits of Utilitarianism (Oxford: Clarendon 
Press, 1965), 119. "In order to discuss the various types of 
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This dissertation will follow the less common, yet 
more discriminating threefold classification as it has been 
developed by William Frankena. He specifically distinguishes 
this middle category of modified act teleology (which he 
illustrates with modified act utilitarianism) from both pure 
act teleology and rule teleology. Modified act teleology 
"would allow us to formulate rules as guides . . . . They 
would be rules which say . . . it is always or generally for 
the greatest good to act in a certain way in such a 
situation."35  
Although John Rawls favors the method of rule 
teleology (which he calls the practice use of rules) he 
offers a thorough summary of modified act teleology (which he 
calls the summary use of rules) in his article "Two Concepts 
of Rules."36 Rawls explains that the modified act teleolo-
gists use rules that are derived from the principle of 
utility. "I have called this conception the summary view 
because rules are pictured as summaries of past decisions 
rule-utilitarianism . . . . I shall distinguish, . . . 
between theoretical (or theory-dependent) rules and merely 
cautionary rules (rules of thumb)." 
35Frankena, "Love and Principle," 208. 
36John Rawls, "Two Concepts of Rules," Philosophical 
Quarterly 64 (January 1955): 3-32. 
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arrived at by the direct application of the utilitarian 
principle to particular cases."37  
For the modified act teleologist consistent utilitar-
ian decisions on a given problem must precede the formulation 
of a rule. 
The decisions made on particular cases are logically 
prior to rules . . . . We are pictured as recognizing 
particular cases prior to there being a rule which 
covers them, for it is only if we meet with a number of 
cases of a certain sort that we can formulate a rule.38  
Such rules are not absolutely necessary in order to 
achieve the desired moral end. They are merely helpful 
guides or rules of thumb (prima facie rules or summary rules) 
which may be ignored if the moral agent would determine to 
resort to act teleology and apply the principle of utility 
directly to the specific act in question. 
The moral agent who is a modified act teleologist 
would ignore a rule if he determined that the prior decisions 
which form the basis of the rule were incorrect. 
Each person is in principle always entitled to recon-
sider the correctness of a rule and to question whether 
or not it is proper to follow it in a given case. As 
rules are guides and aids, one may ask whether in past 




ing the utilitarian principle to get the rule in ques- 
tion.39  
One of the most prominent proponents of modified act 
teleology was Henery Sidgwick, The Methods of Ethics (1874) 
who maintained that the rules used by the utilitarians can be 
perceived through intuition, as is the general principle of 
utilitarianism itself. Another very prominent proponent of 
modified act teleology is J. J. C. Smart, "An Outline of a 
System of Utilitarian Ethics," (1973), whose main purpose is 
"to present Sidgwick in a modern dress."40 For the purpose 
of illustrating modified act teleology various portions of 
Smart's work will be examined. 
Smart states his version of the teleological formula 
when he writes, "The only reason for performing an action A 
rather than an alternative action B is that doing A will make 
mankind (or, perhaps all sentient beings) happier than will 
doing B."41  
39Ibid., 23. 
40J. J. C. Smart, "An Outline of a System of 
Utilitarian Ethics," chap. in Utilitarianism For and Against 
(Cambridge: University Press, 1973), 7. Smart's method of 
updating Sidgwick is basically to replace Sidgwick's 




Smart admits that one of the main problems with 
utilitarianism is the impossibility to accurately foreknow 
all the consequences of one's actions. He asks his readers, 
"Can we just say: 'Envisage two total situations and tell me 
which you prefer' v,42 Such a simplistic question does not do 
justice to the complexities that can arise from a moral 
action. Smart writes, "We cannot say with certainty what 
would be the various total situations which could result from 
our actions. Worse still, we cannot even assign rough 
probabilities to the total situations as a whole."43  
This does not mean that the method of utilitarianism 
is to be discarded. Even though at the present we cannot 
assign probabilities to future situations such a method must 
be worked out in the future. "We need a method of assigning 
numbers to objective, not subjective probabilities . . . . I 
do not know how to do this . . . [but] the situation may not 
be hopeless."44  
What provides hope for Smart is the fact that there do 





made. Smart gives the example of a family who is planning to 
move. Such a family may weigh the advantages and disadvan-
tages in living in each location. In that way they are 
assigning rough probabilities to future events. 
As we are able to take account of probabilities in our 
ordinary prudential decisions it seems idle to say that 
in the field of ethics . . . we cannot do the same 
thing, but must rely on some dogmatic morality, in short 
on some set of rules or rigid criteria.45  
For Smart the rational utilitarian will want to 
determine the moral option based on that which has the 
highest probability to maximize happiness. Such a rational 
utilitarian may still wish to use rules for two different 
reasons. In the first place the rational utilitarian may not 
have the time to consider the future ramifications of a 
particular act. A rule can serve as a convenient shorthand 
method to help make a quick decision. 
We may choose to habituate ourselves to behave in accor-
dance with certain rules, such as to keep promises, in 
the belief that behaving in accordance with these rules 
is generally optimific, and in the knowledge that we 
most often just do not have time to work out individual 
pros and cons . . . . The [modified] act utilitarian 
will, however, regard these rules as mere rules of 
thumb, and will use them only as rough guides. Normally 
he will act in accordance with them when he has no time 
45Ibid., 40. 
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for considering probable consequences.46  
The second reason why the rational utilitarian would 
want to use rules is to avoid the possibility of being 
influenced by personal bias. "He may suspect that on some 
occasions personal bias may prevent him from reasoning in a 
correct utilitarian fashion."47 During such an occasion the 
moral agent could depend upon the rule in an attempt to avoid 
making a prejudicial decision. 
For the modified act teleologist one is justified in 
breaking any such rule of thumb if it was determined that 
breaking the rule was necessary in order to achieve more 
good. 
If the goodness of the consequences to breaking a rule 
is in toto [that is, short term and long term] greater 
than the goodness of the consequences of keeping it, 
then we must break the rule, irrespective of whether the 
goodness of the consequences of everybody's obeying the 
46Ibid., 42. Smart continues by adding, "There is no 
inconsistency whatever in . . . [a modified] act-
utilitarian's schooling himself to act, in normal 
circumstances, habitually and in accordance with stereotyped 
rules . . . . He knows that we would go mad if we went in 
detail into the probable consequences of keeping or not 
keeping every trivial promise: we will do most good and 
reserve our mental energies for more important matters if we 
simply habituate ourselves to keep promises in all normal 
situations." Ibid., 43. 
47Ibid., 43. 
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rule is or is not greater than the consequences of 
everybody's breaking it. To put it shortly, rules do 
not matter, save per accidens as rules of thumb and as 
de facto social institutions with which the utilitarian 
has to reckon when estimating consequences.48  
Smart's use of rules aptly illustrates the modified 
act teleological use of rules as guides, rules of thumb, or 
as prima facie rules. 
Rule Teleology  
Unlike pure act teleology which has no use for rules, 
and modified act teleology which uses rules only as rules of 
thumb, rule teleology insists on determining the moral option 
by using a set of rules. Using rule utilitarianism as an 
example Frankena explains. 
Pure rule-utilitarianism holds that one is to tell what 
is one's right or duty in a particular situation by 
appeal to some set of rules like, "Keep promises," "Tell 
the Truth," etc., and not by appeal to the principle of 
utility. In this respect it is like extreme deontologi-
cal theories. But, as against all deontological theo-
ries, it holds that we are to determine what rules 
should govern our lives by an appeal to the principle of 
utility, i.e. by looking to see what rules are such that 
always acting on them is for the greatest general good. 
That is, we are never to ask what act will have the best 
consequences in a particular situation, but either what 
the rules call for or what rule it is most useful always 
to follow in that kind of a situation."49  
48Smart, "Extreme and Restricted Utilitarianism," 100. 
49Frankena, "Love and Principle," 207-8. Frankena 
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Richard Brandt notes, 
"Rule-utilitarianism," in contrast [to act utilitarian-
ism] applies to views according to which the rightness 
of an act is not fixed by its relative utility, but by 
conformity with general rules or principles; the utili-
tarian feature of these theories consists in the fact 
that the correctness of these rules or principles is 
fixed in some way by the utility of their general accep-
tance.[emphasis mine]" 
John Klotz explains, 
Under a rule utilitarianism individual actions stem from 
moral rules which in turn have been derived from utili-
tarian principles . . . . The rule utilitarian asks 
first "What good or evil consequences will result from 
this sort of action in general under these sorts of 
circumstances . . . . Rules utilitarians believe that 
rules themselves have a central position in the making 
of moral judgments and cannot be disregarded because of 
the exigencies of a particular situation.51  
There are various types of rule teleology. Each type 
is determined by "how it conceives of the rules that are so 
goes so far as to add, "It may even be obligatory to follow 
the rule in a particular situation even if following it is 
known not to have the best possible consequences in this 
particular case." Ibid. Paul Ramsey disagrees that this 
last comment should be an essential part of the definition of 
rule teleology, see Paul Ramsey, Deeds and Rules in Christian 
Ethics (New York: Scribner, 1967), 111. 
50Richard Brandt, "Toward a Credible Form of 
Utilitarianism," chap. in Morality and the Language of 
Conduct (Detroit: Wayne State University Press, 1963), 109. 
51Klotz, 12-13. 
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important to its scheme."52  
The first type of rule teleology is actual rule 
utilitarianism (ARU). 
It [actual rule utilitarianism] holds that an action is 
right if it conforms to the accepted or prevailing moral 
rules and wrong if it does not, assuming that these 
rules are those whose acceptance and observance is 
conducive to the greatest general good.53  
A second type of rule teleology is primitive rule 
utilitarianism (PRU). For primitive rule utilitarianism "an 
act is right if and only if, it conforms to a set of rules 
conformity to which in the case in question would maximize 
utility."54  
A third type of rule teleology is ideal rule utilitar-
ianism (IRU). David Lyons writes that in ideal rule utili-
tarianism, "An act is right if, and only if, it conforms to a 
set of rules general acceptance of which would maximize 
utility [emphasis mine]."55 In this case the rules are 
important because of the utilitarian effect of their general 
52Frankena, Ethics 2nd edition (Englewood Cliff, NJ: 
Prentice-Hall, Inc, 1973), 40. 
53Ibid. 
54David Lyons, Forms and Limits of Utilitarianism 
(Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1965), 139. 
55Ibid., 140. (See also Frankena, Ethics, 40.) 
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acceptance. 
A fourth type of rule teleology is specious rule 
utilitarianism (SRU). In specious rule utilitarianism "an 
act is right if, and only if, it conforms to a set of rules 
general conformity to which would maximize utility."56 In 
this case the rules are important because of the utilitarian 
effect that is generally produced when the moral agent 
conforms to them. This type of conformity in SRU is more 
than the mere acceptance in IRU. IRU emphasizes the 
utilitarian effect of merely accepting a particular rule 
(that is, in believing that a rule is good); whereas SRU 
emphasizes the utilitarian effect of generally acting on a 
rule and obeying it.57  
Actual rule utilitarianism (ARU) and primitive rule 
utilitarianism (PRU) are not necessarily mutually exclusive. 
Elements of both can be found in the following two examples 
of John Austin and John Mill. 
It will also be shown with these two examples how the 
necessary rules in rule teleology offer an opening through 
which the rules of rule deontology can be used along with the 
56Ibid., 137. (See also Frankena, Ethics, 40.) 
57See also David Lyons, 115-23. 
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principle of utility. Both Mill and Austin maintain that one 
may be a utilitarian and still believe that moral laws are 
given by God. In this way it will be shown that the two 
methods of moral reasoning, deontology and teleology, need 
not be kept separate, nor when they are brought together do 
they necessarily create confusion. Rather, they can be 
united into one comprehensive system within which each method 
has a well defined, predetermined, and distinctive function. 
The first example is from John Stuart Mill.58  
In his book Utilitarianism (1861) Mill completely 
accepts Bentham's definition of utility and uses it as the 
foundation for his own method of moral reasoning. 
"Utility" or "the greatest happiness principle" holds 
that actions are right in proportion as they tend to 
promote happiness; wrong as they tend to produce the 
58John Stuart Mill (1806-1873) was born in London. He 
was privately educated by his father, James Mill, until 1826. 
"His father began teaching him Greek at an age when most 
children are still learning to lisp their native tongue. At 
eight, Latin and arithmetic were begun; logic at twelve, and 
political economy at thirteen . . . . Until his fourteenth 
year John Mill was kept from all contact with the outside 
world, except for his father's own friends." Karl Britton, 
John Stuart Mill (New York: Dover Publications, 1969), 11-12. 
For more information on the life of John Stuart Mill the 
reader may wish to see Michael St. John Packe, The Life of 
John Stuart Mill (New York: Capricorn Books, 1954) or John 
Stuart Mill, Autobiography (London: Oxford University Press, 
1952). 
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reverse of happiness. By happiness is intended pleasure 
and the absence of pain; by unhappiness, pain and the 
privation of pleasure.59  
Mill maintains that the ideal goal of utilitarianism 
is summarized by Jesus in the golden rule. 
In the golden rule of Jesus of Nazareth, we read the 
complete spirit of the ethics of utility. "To do as you 
would be done by," and "to love your neighbor as 
yourself," constitutes the ideal perfection of 
utilitarian morality. 60 
For Mill the goal expressed in utilitarianism is the same 
goal Jesus teaches in the golden rule. 
Mill further emphasizes that a utilitarian may hold 
that God has also revealed rules or specific moral absolutes 
which also lend themselves to explaining the principle of 
utility. 
A utilitarian who believes in the perfect goodness and 
wisdom of God necessarily believes that whatever God has 
thought fit to reveal on the subject of morals [rules, 
specific moral absolutes, etc.] must fulfill the 
requirements of utility in a supreme degree . . . . He 
can use it [that is, divine revelation] as the testimony 
of God to the usefulness or hurtfulness of any given 
course of action.61  
59John Stuart Mill, Utilitarianism (Indianapolis, IN: 




Although Mill mentions this as a possibility, he does 
not put much stock in it himself.62 Yet he mentions it here 
to show that such a belief would not necessarily be contrary 
to utilitarianism. 
Mill explains that the principle of utility is only 
the first principle in ethics; whereas, the moral rules of 
common sense that embody the wisdom of the ages are the 
secondary principles of morality. These secondary princi-
ples, not only summarize past wisdom gained from moral 
reflection and experience, but they also serve as the neces-
sary means by which the first principle of utility is 
achieved. Mill writes, 
Again, defenders of utility often find themselves called 
upon to reply to such objections as this — that there is 
not time, previous to action, for calculating and weigh-
ing the effects of any line of conduct on the general 
happiness [this is no doubt a reference to the frequent 
criticism directed toward Bentham's complex hedonic 
calculus] . . . People talk as if commencement of this 
course of experience had hitherto been put off, and as 
if, at the moment when some man feels tempted to meddle 
with the property or life of another he had to begin 
considering for the first time whether murder or theft 
are injurious to human happiness . . . mankind must by 
62He continues by writing that, "Christian revelation 
was intended . . . to inform the hearts and minds of mankind 
with a spirit which should enable them to find for themselves 
what is right . . . . Rather than to tell them, except in a 
very general way, what it is." Ibid. 
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this time have acquired positive beliefs as to the 
effect of some actions on their happiness; and the 
beliefs which have thus come down are the rules of 
morality for the multitude, and for the philosopher 
until he has succeeded in finding better . . . . It is a 
strange notion that the acknowledgment of a first prin-
ciple is inconsistent with the admission of secondary 
ones. To inform a traveler respecting the place of his 
ultimate destination [that is, the primary principle of 
utility] is not to forbid the use of landmarks and 
direction-posts on the way [that is, the secondary 
principle of specific moral rules]. The proposition 
that happiness is the end and aim of morality does not 
mean that no road ought to be laid down to that goal.63  
For Mill, these secondary rules are more than mere 
prima facie rules. Even though the content of such rules may 
be subject to change and revision, such rules are still 
necessary as the means by which the end is achieved. Such 
secondary rules are not only "landmarks and direction-posts" 
but they are the very "road" itself.64 Even when a new 
"road" is paved and moral rules are revised or improved, the 
same principle remains at work. The secondary rules are the 
necessary means by which the primary goal is achieved. 
Mill claims that this is not peculiar to the relation-
ship between rules and utility. Any moral philosophy that 
rests on a fundamental principle will require secondary prin- 




Whatever we adopt as the fundamental principle of moral-
ity, we require subordinate principles to apply it by; 
the impossibility of doing without them, being common to 
all systems, can afford no argument against any one in 
particular; but gravely to argue as if no such secondary 
principles could be had . . . is as high a pitch, I 
think, as absurdity has ever reached in philosophical 
controversy.65  
For Mill the rules that comprise the secondary princi-
ples are so important that most of the time they alone would 
be used in determining the moral option. The primary princi-
ple of utility is far too abstract to be directly applied in 
a practical way in most situations. The main use of the 
primary principle of utility is to serve as a judge to 
arbitrate in the conflict of a moral dilemma, that is, when 
two secondary rules conflict with one another. Mill 
explains, 
If utility is the ultimate source of moral obligations, 
utility may be invoked to decide between them when their 
demands are incompatible. Though the application of the 
standard may be difficult, it is better than none at 
all; while in other systems, the moral laws all claiming 
independent authority, there is no common umpire enti-
tled to interfere between them; their claims to prece-
dence one over another rest on little better than 
sophistry . . . . We must remember that only in these 
cases of conflict between secondary principles is it 
requisite that first principles should be appealed to 
65Ibid., 32. 
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[emphasis mine]. There is no case of moral obligation 
in which some secondary principle is not involved; and 
if only one, there can seldom be any real doubt which 
one it is, in the mind of any person by whom the princi- 
ple itself is recognized." 
It has been shown that for Mill rules are more than 
mere guidelines or rules of thumb used for convenience and 
discarded at will. Rules are the necessary means by which 
the goal of utility is accomplished. The only time the moral 
agent applies the primary principle of utility directly is in 
the rare occasions when two secondary rules conflict. For 
Mill there is never a time when at least one secondary rule 
is not involved.67 In this way John Mill shows himself to be 
a rule utilitarian who illustrates the moral method of rule 
teleology. 68 
A second rule utilitarian who illustrates the use of 
rule teleology is John Austin." He provides a unique 
"Ibid., 33. 
67Ibid. 
68For more information concerning John Mill as a rule 
utilitarian see J. 0. Urmson, "The Interpretation of the 
Moral Philosophy of J. S. Mill," The Philosophical Quarterly 
3(1953): 33-39. 
"John Austin (1790-1859) was born in London. Austin 
became a member of the bar in 1818. For more biographical 
information on John Austin the reader may wish to see Wilfrid 
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element to the method of rule teleology with his strong 
emphasis on divine law. Wilfrid E. Rumble writes, 
One of the most notable elements of Austin's utilitari-
anism is the conspicuous role of Divine Law . . . . 
Austin's use of Divine law also clearly differentiates 
his ethical theories from either Bentham's or J. S. 
Mill's. In their interpretations the principle of util-
ity is logically, and explicitly, independent of the law 
of God. The relationship between the two concepts is 
quite different if the words of John Austin are taken at 
their face value. 
Divine law is the stated foundation of his ethical 
system.70  
With his use of divine law John Austin shows that the 
deontological emphasis of Scripture need not conflict with 
teleology; rather, they both fit together to form a complete 
method of moral analysis. John Austin does not confuse or 
mix together deontology with teleology, but he works each one 
in conjunction with the other, giving each one a specific 
role. 
Austin begins his discussion by distinguishing between 
two different kinds of divine law. The revealed laws of God 
are those laws which are specific commands that God has given 
to mankind through the use of language. These laws revealed 
E. Rumble, The Thought of John Austin (London: The Athlone 
Press, 1985), 1-59. 
70Ibid., 65. 
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in language either come directly from God himself or from 
servants whom he has chosen. Austin writes, 
With regard to the laws which God is pleased to 
reveal . . . . They are express commands: portions of 
the word of God: commands signified to men through the 
medium of human language; and uttered by God directly, 
or by servants whom he sends to announce them.71  
The second category of divine law is the unrevealed 
law. These are the laws which are not revealed in human 
language but are available to mankind through nature. These 
commonly have been referred to as natural law. 
Such of the laws of God as are unrevealed are not unfre-
quently denoted by the following names or phrases: "the 
law of nature;" "natural law;" "the law manifested to 
man by the light of nature or reason;" "the laws, 
precepts, or dictates of natural religion."72  
Austin continues by explaining that unrevealed laws 
are important because they fill up the gap left by the 
revealed law. 
These laws [that is, unrevealed laws of nature] are 
binding upon us (who have access to the truths of 
Revelation), in so far as the revealed law has left our 
duties undetermined. For, though his express declara-
tions are the clearest evidence of his will, we must 
look for many of the duties, which God has imposed upon 
71John Austin, Lectures on Jurisprudence 2 vols 
(London: John Murray, 1885), 1: 104. 
72Ibid. 
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us, to the marks or signs of his pleasure, which are 
styled the light of nature . . . . It was not the 
purpose of Revelation to disclose the whole of those 
duties. Some we could not know, without the help of 
Revelation; and these the revealed law has stated 
distinctly and precisely. The rest we may know, if we 
will, by the light of nature or reason; and these the 
revealed law supposes or assumes. It passes them over 
in silence, or with a brief and incidental notice.73  
Some people, like Joseph Butler, believe they have 
access to this unrevealed revelation through their own innate 
common sense or conscience. According to Austin these people 
are deluding themselves. If man had a conscience that 
contained some sort of "innate practical principles" of the 
unrevealed law there would be no uncertainty about how one 
should act. Yet it is known from experience that there are 
times when the moral agent is confused. An unwed, pregnant 
teenager may be confused as to whether or not she should have 
an abortion. The physician and relatives of an elderly 
terminally ill patient may be confused as to whether or not 
they should initiate extraordinary means of treatment in 
order to prolong the patient's life. Such confusion illus-
trates the lack of any natural moral conscience that could 
determine the moral option by way of direct access to the 
principles of unrevealed law.74 Concerning those who believe 
731bid. 
74WIlfrid E. Rumble, The Thought of John Austin, 66. 
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they have a natural moral conscience Austin writes, "Their 
assumption is groundless. They are battering . . . a 
misconception of their own whilst they fancy they are hard at 
work demolishing the theory which they hate."75  
Austin believes there is only one way that man has 
access to the unrevealed laws of God in nature. That is 
through the principle of utility. "The benevolence of God, 
with the principle of general utility, is our only index or 
guide to his unrevealed law."76  
Austin explains his view of the principle of utility 
and how it may be used to determine the unrevealed laws of 
God. 
God designs the happiness of all his sentient creatures. 
Some human actions forward that benevolent purpose, or 
their tendencies are beneficent or useful. Other 
actions are adverse to that purpose, or their tendencies 
are mischievous or pernicious. The former, as promot-
ing his purpose, God has enjoined. The latter, as 
opposed to his purpose, God has forbidden. He has given 
us the faculty of observing; of remembering; of reason-
ing; and, by duly applying those faculties, we may 
collect the tendencies of our actions. Knowing the 
tendencies of our actions, and knowing his benevolent 
purpose, we know his tacit commands.77  
75John Austin, 1: 113. 
76Ibid., 1: 106. 
77Ibid. 
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These "tacit commands" of God's unrevealed law are not 
directed to specific isolated cases. These "tacit commands" 
are general rules that are to be consistently obeyed in every 
applicable situation. Referring to these tacit commands of 
God's unrevealed law Austin writes: 
Most of his commands are general or universal. The 
useful acts which he enjoins, and the pernicious acts 
which he prohibits, he enjoins or prohibits . . . not by 
commands which are particular, or directed to insulated 
cases; but by laws or rules which are general, and 
commonly inflexible.78  
In this way, for Austin, rules are necessary for the 
determination of the moral option. Some rules are revealed 
directly, other rules are made known indirectly by the 
principle of utility, but in either case they are not just 
mere rules of thumb, or helpful summary rules, or prima facie 
rules. All of the moral rules, revealed and unrevealed, 
serve a utilitarian purpose. "The greatest possible happi-
ness of all his sentient creatures is the purpose . . . of 
those laws."79 For this reason they are the necessary means 
by which the moral option is determined. In this way John 
Austin clearly illustrates the method of rule teleology. 80 
78Ibid., 1: 108-109. 
79Ibid., 1: 110. 
80In one place (1:118-122) Austin does mention that 
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For Austin these tacit rules made known to the moral 
agent by means of the principle of utility work together with 
the revealed rules. In a situation where one of God's 
revealed laws directly applies the moral agent has a duty to 
obey God's revealed law. However, if the moral agent 
encounters a situation in which no revealed moral law of God 
can be directly applied, then the (teleological) principle of 
utility must be used to determine God's unrevealed law (that 
is, the general happiness or good for that kind of 
situation). 
John Austin summarizes this method with these words, 
In so far as the laws of God are clearly and indis-
putably revealed, we are bound to guide our conduct by 
the plain meaning of the terms [the deontological 
element]. In so far as they are not revealed, we must 
resort to another guide: namely, the probable effect of 
our conduct on that general happiness or good [the 
teleological element] which is the object of the Divine 
Lawgiver in all his laws and commandments [that is 
there may be extremely rare cases in which the moral agent 
may find it necessary to break a moral rule and apply the 
principle of utility directly to a specific situation if, 
"the evil of observing the rule might surpass the evil of 
breaking it" (John Austin, 1:118). However, he strongly 
maintains that such cases are exceptions to the usual method 
and are extremely rare. He also adds that, "In this 
eccentric or anomalous case, the application of the principle 
of utility would probably be beset with . . . difficulties 
[and] . . . might well perplex and divide the wise, and the 
good, and the brave." Ibid., 1:119. 
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revealed and unrevealed] .81 
For Austin, God is the source of the laws be they 
tacit or revealed. None of these laws are concoctions 
invented by man. The unrevealed laws of God do not have 
their source in the principle of utility. They have their 
source in God (just as the revealed laws do). However, they 
are made known to man through the principle of utility. 
In each of these cases [that is revealed and unrevealed 
rules] the source of our duties is the same; though the 
proofs by which we know them are different. The princi- 
ple of general utility is the index [that is, the means 
by which they are known] to many of these duties; but 
the principle of general utility is not their fountain 
or source. For duties or obligations arise from 
commands and sanctions. And commands, it is manifest, 
proceed not from abstractions, but from living and 
rational beings [emphasis his] .82 
For both Austin and Mill rules are more than mere 
helpful rules of thumb which explain prima facie duties. 
Rules are a necessary and essential part of utilitarianism. 
In this way they have shown themselves to favor a rule teleo- 
logical method of moral reasoning. 
Their insistence on the importance of rules illustrate 




together to form one comprehensive system of moral analysis. 
For Austin and Mill, the rules that are used in rule teleol-
ogy need not be derived from the principle of utility as a 
pure form of rule utilitarianism would insist. However, Mill 
allows and Austin insists that the rules used in rule utili-
tarianism may have their source in God. In this way their 
method of rule teleology is a combination of Actual Rule 
Utilitarianism and Primitive Rule Utilitarianism. Their rule 
teleology is then joined together with rule deontology into 
one coherent hybrid system. In such a comprehensive system 
each method, deontology and teleology, has its own unique 
function and serves in its own peculiar way. 
John Austin has shown that such a comprehensive system 
may include the following four points: 
1. All absolute moral rules are from God (rule deontol-
ogy). 
2. Their purpose is for the greatest good of all his 
sentient creatures (rule teleology). 
3. "In so far as the laws of God are clearly and indis-
putably revealed, we are bound to guide our conduct 
by the plain meaning of the terms [rule 
deontology]."83  
4. "In so far as they are not revealed, we must resort 
another guide: namely, the probable effect of our 
conduct on that general happiness or good which is 
831bid. 
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the object of the Divine Lawgiver in all his laws and 
commandments [rule teleology]. n84 
John Stuart Mill has shown that such a comprehensive 
system may include the following two points. 
1. Individual rules serve as the necessary means, or 
road the moral agent must travel, in order to achieve 
the goal of accomplishing the greatest good (rule 
teleology). 
2. The goal of utility (that is the greatest good for 
the greatest number) can serve as the arbitrator when 
two duties of rule deontology conflict with one 
another and create a moral dilemma (rule teleology). 
In these six points above Mill and Austin not only 
demonstrate the necessary function of rules in rule teleology 
(a function which sets rule teleology apart from pure act 
teleology and modified act teleology) but they also show that 
rule deontology and rule teleology can be brought together 
and incorporated into one comprehensive system of ethical 
analysis with each method performing its own special 
function. 
Characteristics of Rule Teleology 
in the Holy Scriptures  
It is the main purpose of this section of the disser-
tation to examine various elements of rule teleology in the 
Holy Scriptures. However, characteristics of rule teleology 
841bid. 
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from several theologians such as Luther, Chemnitz and Gerhard 
will also be briefly noted, in order to show their teaching 
to be consistent with Scripture. It will be shown that 
Scripture combines its rule teleology with rule deontology in 
a hybrid method analogous to certain elements previously 
noted in John Austin and John Mill. 
In the act teleology of Jeremy Bentham the teleologi-
cal element is the principle of utility (that is, the great-
est happiness for the greatest number). Likewise, a similar 
emphasis on utility as the teleological element in moral 
reasoning was also emphasized in the modified act teleology 
of J. J. C. Smart, as well as in the rule teleology of John 
Mill and John Austin. 
However, as far as ethics is concerned, the teleologi-
cal element in the Scriptures is love (or what some call 
'agapism'). William Frankena writes, "Agapism is the view 
which assigns to the 'law of love' the same position that 
utilitarianism assigns to the principle of utility."85 Just 
as the principle of utility is the final "guiding goal" or 
85William Frankena, "Love and Principle in Christian 
Ethics," 208. This comparison between utilitarianism and 
agapism is mentioned at this point only to emphasize their 
formal (that is, their structural or methodological) simil-
arity. It is not intended to insinuate any similarity with 
regard to content. 
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"directive principle" for utilitarianism, so the principle of 
love (or agapism) is the "guiding goal or directive 
principle" for theological ethics." 
Paul Ramsey asks, 
But what of "salvation"? Is not "salvation" the end for 
which Christians quest? What of rewards in the kingdom 
of heaven? What of man's everlasting and supernatural 
good, the souls life with God in the hereafter; man's 
"chief end," glorifying God and enjoying him forever? 
Is not "salvation" itself a supreme value which 
Christians seek with earnest passion, each first of all 
for himself?87  
To answer his own rhetorical question Ramsey quotes 
from Luther's Bondage of the Will. "Nay, if they should work 
good in order to obtain the Kingdom, they would never obtain 
it, but would be numbered rather with the wicked, who, with 
an evil and mercenary eye, seek the things of self even in 
God."88 Thus Ramsey concludes, 
86Frankena continues explaining agapism by writing 
that agapism "allows no basic ethical principles other than 
or independent of the 'law of love.' It can take any of 
three main forms: pure act-agapism, modified act agapism, and 
pure rule agapism." Ibid., 208. 
87Paul Ramsey, Basic Christian Ethics (New York: 
Charles Scribner's Sons, 1950), 133. 
88Martin Luther, Bondage of the Will, trans. H. Cole 
(London:Atherton, 1931), 192 quoted in Paul Ramsey, Basic 
Christian Ethics, 134. L. W. 33:152. W. A. 18:694. 
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'Salvation' cannot be the goal or aim of Christian 
endeavor, the highest good among all goods upon which 
the Christian draws his sights, . . . for faith is 
effective in love which seeks only the neighbor's good 
(emphasis his).89  
Without using the specific term (love) Luther 
illustrates the use of love as the guiding principle of the 
Christian life in his 1520 treatise "The Freedom of a 
Christian." He writes, 
Therefore he [the Christian] should be guided in all his 
works by this thought and contemplate this one thing 
alone, that he may serve and benefit others in all that 
he does, considering nothing except the need and the 
advantage of his neighbor." 
The entire purpose for the Christian's life here on 
this earth is to help those in need. Luther explains, 
We have no other reason for living on earth than to be 
of help to others. If this were not the case, it would 
be best for God to kill us and let us die as soon as we 
are baptized and have begun to believe.91  
89Ramsey, 135-36. 
"Martin Luther, L. W. 31:365. "Ideo in omnibus 
operibus suis ea debet opinione esse formatus et huc solum 
spectare, ut aliis serviat et prosit in omnibus quaecunque 
fecerit, nihil ante oculos habens nisi necessitatem et 
comoditatem proximi." Tractatus de Libertate Christiana, 
1520. W. A. 7:64. 
91L. W. 30:11 "Das wyr auff erden leben, das 
geschicht nyrgent umb, denn das wyr ander leutten auch 
helffen sollen. Sonst were es das best, das uns Gott so bald 
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Luther compares the ethical life of a Christian to a 
channel or a tube whose end or purpose is merely to pass 
along that which has been poured into it. In his church 
postil based on Titus 3:4-7, Luther writes: 
A man is placed between God and his neighbor as a medium 
(mittell) which receives from above and gives out again 
below, and is like a vessel or tube (gefess oder rhor) 
through which the stream of divine blessings must flow 
without intermission to other people.92  
With the analogy of the tube Luther explains that it 
is the purpose or goal of Christian morality merely to pass 
along to others the love that one has previously received 
from God. Anders Nygren expounds further on Luther's view as 
follows: To Luther, 
divine love employs man as its instrument and organ. 
wurgete und sterben liesse, wenn wyr getaufft weren und 
hetten angefangen zu glewben." Epistel S. Petri gepredigt 
und ausgelegt. Ersts Bearbeitung, 1523. W. A. 12:267. For 
Luther, a good work is good only insofar as it benefits the 
neighbor. See Appendix II: Luther on the Purpose of Good 
Works. 
92This English translation is provided by Phillip S. 
Watson in, Anders Nygren, Agape and Eros, trans. Philip S. 
Watson (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1982), 734-
35. "Der mensch Tzwischen Gott unnd seynem nehisten gesetzt 
wirt alss eyn mittell, das da von oben empfehet und unten 
widder aussgibt unnd gleych eyn gefess oder rhor wirt, durch 
wilchs der brun gotlicher gutter on unterlass fliessen soil 
ynn andere luett." Kirchenpostille 1522, Epistel in der Frue 
Christmess. Tit. 3, 4-7. 10.1.1:100. 
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The Christian is set between God and his neighbor. In 
faith he receives God's love, in love he passes it on to 
his neighbor. Christian love is, so to speak the exten-
sion of God's love . . . . The love which he can give is 
only that which he has received from God. Christian 
love is through and through a Divine work . . . . All 
that a Christian possesses he has received from God, 
from the Divine love; and all that he possesses he 
passes on in love to his neighbor. He has nothing of 
his own to give. He is merely the tube, the channel 
through which God's love flows.93  
In this way Luther is emphasizing that it is the goal, 
purpose (or TiXfos.) of Christian morality to share God's love 
with others. Luther especially emphasized this, when, in his 
sermon on Luke 14:1-11 he explained that all of the individ-
ual moral commands (that is, what this dissertation has 
labeled as deontological obligations) are established for the 
sole purpose of serving the principle of love. That is, they 
93Anders Nygren, Agape and Eros, trans. Philip S. 
Watson (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1982), 734-
35. Luther also stresses that in filling this function, as a 
channel that passes along God's love to others, Christians 
themselves become, in a sense, 'Christs' to one another. In 
his 1520 treatise "The Freedom of a Christian," Luther 
writes, "Hence, as our heavenly Father has in Christ freely 
come to our aid, we also ought freely to help our neighbor 
through our body and its works, and each one should become as 
it were a Christ to the other that we may be Christs to one 
another . . . . Surely we are named after Christ, not because 
he is absent from us, but because he dwells in us, that is, 
because we believe in him and are Christs one to another and 
do to our neighbors as Christ does to us." L. W. 31:367-68. 
(Wr. A. 7:66). 
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help to guide and direct the Christian toward that goal of 
love. Luther writes, 
All laws, divine or human, bind us only as far as love 
permits. For Christians, love must always make the 
final decision in the interpretation of all laws . . . 
It is even a principle of canon law that if any law 
runs counter to love, it should be set aside as soon as 
possible. This, in a word, is stated both of divine and 
human commandments. The reason for this is that all 
laws have been enacted for the sole purpose of setting 
up the principle of love as Paul also reminds us in 
Romans when he says . . . . "Love is the fulfillment of 
the Law" (Romans 13:8,10) . . . . 
Therefore, since all laws should help to establish 
the principle of love, they must cease immediately that 
they run counter to love.94  
Here Luther illustrates that this teleological 
94This English translation is taken from, Luther For 
the Busy Man Edited and translated by P. D. Pahl. (Adelaide, 
Australia: Lutheran Publishing House, 1974), 338. "Alle 
Gesetze, gottliche und menschliche, nicht weiter binden, denn 
die Liebe geht. Die Liebe soll sein eine Auslegung aller 
Gesetze . . . . Wie denn in des Pabstes Buch auch steht: Wenn 
ein Gesetz wider die Liebe laufen will, so soll es bald 
aufhoren. Und das ist kurzum von glittlichen und menschlichen 
Geboten gesagt. Ursache, denn alle Gesetze sind gegeben, 
allein dass sie Liebe aufrichten sollen; wie Paulus Rom. 13, 
8.10. sagt: 'Die Liebe ist des Gesetzes Erfullung' . . . . 
Dass allein die Gesetze allzumal Liebe aufrichten, so mUssen 
sie alsobald aufhoren, wenn sie wider die Liebe laufen 
wollen." Martin Luther, "Am Siebenzehnten Sonntage nach 
Trinitatis (Lk. 14: 1-11)" Luthers Sammtliche Schriften, St. 
Louis Edition 23 vols. (St. Louis: Concordia Publishing 
House, 1882), 11:1677-78. This sermon was preached on the 
Seventeenth Sunday after Trinity 1522. 
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principle of love is to be the final determining factor for 
the Christian's moral decisions. Luther does not eliminate 
the deontological emphasis on the individual commandments. 
Rather he emphasizes that they are important, because their 
sole purpose (ursache) is to set up or establish (aufrichten) 
the way love behaves in specific situations. Any law, divine 
or human, that does not serve this purpose or lead to this 
goal is to be set aside as soon as possible (so soil es bald 
aufhoren). 
Luther stresses this same idea in his 1523 "Prefaces 
to the Old Testament" where he writes, 
Therefore faith and love are always to be mistress of 
the law and to have all laws in their power. For since 
all laws aim at faith and love, none of them can be 
valid, or be a law if it conflicts with faith or 
love . . . . 
Christ also says in Matthew 12:13, that one might 
break the sabbath if an ox had fallen into a 
pit . . . How much more ought one boldly to break all 
kinds of laws when bodily necessity demands it, provided 
that nothing is done against faith and love. Christ 
says that David did this very thing when he ate the holy 
bread, Mark 3 [2:25-26].95  
95L. W. 35:240-41. "Denn syntemal alle gesetz auff 
den glauben and liebe treyben, sol keyns nicht mehr gelten 
noch eyn gesetze seyn, wo es dem glauben odder der liebe will 
zu widder geratten. 
. . . Denn also sagt auch Christus Matth. 12. das man 
den Sabbath brechen mocht, wo eyn ochs ynn eyn gruben 
gefallen war . . . . Wie viel mehr sol man frisch allerley 
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For Luther, love determines how, when, and which 
divine laws are to be applied to a specific situation. In a 
sermon based on Matthew 22 Luther wrote, 
This commandment of love pervades all law and all law 
must be implemented by love. Because love is the rule 
and mistress of all law. All the laws must guide them-
selves according to love.96  
Again Luther writes, 
When the law contradicts love, it ceases and must not be 
a law any longer . . . . For this is why one uses the 
law so that love can be shown. But wherever the keeping 
of the law cannot be done without injury to one's 
neighbor, then God would have us abolish the law and 
take it away.97  
gesetz brechen, wo es leybs nott foddert, so anders dem 
glauben und der liebe nichts zu widder geschicht. Wie 
Christus sagt, das David than hat, da er die heyligen brod 
ass Marci. 3." W. A. (Deutsche Bibel) 8:18. 
%This is my own translation from Luther's sermon for 
September 30, 1526. "Dis gebot liebe ist gezogen durch alle 
gesetz und alle gesetz mussen gehen durch die liebe. Denn 
sie ist ein regel und meisterin aller gesetz; welche sich 
alle mussen lencken nach der liebe." W.A. 20:510. This 
sermon was preached on September 30, 1526. 
97My translation of Luther's Summerpostille, 
Evangelium am 18. Sonntag nach Trinitatis. Matth. 22, 34-
36. "Wenn das gesass wider die liebe tringet, so horet es 
auff unnd soil kain gesass mer sein . . . Denn darumb 
gebraucht man der gesasse, auff das die liebe an inen 
beweiset were, wenn sie aber one verlessung des nechsten 
nicht kiiden gehalten werden, so wil Got, man soil sie 
auffheben und wegnemen." W. A. 10.1.2:403. In his 
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Luther also found that St. Paul emphasizes this 
teleological element of love when he writes, "The goal (Taos.) 
of this command is love (dyciv)" (1 Timothy 1:5). In his 
lectures on Timothy (1527-1528) Luther explains, 
The aim of our charge looks to this goal [in order] that 
you do not doubt, etc. This is the aim of all charges 
and laws-of God as well as of man-in all the 
world . . . . were a Carthusian monk to wear a hair 
shirt for a hundred years, he would not realize his aim, 
he would not know how to please God . . . . If a 
Carthusian keeps his rule, he still is afraid it is not 
enough, that is, it is not the be-all-and-end-all of 
certainty, that the rule does not have an end, that the 
rule does not mean what he is striving for and what he 
stands in, and that the law thus does not come to an end 
and make no further demands. 
What is the "aim of our charge"? Love. This is 
the full thunder clap against a human doctrine that 
cannot reflect love from a pure heart, etc. Paul gives 
a beautiful description: a faith from an unpretending 
heart is the tree, or root. Its fruit is love.98  
Churchpostil for the 4th Sunday after Epiphany, based on 
Romans 13:8-10, Luther discussed, at length, the relationship 
between love and the other numerous commands of the law. See 
Appendix III: Luther on the Relationship Between Love and the 
Law. 
98Luther, L.w. 28:224-25. "Huc spectat 'finis 
praecepti', ut non dubites u. Omnium praeceptorum et legum, 
quae sunt in orbe terrarum quam dei quam hominis. . . . 
Carthusianus si centum annos gestaret cilicium, non novit 
finem, non scit deo placere. . . . Si vero Carthusianus 
servat regulam, tamen timet, ne satis i.e. summa summarum et 
certitudo, das ein end hat praeceptum and das das praeceptum 
meint hoc, quod quaerit, in quo stat, finitur lex ita, quod 
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With this explanation, Luther is stressing that all of the 
individual moral commands (that is, what this study has 
labeled as the rule deontological duty of the Christian moral 
agent) have love as their fruit, that is, goal, or purpose. 
Martin Chemnitz viewed the teleological element of 
this passage in a similar way. In his Loci Theologici 
Chemnitz writes, 
In order that by a sure and certain method we can set up 
a list of the sins as well as the good works included 
under each of the commandments, we must first determine 
the definite and general goal for each of God's 
precepts. Then we must consider of what things this 
goal consists, and what things are joined with it and 
appointed for it. Likewise [to be considered are] the 
contraries, which are in conflict with this purpose or 
impede it . . . . For Paul says of the entire Decalog in 
I Tim. 1:5, "The purpose of the commandment is love 
which comes from a pure heart and a good conscience and 
a sincere faith." He adds, v.7 " . . . teachers of the 
Law who do not draw their lectures from this purpose and 
direct them to this end have turned aside and do not 
understand either what they are talking about or what 
they are affirming."99  
non ultra exigit. Quid est? 'Charitas.' Das sind mol 
tonitrua contra doctrinam humanam quae non potest praestare 
charitatem de corde puro u. Paulus pulchre describit: fides 
non simulata ex corde arbor vel radix est, fructus illius 
charitas." W.A. 26:9-10. 
99Chemnitz, Loci Theologici, trans. J. A. 0. Preus 3 
vols. (St. Louis: Concordia Publishing House, 1989), 2:359. 
"Ut autem expedita + certa methodo institui possit catalogus, 
quae turn peccata tum bona opera sub quolibet praecept compre- 
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John Gerhard affirms that love is the Tehos- of the law 
when he comments on this same passage. 
It is particularly beneficial to consider the end and 
goal of each [commandment], for from the end one can 
easily pass judgment about the middle. The whole goal 
of the Law "is love that issues from a pure heart and a 
good conscience." I Tim. 1:5.100  
Walter Bauer lists three ways in which Taos may be 
used to mean end.101 The first definition is end in the 
hendantur, constituendus est primo certus aliquis + generalis 
finis, cuiusliber praecepti. Deinde consideretur in quibus 
rebus finis iste consistat, quae cum illo sint coniuncta + ad 
eum ordinata: Item contraria quae cum illo fine pugnant, vel 
eum impediunt . . . . Paulus enim de toto Decalogo I Timoth. 
1 v.5.6. +7, iniquit: finis praecepti est charitas, de corde 
puro, + conscientia bona, + fide non ficta. Et addit, 
Doctores Legis, qui non ex hoc fine deducunt suas 
enarrationes, + eo dirigunt, non intelligere nec de quibus 
loquantur, nec de quibus affirment." Martin Chemnitz, Loci 
Theologici, 3 vols. Editi Nomine Haeredum, (Opera Et Studio 
Polycarpi Lesieri: Francoforti ad Moenum excudebat Ioannes 
Spies, 1591-1595), 2:306. 
100John Gerhard, The Theological Commonplaces of John 
Gerhard trans. Richard Dinda, 1971. Unpublished. Located in 
the Concordia Seminary library St. Louis, MO. MFCH 81-1: 
G12-102. "Ad veram cujusque praecepti sententiam 
investigandam valde prodest finem ac mediis facile potest 
fieri judicium. Totus legis finis est caritas de corde puro 
et concsientia bona et fide non ficta. I Tim. 1, v. 7." 
John Gerhard, Loci Theologici, Ed Preuss ed. 10 vols. 
(Berolini: Sumtibus Gust. Schlawltz, 1863), 3:24. 
101Walter Bauer, A Greek-English Lexicon, 2d ed., 
trans. William Arndt and F. Wilber Gingrich (Chicago: The 
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sense of "termination" or "cessation." The second definition 
is end in the sense of the "last part, close" or 
"conclusion." The third definition is end in the sense of 
"goal" or "outcome." Of these three ways of understanding 
TAW this third definition as "goal" or "outcome" best 
expresses the idea of TEXCG as it is used with respect to the 
teleological method of moral reasoning. It was noted above 
that the emphasis in teleological reasoning is on the goal or 
outcome of one's moral action. It is under this third 
definition of T6Wg as "goal" or "outcome" that Walter Bauer 
has listed 1 Timothy 1:5 as an example. In this way Bauer is 
also emphasizing that this passage uses the concept of love 
in a teleological way. 
Likewise St. Paul emphasizes that love is the moral 
T6kog after which Christians should strive when he writes, 
"Follow the way of love (AtoiKETE . . ." 
(1 Corinthians 14:1). 
For the definition of 81.4Kw Walter Bauer lists four 
University of Chicago Press, 1979), 811. This following 
discussion concerning TEXIDS' is also in agreement with Walter 
Bauer, Griechisch-deutsches WOrterbuch 6ed. edited by Kurt 
Aland and Barbara Aland (Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 1988), 
1617-18. This discussion excludes the use of TAOS as an 
adverbial expression as well as the more rare usages such as 
"rest," "remainder," "tax," or "custom duties." 
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possibilities.102 The first definition listed is "hasten, 
run, press on." The second definition listed is "persecute." 
The third definition listed is "drive away, drive out." The 
fourth definition listed is "run after, pursue, strive for, 
seek after, aspire to."103 Of these four possible defini-
tions of &dia.) this fourth definition "run after, pursue, 
strive for, seek after, aspire to," best expresses the role 
of the teleological element in moral reasoning. It has been 
shown that in the teleological method of moral reasoning the 
moral import of a particular act is determined by the goal 
which is pursued. It is under this fourth definition of Swim') 
that Bauer has listed 1 Corinthians 14:1 as an example. In 
this way Bauer is pointing out that he understands this 
passage to mean that love (that is, a life of love, the 
expediting of love, or the flowing of God's love through us) 
is to be the goal for which Christians are to "pursue," 
"strive," "seek" or "aspire." 
Commenting on this passage Richard Lenski emphasizes 
the same interpretation. 
The translation is simple and perfect. After what has 
102Walter Bauer, A Greek-English Lexicon, 201. The 
following discussion of &am is also in agreement with Walter 
Bauer, Worterbuch zum Neuen Testament 6 Auflage (1988), 404. 
103Ibid. 
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been said about the value of love [in 1 Corinthians 13] 
only one admonition is in place: "Pursue 
love!" . . . . In the classics we have &ASKEW with 
objects such as "honors," "pleasures," "the good," 
etc. . . . Paul thus very properly bids the Christian 
"pursue love . . . . We pursue love when we set our 
hearts earnestly to practice love. n104 
Lenski stresses the teleological aspect of love when, 
in writing on Matthew 22:40 ("All the Law and the prophets 
hang on these two commandments.") he states, 
These two [commandments of love] are the nail from which 
all else written in the Old Testament [including the 
individual moral laws] hang suspended. Take away this 
nail, and everything would fall in a heap. It would 
lose its true meaning, significance, and purpose 
(emphasis mine) !105 
Martin Luther, Martin Chemnitz, John Gerhard, Richard Lenski, 
and Walter Bauer all held that the New Testament teaches that 
love is the TOog of every individual moral command.106  
104Richard Lenski, Interpretation of I and II 
Corinthians (Minneapolis, MN: Augsburg Publishing house, 
1937), 575. 
105Richard Lenski, Interpretation of St. Matthew's 
Gospel (Minneapolis, MN: Augsburg Publishing House, 1943), 
883. 
106Thomas Aquinas also emphasized that love is the end 
or purpose of the ten commandments when he wrote, "Omnia 
praecept decalogi ordinantur ad dilectionem Dei et proximi. 
Et ideo praecepta caritatis non fuerunt connumeranda inter 
praecepta decalogi, sed in omnibus includuntur." Summa 
Theologie Blackfriars edition (New York: McGraw-Hill Book 
113 
The emphasis in this section, on love being the end of 
the law, does not in any way detract from St. Paul's state-
ment that "Christ is the end (Taw) of the law" (Romans 
10:4). This statement of St. Paul's holds true in several 
respects.'" In this section it is merely being shown that 
Co., 1964), 2a 2ae 44:1.3. He also emphasizes this same idea 
in 2a 2ae 110.4 (Blackfriars 41:164) Augustine mentions that 
love is the purpose of all the commandments of God when he 
writes, "Omnia igitur praecepta divina referuntur ad 
charitatem, de qua dicit Apostolus: Finis autem praecepts est 
charitas . . . [1 Tim. 1:5] Omnis itaque praecepti finis est 
charitas; id est, ad charitatem refertur omne 
praecptum . . . . Charitas quippe ista Dei est et proximi: et 
utique in his duobus praeceptis tota Lex pendet et Prophetae 
(Matth. xxii, 40)." Augustini, "Enchiridion ad Laurentium 
sive De Fide, Spe et Charitate," J. P. Migne ed. Patrologiae: 
Patrum Latinorum (Paris, 1887), 40:288. 
107Christ is the end of the law in at least four 
different ways: 1) He is the perfect fulfillment of the law. 
"Do not think that I have come to abolish the Law or the 
Prophets; I have not come to abolish them but to fulfill 
them" (Matthew 5:17). 2) He is the goal to which the law 
directs sinners. "So the law was put in charge to lead us to 
Christ that we might be justified by faith" (Galatians 3:24). 
3) He brings an end to the condemnation of the law. 
"Therefore, there is now no condemnation for those who are in 
Christ Jesus, because . . . Christ Jesus . . .set me free 
from the law of sin and death. For what the law was 
powerless to do . . . God did by sending his own Son" (Romans 
8:1-3). 4) He abrogated the ceremonial and political 
elements of the law. "It is for freedom that Christ has set 
us free. Stand firm, then, and do not let yourselves be 
burdened again by a yoke of slavery . . . . I declare to 
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love is the end of the law in so far as the intended 
consequences, or purposeful result of fulfilling one's 
deontological duties is the expedition, flowing, or manifes-
tation of that love which God has given us.108  
Nor does this emphasis, on the individual deontologi-
cal duties serving as the means by which one strives to 
achieve this goal, detract from the powerful role of the 
Gospel in Christian living. Whereas, the Gospel is necessary 
because it empowers, strengthens and motivates one to live a 
truly Christian moral life; it is only by the instruction of 
every man who lets himself be circumcised that he is 
obligated to obey the whole law . . . . For in Christ Jesus 
neither circumcision nor uncircumcision has any value. The 
only thing that counts is faith expressing itself through 
love" (Galatians 5:1,3,6). 
108This assertion, that love is the end of the law, 
does not contradict the Scriptural teaching that the goal or 
purpose of the Christians life is to glorify God (Matthew 
5:16; 1 Corinthians 10:31; 1 Peter 4:11). To glorify God is 
the spiritual goal of the Christian life; whereas, serving 
the needs of the neighbor in love is the temporal or ethical 
goal of the Christian life. For more information concerning 
the purposes that are served by good works see Martin 
Chemnitz, Loci Theologici, Concordia 1989 edition 2:586-88; 
627-30. Polycar Lyser 1591-1595 edition 3:55-58; 150-61. 
John Gerhard, "Selections Translated From the Loci Theologici 
by John Gerhard" trans. Charles Paulson. Unpublished, 1982 
pages 30-34. This is located in the Concordia Seminary 
Library, St. Louis, MO. BT736 G4213. Berolini 1863 edition 
4:11-15. 
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the law that the Christian learns which actions actually 
constitute a God pleasing life. 
For the Law says indeed that it is God's will and 
command that we should walk in a new life, but it does 
not give the power (Kraft/wires) and ability 
(Vermogen/facultatem) to begin, and do it; but the Holy 
Ghost, who is given and received, not through the Law, 
but through the preaching of the Gospel, Gal. 3, 14, 
renews the heart. Thereafter the Holy Ghost employs the 
Law so as to teach the regenerate from it, and to point 
out and show them in the Ten Commandments what is the 
[good and] acceptable will of God, Rom. 12,2, in what 
good works God hath before ordained that they should 
walk, Eph. 2, 10.109  
109Concordia Triglotta, "Thorough Declaration of the 
Formula of Concord," VI, 11-12. Martin Chemnitz also empha-
sizes the ongoing importance of the law for the life of the 
Christian when he writes, "There is a use for the Law in the 
regenerate. It is threefold: (1) It pertains to doctrine 
and obedience that the regenerate should know . . . what 
kinds of works are pleasing to God, so that they do not 
devise new forms of worship . . . (2) The Law shows the 
imperfection and uncleanness which still clings to their good 
works . . . (3) There is also a use for the Law in the 
regenerate that it may contend against and coerce their old 
man . . . Therefore these weak beginnings [of the new 
obedience of the regenerate] must not only be encouraged by 
the earnest entreaties of the Gospel, but also fostered by 
the precepts, exhortations, warnings, and promises of the 
Law. For we experience that the new obedience is not so 
voluntary a thing as a good tree which brings forth its new 
fruit without any command or exhortation." Chemnitz, Loci 
Theologici, trans. J. A. 0. Preuss, II: 441 (Polycarpi 
Leiseri: Francoforti ad Moenum, II:272-73.) 
Likewise, John Gerhard also stresses the didactic use 
of the law for Christians when he writes, "As to the fact 
that the Holy Spirit controls and leads the reborn, He does 
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The Scriptural method of moral analysis contains 
characteristics of both deontology and teleology. The 
teleological element emphasizes that the expedition of Divine 
love is to be the final goal or result of all moral 
activity. 110  The deontological element emphasizes the means 
by which this Taoc is to be achieved in a particular 
situation. In this way both methods fit together in a hybrid 
method that joins rule deontology and rule teleology. 
Together these methods serve an instructional function and 
comprise the didactic (that is, the third) use of the law. 
The teleological element of moral reasoning in the 
Scriptures, may be classified as a form of rule teleology 
which incorporates the individual deontological duties (that 
is, rule deontology) as the means by which one strives for 
not do this immediately but uses the Word as the means. 
Therefore one must seek from the Law the norm for good works 
in which the reborn walk. All of Ps. 119 relates to this." 
Gerhard, Theological Commonplaces, trans. Richard Dinda. 
Concordia Seminary Library G12-435. (Loci Theologici 
11:106). 
110This didactic function of the teleological element 
which comprises part of the third use of the law is an 
example of the positive use of the teleological element. 
There would also be a negative use of this teleological 
element which comprises part of the second use of the law. 
In this second use of the law the teleological element of 
love stands to accuse and condemn the Christian for his 
failure to achieve this goal. 
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the Teikos. of love. In this way Scripture combines a form of 
rule teleology (which is analogous to the Actual Rule 
Utilitarianism and Primitive Rule Utilitarianism of John Mill 
and John Austin) with a form of rule deontology. At least 
three parallels can be drawn. 
First, all the individual absolute moral rules are 
from God. John Austin mentions this in his emphasis that God 
is the source of both the tacit and revealed absolute moral 
commands. Likewise, Scripture stresses this point in its 
emphasis that all the various deontological duties, which 
humankind is obligated to obey, come from God. 
Second, these individual absolute moral rules are not 
an end in themselves. They are the indispensable means, the 
road or the way by which the end is accomplished. John Mill 
mentions this in his explanation of the essential role of 
secondary principles. John Austin also mentions this when he 
explains that the purpose of all God's laws is the happiness 
of his sentient creatures. Likewise, Scripture also makes 
this point when it declares that the end of the law is love. 
Third, this teleological principle is applied to serve 
as an arbitrator when two absolute rules conflict within a 
moral dilemma. John Mill emphasizes this when he specifi-
cally writes that only when secondary principles conflict 
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should the first principle of utility be used. Likewise, 
Scripture illustrates this point when it states that love is 
to be the moral end after which Christians should strive. 
Thus, in a conflict situation the greater evil is that which 
least expedites love. 111  
This emphasis on rule teleology in Scriptures merely 
attempts to show that Scripture uses a hybrid form of rule 
teleology and rule deontology. In this way Scripture does 
not limit itself to only one method of moral reasoning; 
rather, it joins rule deontology together with rule teleology 
to form a unique, and comprehensive method of moral analysis. 
Summary and Conclusion of Part One 
It has been the purpose of this first chapter to 
define and illustrate both deontology and teleology and 
thereby show that the Scriptural method of moral reasoning is 
a unique hybrid combination of both forms of moral reasoning. 
Deontology was defined as that method of moral reason-
ing which determines the moral option in view of certain 
duties which the moral agent is obligated to fulfill. It was 
noted that there are three different forms of deontology. 
111A more detailed examination of "the lesser evil" in 
conflict situations will be given below in Part Two. 
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Pure act deontology does not use pre-established rules. The 
duty of the moral agent is determined anew in each specific 
situation through such immediate ways as conscience or 
intuition. Modified act deontology accepts the use of pre-
established rules only to a certain qualified extent. They 
relate one's prima facie duties. These do not express 
absolute duties, but are mere helpful summaries of the wisdom 
of the ages. Such rules may be used and obeyed in so far as 
they are helpful to the moral agent. Rule deontology insists 
that moral rules must be used, because they express the 
absolute duty of the moral agent. It was shown that 
Scripture uses rule deontology in its emphasis on one's 
absolute duty to obey all of the moral commandments of God. 
Teleology was defined as that method of moral reason-
ing which determines the moral option in view of a specific 
goal or result that the moral agent is trying to achieve. It 
was also noted that there are three different forms of 
teleology which parallel the use of rules in deontology. 
Pure act teleology does not use pre-established rules. The 
moral agent is to determine the moral option simply by 
deciding what action is most conducive to accomplish the 
desired end. Modified act teleology accepts a qualified use 
of rules. Rules used in this way are prima facie or summary 
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rules which can be used by the moral agent only in so far as 
they are helpful in accomplishing the desired goal. Rule 
teleology insists on the use of rules. Rules are essential 
because they are the necessary means, the road or the way, in 
which the goal can be achieved. 
It was shown that Scripture uses a hybrid form of rule 
teleology and rule deontology when it teaches that love is 
the end of the law (1 Timothy 1:5). The absolute moral rules 
that Scripture uses for its rule teleology are the very moral 
rules it obligates humankind to obey in its rule deontology. 
These rules are not an end in and of themselves, but are used 
as a means to incarnate or practice love in specific situa-
tions. Thus does Scripture join together rule deontology and 
rule teleology into a unique, hybrid, comprehensive system 
which contains at least three points. 
1. All individual moral rules in the Scriptures are 
from God. Humankind has an absolute duty to obey each and 
every one. 
2. These individual moral rules are not an end in 
themselves; rather, they are the indispensable means by which 
the love of God flows through a Christian and into a specific 
situation. 
3. Only in a situation of a moral dilemma, when two of 
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God's absolute moral laws come into conflict with one 
another, can the principle of love be applied directly in 
order to determine the lesser of two evils.112  
This Scriptural method of moral analysis has been 
identified (as a hybrid form of rule deontology and rule 
teleology). It will be the task of part two to compare and 
contrast various methods of current theological ethics with 
this method that has been derived from Scripture. 
112To this list of three, a hypothetical fourth point 
may be added. 4. If there should ever be an occasion when 
there is no revealed moral law that can be applied directly 
to a situation, then the moral option must be determined by 
directly choosing which action best expedites love. However, 
due to the broad range of God's moral laws and due to their 
extensive application to life that Luther illustrated in his 
explanations to the ten commandments in his Large Catechism 
and in his 1520 "Treatise of Good Works," the author of this 
dissertation is inclined to agree with John Mill who stated 
that there is never a situation in which some moral rule does 
not apply. John Mill, Utilitarianism 33. Utilitarian 
calculations should not be confused with quantitative 
agapistic analysis. See Appendix IV: Utilitarian 
Calculations Versus Quantitative Agapistic Analysis. 
PART 2 
A Case For Conflicting Absolutism 
The purpose of this section is to examine, from 
another perspective, the role of deontology and teleology in 
theological ethics. The previous examination, in part one 
above, was developed within the conceptual framework provided 
by William Frankena. The investigation in this part uses the 
insights from the previous chapter; however, it takes place 
within the context of the current debate among three 
contrasting, and mutually exclusive, ethical methodologies, 
non-conflicting absolutism, hierarchicalism, and conflicting 
absolutism.' These methods are similar in some respects. 
All three methods accept that Holy Scriptures contain 
absolute moral commands which reveal God's holy will, 
establish the deontological duties of the Christian, and 
guide the Christian in his daily life. However, they differ 
extensively in their understanding of how these 
deontological duties are to be used. This difference becomes 
'This debate is currently underway among various 
members of the Evangelical Theological Society. 
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especially evident when these three methodologies explain 
their interpretation of a moral dilemma. 
The term "moral dilemma" can be used in a number of 
ways.2 In this dissertation the phrase "moral dilemma" 
refers to any situation in which the moral agent is con-
fronted with contradictory and mutually exclusive obliga-
tions. This definition is given by Terrance C. McConnell 
when he writes that, 
A genuine moral dilemma is a situation in which an agent 
ought to do each of two acts, both of which he cannot 
do. That is, he ought to do A and he ought to do B, but 
he cannot do both A and B.3  
2See E. J. Lemmon, "Moral Dilemmas," Philosophical 
Review 71 (1962): 139-58. Lemmon explains that there are at 
least three different types of moral dilemmas. The first 
type is present when the moral agent "both ought to do 
something and ought not to do that thing." Ibid., 148. The 
second type of moral dilemma may be recognized when "there is 
some, but not conclusive, evidence that one ought to do 
something, and there is some, but not conclusive, evidence, 
that one ought not to do that thing." Ibid., 152. The third 
type of moral dilemma is "the kind of situation in which the 
agent has to make a decision of a recognizably moral 
character though he is completely unprepared for the 
situation by his present moral outlook. This case differs 
from the last in that there the question was rather of the 
applicability of his moral outlook to his present situation, 
while here the question is rather how to create a new moral 
outlook to meet unprecedented moral needs." Ibid., 156. 
3Terrance C. McConnell, "Utilitarianism and Conflict 
Resolutions," Logique and Analyse 24 (1981): 245. 
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In a Christian context this would involve a situation in 
which the moral agent is confronted with two absolute moral 
commands (that is, two deontological duties) from God in such 
a way that compliance to one moral absolute necessitates non-
compliance or disobedience to the other moral absolute.4 In 
this way there is an existential conflict between two com-
mands. 
Non-conflicting absolutists deny that any genuine 
moral conflict can actually exist within the life of the 
Christian. They maintain that such apparent conflicts actu-
ally dissolve under proper investigation. 
Hierarchicalists accept the existence of genuine moral 
conflicts; however, they believe that the absolute moral 
commands of God (that is, the numerous deontological duties) 
can be prearranged in a hierarchical order. In a conflict 
situation the moral agent is to choose the greater good. In 
such a dilemma the moral agent is inculpable for not doing 
4The term "absolute" is used in this dissertation to 
refer to any moral law that is more than merely prima facie. 
Obedience is not optional. It is required. It is not, "obey 
this if you like," It is rather, "Obey this or you will die" 
(confer Ezekiel 18:20). An absolute law is a universally 
obligatory moral norm. It is "free from conditions or 
reservations; unreserved, unqualified [and] unconditional." 
The Oxford English Dictionary second edition 20 vols (Oxford: 
Clarendon Press, 1989), 1:48 definition 12a. 
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the lesser good. 
Conflicting absolutists also accept the existence of 
genuine moral conflicts. They believe that, within a given 
situation, the absolute moral commands of God must be ar-
ranged in a hierarchical order. In a conflict situation the 
Christian is to do the lesser evil, incur the culpability, 
and then look to Christ for forgiveness.5  
Each one of these three models are defined and illus-
trated by their most current proponents. It will be shown 
that, of these three options, conflicting absolutism offers 
the most Scriptural approach to understanding and using the 
deontological and the teleological elements in theological 
ethics.6  
5The first one to define, label and contrast these 
different methodologies was Norman Geisler, Ethics: 
Alternatives and Issues (Grand Rapids, MI: Zondervan 
Publishing House, 1971), 1-270. 
60ne may be inclined to think that moral dilemmas are 
mere insignificant abnormalities and any extensive discussion 
of them in a prolegomenon exaggerates their importance. 
However, Helmut Thielicke writes, "Theological ethics usually 
makes the mistake of taking the 'Normal case' as its standard 
for measuring reality. The result is the illusion that by 
providing certain Christian directives we have actually 
solved the problems. In ethics, however, the situation is 
similar to that in medicine. The problems do not arise with 
the ordinary cases, but with the borderline cases (Grenz-
falle), those involving transitions or complications. It is 
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the abnormal rather than the normal case which brings us up 
against the real problems. Hence the real test even in 
respect of foundational principles, is whether an ethics has 
been proved in the crucible of the borderline situation 
(Grenzsituation) and emerged with even deeper insights." 
Helmut Thielicke, Theological Ethics; 3 vols. trans. John 
Doberstein (Grand Rapids: Eerdmanns, 1979), 1:578. The 
German references are from Theologische Ethik, 3 Bdnde 
(Tubingen: J. C. B. Mohr, 1955-1964), 2.1:202. "An example 
will show how correct Thielicke is in this regard. Seldom, 
if ever, is a pastor consulted concerning an ethical issue 
that is a clear-cut choice between right and wrong. Thus, 
probably no one has ever seriously approached his pastor to 
ask, 'My neighbor insists on playing his stereo loudly late 
into the night; may I shoot him?" Frank, Morgret, "The Law 
and the Gospel in Ethical Decision-Making," Consensus 10 
(October 1984), 19. 
CHAPTER THREE 
Non-conflicting Absolutism' 
The numerous absolute moral commands, which were shown 
in chapter one above to compose the deontological element in 
theological ethics, are often understood as "non-conflicting 
absolutes." According to this view the moral commandments 
are absolute in that they admit no exceptions. They are all 
to be enforced in every applicable situation. They are also 
"non-conflicting" in that there is never a situation wherein 
the Christian moral agent is forced to break one absolute 
command in order to keep another. 
In the situation of a so called "moral dilemma" two 
'This view has also been called "unqualified 
absolutism" or "the third alternative view." The most 
detailed presentation of this position is Robert Rakestraw, 
"Ethical Choices: A Case For Non-Conflicting Absolutism, 
Criswell Theological Review 2 no. 2 (Spring 1988): 237-67. 
Modified forms of this view are also promoted in: John M. 
Frame, Medical Ethics: Principles, Persons and Problems 
(Phillipsburg, NJ: Presbyterian and Reformed Publishing Co., 
1988), 7-32. William Luck, "Moral Conflicts and Evangelical 
Ethics: A Second Look at the Salvaging Operations," Grace 
Theological Journal 8 no. 1 (Spring 1987), C. Gordon Olson, 
"Norman Geisler's Hierarchical Ethics Revisited," Evangelical 
Journal 4 no. 1 (Summer 1986): 3-14. 
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absolute commands may seem to conflict, but this in only an 
outward, superficial, appearance. They do not conflict in 
actuality. The moral agent may be misled into thinking that 
it is necessary to break one of the absolute moral commands 
in order to keep another, but, in reality, that is never 
truly the case. There is no such thing as a genuine moral 
dilemma. There is always a third alternative out of every 
apparent dilemma, which does not involve breaking one of 
God's absolute moral commands. The alternative might not be 
readily apparent. It might not be easy or painless. 
However, there is always a way to avoid sin. 
One of the most complete and systematic presentations 
of non-conflicting absolutism has been given by Robert 
Rakestraw in his article "Ethical Choice: A Case For Non 
Conflicting Absolutism."2 In this article Rakestraw mentions 
at least seven major tenets that are important to non-
conflicting absolutism. The following critical examination 
of these seven tenets reveals both the strengths and the 
2Rakestraw, 239-67. Robert Rakestraw was born in 
1943. He was ordained in 1967 and served as a pastor in the 
Southern Baptist Convention. He received his Ph.D. in 
Theology from Drew University in 1985. He currently teaches 
theology and Christian ethics at Bethel Theological Seminary 
in St. Paul, Minnesota. Edmund Santurri has also held this 
view. See Appendix V: Edmund Santurri amd Helmut Thielicke 
on the Question of Genuine Moral Dilemmas. 
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weaknesses of this particular ethical methodology. 
The first tenet of non-conflicting absolutism empha-
sizes that the moral absolutes which God has given to 
humankind in the Scriptures are extensions of the one all 
encompassing absolute of love. Rakestraw explains, 
NCA [Non-Conflicting Absolutism] builds its entire 
structure upon the foundational principle that there are 
numerous absolutes given by God. . . . These absolutes 
are derived from the Hebrew-Christian Scriptures after 
careful exegesis and interpretation. . . . All moral 
absolutes are extensions of the one all-encompassing 
absolute: love for God with all one's being and love for 
neighbor as oneself (Matt 22: 34-40).3  
This first tenet of non-conflicting absolutism agrees 
with the analysis of the deontological element of theological 
ethics given above, in chapter one. In chapter two it is 
also emphasized that the numerous absolute moral commands 
which God reveals in the Scriptures are used to bring the 
love of God into a specific situation. In this first tenet 
the non-conflicting absolutists are emphasizing the same 
points, by saying that all of the moral absolutes in 
Scripture are extensions of the one all-encompassing absolute 
of love. 
The second tenet of non-conflicting absolutism 
stresses that the numerous absolute moral commandments, 
3Rakestraw, 247-48. 
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mentioned in tenet number one above, never actually come into 
direct conflict with one another. 
Divinely given moral absolutes never truly conflict, 
although there are occasions when they appear to 
conflict. NCA holds that there will never be a situa-
tion in which obedience to one absolute will entail dis-
obedience to or the setting aside of another absolute.4  
This second tenet is unique to the non-conflicting abso-
lutists. Representing the hierarchicalists, Norman Geisler 
has gone to great lengths in his attempt to prove the false-
hood of this tenet. In 1981 Norman Geisler wrote Options in 
Contemporary Christian Ethics,5 wherein he attempted to point 
out that moral dilemmas are illustrated in the Scriptures on 
at least six different occasions. In the summer of 1986 Carl 
Gordon Olson, seeking to support this second tenet of non-
conflicting absolutism, responded to Geisler's criticism in 
his article "Norman Geisler's Hierarchical Ethics 
Revisited."6 In the fall of 1986 Geisler defended his views 
4lbid., 248. 
5Norman Geisler, Options in Contemporary Christian 
Ethics (Grand Rapids, MI: Baker Book House, 1981), 1-121. 
Norman Geisler was born in 1932. He was ordained into the 
ministry of the Independent Church in 1956. He is presently 
director of Quest Ministries, Lynchburg, Virginia. 
6C. Gordon Olson, "Norman Geisler's Hierarchical 
Ethics Revisited," Evangelical Journal 4(1986): 3-14. Carl 
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against Olson in "A Response to Olson's Critique of Ethical 
Hierarchicalism."7 Then again in 1989 Geisler also published 
Christian Ethics: Options and Issues.8 Part of this book 
continues his criticism of Olson and again seeks to refute 
this second tenet of non-conflicting absolutism. The follow-
ing examination of the discussion between Geisler and Olson, 
given below, helps to explain this second tenet. 
The first illustration, with which Geisler attempts to 
show a conflict between two moral absolutes in the Scripture, 
is Abraham's near sacrifice of Isaac (Genesis 22). Geisler 
maintains that in this account one can clearly note a 
conflict between murder and obedience to God. 
First, the Abraham and Isaac story (Gen. 22), contains a 
real moral conflict. "Thou shalt not kill" is a divine 
moral command, and yet God commanded Abraham to kill his 
son, Isaac."9  
Gordon Olson was born in 1930, received his Th.M. from Dallas 
Theological Seminary in 1955. He was ordained into the 
ministry of the Reinhart Bible Church of Dallas, Texas, in 
1955. He has served as a missionary to Pakistan and pastor 
of Mansfield Baptist Church, New Jersey. 
7Norman Geisler, "A Response to Olson's Critique of 
Ethical Hierarchicalism," Evangelical Journal 4(1986): 82-87. 
8Norman Geisler, Christian Ethics Options and Issues 
(Grand Rapids, MI: Baker Book House, 1989), 1-335. 
9Geisler, Options, 84. One might be inclined to 
132 
Olson responds that this conflict is only apparent and 
not real at al1.10 Olson maintains that there are many 
places in Scripture, this story being one of them, where 
killing is not immoral because it is in compliance with a 
command from God. Olson lists other examples such as killing 
in a just war against an evil aggressor (Genesis 14:14-16) 
and capital punishment (Genesis 9:6 and Deuteronomy 19:21) .11 
Olson concludes that, "The cause of the offering of 
Isaac . . . was also a justifiable life-taking since it was 
by a direct command of God. Hence there was no conflict of 
absolutes."12  
object to Geisler's insistence that this story contains a 
moral dilemma on the grounds that God graciously called a 
halt to the sacrifice before it was actually committed. Thus 
the dilemma in sacrificing Isaac never actually took place. 
However, Geisler answers that objection. "The fact that 
Abraham was not required to go through with the act does not 
eliminate the reality of the moral conflict, since the 
intention to perform an act with moral implications is itself 
a morally responsible act (cf. Matt. 5:28)." Ibid. 85. 
1001son, 6. 
111bid. 
12Ibid. This argument, which emphasizes that God can 
renounce a previously given command and give a contrary 
command in an exceptional situation is not new to Olson. It 
is also mentioned by the following: Bernard of Clairvaux 
(1090-1153), "Necessarium deinde, quod inviolabile nominavi, 
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illud intelligo, quod non ab homine traditum, sed divinitus 
promulgatum, nisi a Deo qui tradidit, mutari omnino non 
patitur: ut, exempli causa, Non occides, Non moechaberis, Non 
furtum facies (Exod. XX, 13-15), et reliqua illius tabulae 
legiscita: quae, etsi nullam prorsus humanam dispensationem 
admittunt, nec cuiquam hominum ex his aliquid alique modo 
solvere, aut licuit, aut licebit; Dominus tamen horum quod 
voluit, quando voluit solvit, sive cum ab Hebraeis Aegyptios 
spoliari (Exod. III, 22), sive quando prophetam cum muliere 
fornicaria misceri praecepit (Ose. I, 2)." J. P. Migne, ed. 
Patrologiae: Patrum Latinorum, 221 vol. (Parisiis, 1855-
1881), 182:864. Hereafter this is abbreviated as Migne P. L. 
Duns Scotus (1266-1308), "Haec strictissime dicuntur 
de lege naturae. . . . non potest esse dispensatio et de 
istis. . . . 
Et non est sic loquendo universaliter de omnibus 
praeceptis secundae Tabulae . . . . Non enim est necessaria 
bonitas in his quae ibi praecipiuntur ad bonitatem finis 
ultimi . . . . 
De praeceptis autem primae tabulae secus est, quia 
illa immediate respiciunt Deum pro obiecto . . . .Et per 
consequens in istis non poterit Deus dispensare." Allen B. 
Wolter, ed. Duns Scotus on the Will and Morality (Washington 
D. C.: The Catholic University of America Press, 1986), 276. 
William of Ockham (circa 1280-1349), "Et ideo ipso 
quod Deus vult hoc, (hoc) est iustum fieri . . . . Unde si 
Deus causaret odium in voluntate alicuius sicut causa 
totalis, sicut semper causat sicut causa partialis, neuter 
peccaret: nec Deus, quia ad nihil obligatur; nec alius, quia 
actus ille non esset in potestate sua." Guillelmi de ockham, 
Opera Philosophica et Theologica, Rega Wood ed. Editions 
Instituti Franciscani 7 vols. (St. Bonaventure, N.Y.: 
Universitatis S. Bonaventurae, 1984), 7:198. 
Martin Luther (1483-1546) "Also kan und pflegt auch 
der geyst zu weylen werck zu thun, die an zusehen sind, als 
seyen sie widder alle gottis gepott. Aber sie sind nur 
widder die gepott der andern taffelln, die uns zum nehisten 
weysen und nach den ersten dreyen gepotten ynn der ersten 
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Geisler defends his first illustration against Olson 
by pointing out that it will not suffice simply to say that 
the sacrifice of Isaac was an exception to the command 
against murder (as is a just war and capital punishment). 
The mere fact that an exception has to be made shows that 
there is a conflict.13 Geisler makes a compelling point in 
his answer to Olson. Olson is begging the question when he 
tries to remove the tension between two conflicting commands 
simply by asserting that there can be no tension since they 
are both commanded by God. Olson is attempting to support 
this second tenet by basing it on the unity and simplicity of 
taffeln, die uns zu Gott weysen." D. Martin Luther's Werke, 
Rritisch Gesamtausgabe, 64 Bande (Weimar, 1883 -), 17.2: 54, 
hereafter abreviated as W. A. 
This line of thought is contrary to that of Thomas 
Aquinas who emphasized that, "Praecepta autem decalogi 
continent ipsam intentionem legislatoris, scilicet Dei. Nam 
praecepta primae tabulae, quae ordinant ad Deum, continent 
ipsum ordinem ad bonum commune et finale, quod Deus est; 
praecepta autem secundae Tabulae continent ipsum ordinem 
justitiae inter homines observandae, ut scilicet nulli fiat 
indebitum, et cuilibet reddatur debitum; secundum hanc enim 
rationem sunt intelligenda praecepta decalogi. Et ideo 
praecepta decalogi sunt omnino indispensabilia." Thomas 
Aquinas Summa Theologiae Blackfrairs edition 60 vols. (New 
York: McGraw-Hill Book Co., 1964), 29: 90-92. 
13Norman Geisler, "A Response to Olson's Critique of 
Ethical Hierarchicalism," Evangelical Journal 4 (Fall, 1986): 
86. Geisler, Christian Ethics: Options and Issues (Grand 
Rapids: Baker Book House, 1989), 117-118. 
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God's essential will (that is, God's will as it exists in and 
of itself). However, such a task is not possible for two 
reasons. 
In the first place the essential will of God has not 
been completely revealed to man. Insofar as it remains 
hidden (voluntas abscondita) it is far beyond the realm of 
human comprehension. It cannot be used by Christians to 
define doctrine or determine practice. St. Paul emphasizes 
this when he exclaims, 
Oh, the depth of the riches of wisdom and knowledge of 
God! How unsearchable his judgments, and his paths 
beyond tracing out! Who has known the mind of the Lord? 
Or who has been his counselor (Romans 11:33-34) .14 
God's will can only be studied and applied insofar as 
he has revealed it to humanity (that is, in the voluntas 
revelata). That which is not revealed must remain a mystery. 
Luther writes, 
God must therefore be left to himself in his own 
majesty, for in this regard we have nothing to do with 
him, nor has he willed that we should have anything to 
do with him. But we have something to do with him in-
sofar as he is clothed and set forth in his Word, 
through which he offers himself to us. . . . It is our 
business, however, to pay attention to the word and 
leave that inscrutable will alone, for we must be guided 
14A1l scripture passages in English are from the New 
International Version, unless otherwise noted. 
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by the word and not by that inscrutable will. After 
all, who can direct himself by a will completely in-
scrutable and unknowable? It is enough to know simply 
that there is a certain inscrutable will in God, and as 
to what, why, and how far it wills, that is something we 
have no right whatever to inquire into, hanker after, 
care about, or meddle with, but only to fear and 
adore.15  
In the second place, humans are incapable of under-
standing the unity and simplicity of God's essential will be-
cause even that which has been revealed (voluntas revelata) 
has been revealed in parts in order to accommodate the tem-
poral limitations of human thought. Franz Pieper explains, 
There can be no division and classification of God's 
will as far as God's essence is concerned. In Him there 
is only one will, and this is identical with his 
15Luther's Works, 55 vols., edd. J. Pelikan and H. T. 
Lehmann, American Edition in English Translation 
(Philadelphia: Fortress Press and St. Louis: Concordia 
Publishing House, 1958-1986), 33:139-40. Hereafter this is 
abbreviated as L. W. "Relinquendus est igitur Deus in 
maiestate et natura sua, sic enim nihil nos cum illo habemus 
agere, nec sic voluit a nobis agi cum eo. Sed quatenus 
indutus et proditus est verbo suo, quo nobis sese obtulit, 
cum eo agimus. . . . 
Nunc autem nobis spectandum est verbum relinquendaque 
illa voluntas imperscrutabilis. Verbo enim nos dirigi, non 
voluntate illa inscrutabili oportet. Atque adeo quis sese 
dirigere queat ad voluntatem prorsus imperscrutabilem et 
incognoscibilem? Satis est, nosse tantum, quod sit quaedam 
in Deo voluntas imperscrutabilis. Quid vero, Cur et quatenus 
illa velit, hoc prorsus non licet quaerere, optare, curare 
aut tangere, sed tantum timere et adorare." Luther, W. A. 
18:685-86. 
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essence. But because of our finite comprehension Scrip-
ture itself teaches us to . . . . distinguish between 
God's first, or antecedent, and second, or consequent, 
will (voluntas prima, sive antecedens, et voluntas 
secunda, sive consequens) .16 
16Franz Pieper, Christian Dogmatics Trans. Theodore 
Engelder, 4 vols. (St. Louis: Concordia Publishing House, 
1950), 1: 454. "Was die Einteilungen des Ottlichen Willens 
betrifft, so ist auch hier wieder darah zu erinnern, dass sie 
ihren Grund in dem beschrankten menschlichen Auffassungs - 
vermogen haben. In Gott ist der Wille einer und mit Gottes 
Wesen identisch. Aber nach Gottes Selbstoffenbarung in 
seinem Wort Kamen wir unterscheiden: 1. Gottes ersten und 
zweiten Willen (voluntas prima oder antecedens und voluntas 
secunda oder consequens)." Franz Pieper, Christliche 
Dogmatik 4 vol. (St. Louis: Concordia Publishing House, 
1917), 1: 558-59. Others also emphasized this distinction: 
St. Chrysostom, "Mow Trp6.1Tov TO µii throVaOat hp.apripaiTas. 
Oelmga BeliTepov, TO yevog6/oug mmoOserfroX&FOaL." J. P. Migne, ed. 
Patrologiae: Patrum Graecorum, 161 vols. (Paris, 1857-1866), 
62:13. Hereafter this is abbreviated as Migne P. G. 
John of Damascus (347?-407), " '0 0e6; wpowyoug4vws °Au 
mcivTas ow0Avat, Kai T11s  Oaaaeiac airra Tuvftv. . . . 'ApapvivcwTag Si 
OAEL KoXigEaeat, (.5s. 8iKatos. A4y€Tat dm, TO giv ipitrrov, Trpomyatip.evov 
Oelmµa, Kai iigkwia, it abTa V. TO Si 6E1/TEpOV iirtigevov OATiga, Kai 
wapaxoSpriats, if 1figeT4pas al.TLaS . . . . T(I)v Si .11µtv, Ta giv dyalkt 
irporlyouµ4vws eau, Kal eiZoKei. Ta SE novripa, Kai O'VTWS' KaKa, 01/TE 
wpo11youµ4vtos., ATE kw oitiOws• °act. napavapel Si TW airretovaif). " 
Migne, P.G. 94:968-69. 
St. Thomas Aquinas (1225?-1274), "Unde potest dici 
quod judex justus antecedenter vult omnem hominem vivere, sed 
consequenter vult homicidam suspendi. Similiter Deus 
antecedenter vult omnem hominem salvari, sed consequenter 
vult quosdam damnari secundum exigentiam suae justitiae." 
Summa Theologiae, la.19,6. 
Leonard Hutter (1563-1616), "Est vero Distinctio hec 
Voluntatis Dei in Antecedentem + Consequentem introducta in 
Ecclesiam, propter ae Scripturae locaquae Voluntatem Dei non 
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Semper fieri aut impleri testantur. Exempli gratia: Matth. 
23,37. Quoties volui congregare filios tuos, sicut gallina 
pullos suos sub alis, + noluistis. Et I. Tim. 2,4. Deus 
vult omnes homines salvari. . . . 
Tandem consideratione fidei. Nam in Voluntate 
npariyoutavri Fides attenditur, tanquam pars ordinis, quern Deus, 
quantum quidem in se est, observatum cupit. In Voluntate 
kimp4v0 eadem attenditur, non hoc solum modo, quo Deus ordinem 
suum ab hominibus observatum cupit. sed quatenus ordo iste 
actu ipso observatur credendo, vel non observatur, non 
credendo: Qud licet ratione hominum in tempore demum fiat: 
Deo tamen. Praescientiae ratione, suit praesentis simum, 
quippe cui per naturam, aeternitatis, nihil est futurism, sed 
in, simplicissimo Ty vilsv omnia, ab aeterno sunt 
praesentissima. Ultmae hujus differentiae respectu, Voluntas 
consequens, finem suum, semper assequitur, vel ad salutem, 
vel ad damnationem: Voluntas vero Antecedens non item." 
Leonharto HUttero, Loci Communes Theologici (Wittenbergae, 
1619), 783, 794-95. 
John Gerhard (1582-1637), "Distinguit autem haec 
divisio non ipsam per se voluntatem, quae in Deo una et 
indivisa est, sicut et una essentia; sed geminum istius 
respectum. In antecedente voluntate respectus habetur 
mediorum ad salutem, prout ex parte Dei ordinates sunt et 
omnibus offeruntur. In consequente voluntate respectus 
habetur eorundem mediorum, sed prout ab hominibus acceptantur 
vel negliguntur." Ioannis Gerhardi, Loci Theologici, 10 
vols. (1609-1622 repr., Berolini: Sumtibus Gust. Schlawitz, 
1865), 2:61. 
David Hollaz (1648-1713), "Voluntas DEI dictur 
Antecedens + consequens non (1) ratione temporis . . . . (2) 
Nec ex parte ipsius voluntatis divina. . . . (3) Dicitur 
voluntas DEI antecedens + consequens ab ordine rationis 
nostrae diversos volendi actus in DEO pro diversa objector= 
consideratione distinguentis." M. Davidis Hollazii, Examen 
Theologicum (Stargardiae Pomeranorum, 1707), 4. 
John Quenstedt (1617-1688), "Antecedens fertur in 
hominem, qua miser est, non habita ratione circumstantiarum 
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John Bair explains further that, 
The free will of God is distinguished as . . . first or 
antecedent, by which He wills something from Himself 
alone, or entirely from His own inclination, without any 
regard being had to the circumstances; and second or 
consequent, by which He wills something with a consider-
ation of the circumstances, or in consideration of a 
cause or condition.17  
Millard J. Erickson gives the following example. 
God's will in the ultimate sense (W 1) would be the 
fully good. Yet God's will (W 2) is that man should do 
what most nearly approximates that complete good. 
For example, it may be God's will [W 1 primary 
will] that no human life should ever have to be taken. 
This would be the good. Yet, given our world in which 
men are characterized by greed, avarice, hatred, and 
fear, I may find myself called upon to take the life of 
another to defend myself or to protect the lives of my 
children. It may, in this case, be God's will (W 2) 
that I kill this man. . . . This distinction between 
in Objecto: Consequens vero versatur circa hominem cum certis 
circumstantiis, quatenus scil. is fidelis vel incredulus 
est." Johann Quenstedt, Theologia Didactico-Polemica 4 
vols. (Wittenbergae, 1685), 3:2. 
17Heinrich Schmid, Doctrinal Theology of the 
Evangelical Lutheran Church Third Edition trans. C. A. Hay 
and H. E. Jacobs (Minneapolis: Augsburg Publishing House, 
1961), 127-28, citing John Baier, Compendium Theologiae 
Positivae (Lipsiae: Apud Thomas Fritsch, 1717), 194. 
"Voluntas DEI libra distinguitur . . . . in primam seu 
antecedentem, qua vult aliquid ex se solo, seu ex nativa sua 
inclinatione praecise, necdum habita ratione 
circumstantiarum: + secundam, seu consequentem, qua aliquid 
vult, consideratis circumstantiis, seu intuitu alicujus 
causae aut conditionis." Ibid. 
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God's will (W 1) and (W 2) is an important one. For a 
Christian to discuss the morality of war, for instance, 
without observing this distinction invites confusion.18  
According to God's primary will, he wills that there 
would be no sin, nor suffering, nor death. God's primary 
will is best exemplified when one considers the perfect 
blessedness of the lives of Adam and Eve in the garden of 
Eden prior to the fall. 
However, since sin and death have now come into the 
world they present circumstances and conditions which God 
takes into consideration when he wills specific deeds in the 
daily lives of individuals. This secondary will of God may 
conflict with his primary will, as in the case of Abraham's 
offering of Isaac. 
According to God's primary will there is to be no 
murder. Yet, within the temporary situation of the testing 
of Abraham, God, according to his secondary will, commanded 
that murder should be done. Thus Geisler is correct in 
pointing out that this story does illustrate a conflict 
between two commands of God. It is a conflict between his 
primary and secondary will. 
18Millard J. Erickson, Relativism in Contemporary 
Christian Ethics (Grand Rapids, MI: Baker Book House, 1974), 
143-44. 
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However, this does not necessarily mean that this 
story can be used, as Geisler attempts, to prove that such 
conflicts still confront Christians today. Geisler fails to 
take into consideration the uniqueness of this particular 
event. For here was the spiritual father of all believers.19  
He was living at a time when God revealed his will directly 
to people of his choosing. 20  He was undergoing a special 
trial to test his faith.21 There is no justification for 
using this particular, unique, event to substantiate the 
existence of moral conflicts today. 
On the one hand, there are elements in the lives of 
the prophets and the apostles that are worthy of imitation. 
They serve as examples to be followed.22 Yet on the other 
19"So, then, he is the father of all who believe but 
have not been circumcised, in order that righteousness might 
be credited to them. And he is also the father of the 
circumcised who not only are circumcised but who also walk in 
the footsteps of the faith that our father Abraham had before 
he was circumcised" Romans 4:11-12. "Understand, then, that 
those who believe are children of Abraham" Galatians 3:7. 
20"In the past God spoke to our forefathers through 
the prophets at many times and in various ways, but these 
last days he has spoken to us by his Son" Hebrews 1:1-2. 
21"Some time later God tested Abraham" Genesis 22:1a. 
"By faith Abraham, when God tested him, offered Isaac as a 
sacrifice" Hebrews 11:17a. 
22"We do not want you to become lazy, but to imitate 
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hand, there are certain elements which are unique to the 
lives of the prophets and apostles. Insofar as their unique-
ness is concerned they do not serve as examples to be 
imitated. They establish no precedent upon which to base any 
future action. Least of all do they constitute a foundation 
for theological ethics. Luther explains, 
Whatever the case may be, one must adhere to the rule 
that the deeds of the saints should not be imitated or 
taken as examples. It is not logical to say that 
because Abraham, Augustine and Peter did this, "I must 
do it." But this is a valid argument: God says and 
commands this; therefore, it must be done. For the Word 
is a reliable rule which cannot deceive. Thus the 
jurists, too, say that an action is not a law, just as a 
law is not an action.23  
Luther also explains that, 
In order to reveal His power and wisdom, God does many 
things contrary to the rule; He does so through heroes, 
whom He himself calls in a special way, although these 
heroes are rare and few. Others must adhere to the norm 
and rule, because, if they want to imitate those heroes, 
those who through faith and patience inherit what has been 
promised" Hebrews 6:12. 
23Luther, L. W. 3:259-60. "Caeterum, ut ut sit, 
regula tenenda est, quod sanctorum facta non imitanda, nec 
trahenda sunt in exemplum. Non enim sequitur: Abraham, 
Augustinus, Petrus hoc fecit, ergo mihi quoque faciendum est. 
Haec autem consequentia valet: Deus hos dicit et iubet, ergo 
faciendum est. Verbum enim est regula certa, quae fallere 
non potent. Sic Iure consulti quoque dicunt, factum non esse 
ius, sicut nec ius est factum." Luther, W.A. 43:61. 
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who deviate from the rule, they stumble disgracefully. 
Such deeds are praised because they are done by heroes 
and "wonder men," but nobody can successfully imitate 
them.24  
The uniqueness of the story of Abraham's near sacri-
fice of Isaac sets it apart from all other stories. Abraham 
is a "wonder man." Abraham cannot be used as an example to 
completely imitate. Nor can one expect the circumstances of 
the story (that is, a conflict between a command of God's 
primary will and a command of his secondary will) to 
necessarily be repeated. Even though this story contains a 
conflict between two of God's commands, as Geisler maintains, 
it nevertheless, cannot show that such conflicts necessarily 
exist today. It therefore does not serve Geisler's intended 
purpose. It does not refute the second tenet of non-
conflicting absolutism, which maintains that in this day 
moral absolutes do not conflict.25  
24L.W. 3:262. "Deus ut ostendat potentiam ct 
sapientiam saum, multa facit contra regulam per homines 
Heroicos, quos ipse singulariter vocat, quanquam rani et 
pauci sunt. Reliqui arte et regula utantur necesse est, quod 
si heroicos illos, qui a regula discedunt, imitari volent, 
turpiter impingent. Laudantur igitur talia, quia ab heroicis 
et miraculosis fiunt, sed nemo ea foeliciter potest imitari." 
Luther, W. A. 43:62-63. 
25Although this particular example of Abraham's near 
sacrifice of Isaac fails to show that there are still 
conflicts between the commands of God's primary will and 
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Geisler's second illustration with which he attempts 
to show a conflict between two of God's absolute moral 
commands, and thereby refute the second tenet of non-
conflicting absolutism, is the suicide of Samson (Judges 
16:23-31). Geisler maintains that Samson had divine approval 
for his self inflicted death.26 Since such approval is 
contrary to the commandment against murder, this story would 
illustrate a conflict between two divine commands. 
Olson responds by saying that the story of Samson's 
suicide contains no actual conflict. For in this case there 
was no explicit command from God for Samson to kill himself. 
This suicide was a decision Samson made completely on his 
own. Scripture does not say that Samson did a God-pleasing 
those of his secondary will today, there are other examples 
below which illustrate that such conflicts do still occur. 
The contention here against Geisler is not that such 
conflicts do not exist today. It is rather, that he has not 
chosen a good example to prove his point. 
26Geisler, Options, 85. Augustine also believed that 
Samson had divine approval for his suicide. In De Civitate 
Dei 1:21 he writes "Nec Samson aliter excusatur, quod se 
ipsum cum hostibus ruina domus oppressit, nisi quia spirtus 
latenter hoc jusserat, qui per illum miracula faciebat." 
Migne, P. L. 41:35. Martin Luther also seemed to hold the 
same view. "[Samson] qui Spiritus instinctu et impulsu fecit 
omnia, etiam in ipsa morte." Luther, W. A. 44:785. (L. W. 
8:281). 
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thing when he committed suicide.27  
In Geisler's "Response to Olson" he does not answer 
this criticism. Likewise, in his later work, Christian 
Ethics, Geisler makes no effort to respond to Olson's point. 
He simply repeats this same argument concerning the divine 
approval of Samson's death.28  
Olson makes a compelling point here. Although Olson 
did not mention it, he could also have pointed out that in 
order to understand the ethical implications in the suicide 
of Samson it is helpful to distinguish, as Geisler has failed 
to do, between God's general concurrence (concursus 
generalis), which enables all acts to occur regardless of 
their morality, and his moral will (voluntas moralis) which 
expresses the specific moral actions which he demands of 
humanity. Just because God gave Samson the power to commit 
suicide does not mean that God agreed with, or was pleased 
by, this act. God also gives to all criminals their power to 
burglarize, maim, or kill (that is, his concursus generalis); 
yet, he certainly disproves of their actions according to his 
moral will (voluntas moralis). Thus the account of Samson's 
2701son, 6. 
28Geisler, Christian Ethics, 118. 
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suicide does not help Geisler prove the existence of divine 
conflicts, because it does not contain a conflict between two 
of God's absolute moral commands. This story does not help 
him in his attempt to disprove the second tenet of non-
conflicting absolutism. 
Geisler's third illustration with which he attempts to 
show a conflict between two of God's moral commands is the 
case of Jephthah and his daughter (Judges 11:30-40). In this 
passage Jephthah vows to God, 
If you give the Ammonites into my hands, whatever comes 
out of the door of my house to meet me when I return in 
triumph from the Ammonites will be the Lord's, and I 
will sacrifice it as a burnt offering. Judges 11:30-31 
After his victory he returned home and "who should 
come out to meet him but his daughter. . . . She was an only 
child" (Judges 11:34). Geisler maintains that in this story 
Jephthah is torn between keeping a vow to God (Ecclesiastes 
5:1-4) and obeying the commandment against murder (Exodus 
20:13).29  
Olson responds that once again, as in the case of 
Samson, there is no explicit command from God here. God does 
not tell Jephthah to sacrifice his daughter (as he told 
Abraham to sacrifice his son). Nor did God command Jephthah 
29Geisler, Options, 85. 
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to make such a careless vow. There is no conflict here 
because neither the vow nor the sacrifice was commanded. 
Olson could also have pointed out that there is no 
conflict in this story because the vow which Jephthah made, 
was in fact, sinful, and contrary to God's will from the very 
beginning. Through Moses God had already established the 
details of an elaborate sacrificial system.30 God had 
specifically commanded that burnt offerings were to be either 
a bull a sheep a goat or a bird.31 According to God's 
command, these were the only animals that were to be offered 
in burnt sacrifices. The Israelites had no authority to 
change this. Moses specifically told them, that with respect 
to God's law, they were not to "add to it or take away from 
it" (Deuteronomy 12:32).32  
However, in the days of the judges, the Israelites 
were not careful to be so faithful to God's laws. Twice the 
author of the book of Judges states that it was a time when 
"everyone did as he saw fit" (Judges 17:6; 21:25). When 
Jephthah made his foolish vow, to offer "whatever comes out 
of the door of my house as a burnt offering" (Judges 11:31), 
30See Leviticus 1-7. 
31Leviticus 1:5-14 
32This same emphasis is in Deuteronomy 4:2. 
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he was not obeying a command from God. He was doing "as he 
saw fit." He was breaking away from the sacrificial system 
which God had given them, and inventing his own good works 
contrary to the will of God.33 Since this vow was a human 
invention, unauthorized by God, it cannot be construed as a 
divine command that conflicts with the fifth commandment. 
The same can be said with regard to the fulfilling of 
this vow. The sacrifice of the daughter was also without 
33This is not unlike the fictitious good works 
practiced by the monks of the middle ages which Luther so 
strongly condemned in his "Von Den Guten Werken" (W. A. 
6:202-76) and "De Votis Monasticis Martini Lutheri Iudicium," 
(W. A. 8:573-669). In the "Praefatio Martini Lutheri Vetus 
Testamentum" he also wrote, "Praeter haec autem hoc quoque 
observandum est, Mosen adeo diligenter hunc populum legibus 
circumscripsisse, ut prorsus nullum locum relinqueret, aut 
novi cuiusdam operis, aut alterius religionis excogit-
andae. . . . 
. . . Sic igitur omnia instituit, ut certum verbum 
haberent, Deum omnia ipsorum opera probare. Non enim Deus 
illa opera probat, quae sine certo suo verbo et mandato a 
nobis fiunt. Nam in .IIII. et .XIII. Deuteronomii capite sic 
inquit, vos nihil neque addetis neque detrahetis legi maeae, 
et in .XII. monet eos, ne faciant, quae ipsis recta videntur. 
David preterea in psal., item prophetae omnes de hac una re 
queruntur, quod populus se talibus operibus Deo commendare 
studeat, quae ipsi excogitassent, non quae dei verbum 
prescripsisset, Neque enim ferre hoc Deus potest, ut quidquam 
instituamus, quantumvis bonum in speciem, quod ipse non ante 
mandaverit. Nam opera nihil aeque commendat atque 
obedientia, si quis verbum sequatur." D. Martin Luthers 
Werke, Kritische Gesamtausgabe, Die Deutsch Bibel 12 vols. 
(Wiemar, 1906-1961), 5:5, hereafter refered to as W. A. D. B. 
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divine authorization. It was also directly contrary to God's 
law which prohibited child sacrifices. Moses wrote 
You must not worship the Lord your God in their way, 
because in worshipping their gods, they do all kinds of 
detestable things the Lord hates. They even burn their 
sons and daughters in the fire as sacrifices to their 
gods" (Deuteronomy 12:30).34  
Both Jephthah's vow and his sacrifice were made with-
out divine authorization. They were both sinful human inven-
tions contrary to God's will. Geisler claims that, "The 
Scripture appears to approve of Jephthah keeping the oath to 
kill."35 However, this is completely unsubstantiated by 
Scripture. There is nothing in the text that even remotely 
hints at such an idea. 
Thus Olson is correct when he states that this story 
contains no conflict of divine moral absolutes. This text 
cannot be used to refute the second tenet of non-conflicting 
absolutism. 
Geisler's fourth illustration with which he attempts 
to show a conflict between two moral absolutes, is the case 
34This point is repeated. "Let no one be found among 
you who sacrifices his son or daughter in the fire. . . . 
Anyone who does . . . is detestable to the Lord." 
Deuteronomy 18: 10-12. 
35Geisler, Options, 85; idem, Christian Ethics, 118. 
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of the Hebrew midwives (Exodus 1) and the case of Rahab 
(Joshua 2). In both of these stories, Geisler maintains, one 
can note a conflict between lying and showing mercy. 
In the case of the Hebrew midwives Pharaoh commanded 
the midwives, Shiphrah and Puah, to kill all of the newborn 
male Israelites (Exodus 1:15-16). However, they refused to 
obey. They let the children live. When they were asked why, 
they responded by lying, "Hebrew women are not like Egyptian 
women, they are vigorous and give birth before the midwives 
arrive" (Exodus 1:19). Geisler maintains that the midwives 
were confronted with a conflict of moral absolutes.36  
Because of their similarity, Geisler discusses the 
case of the Hebrew midwives together with the case of Rahab 
the prostitute (Joshua 2). Rahab hid two Israelite spies on 
the roof of her house in Jericho. When asked concerning 
their whereabouts she protected them by lying. "Yes, the men 
came to me, but. . . . I do not know which way they went. Go 
after them quickly. You may catch up with them" (Joshua 2:4-
5). In both of these cases Geisler maintains one can note an 
absolute conflict between "lying and not helping to save a 
life (that is, not showing mercy)."37 Thus, Geisler claims 
36Geisler, Options, 86. 
371bid. 
151 
that these examples refute the second tenet of the non-
conflicting absolutists which holds that moral absolutes 
never truly conflict. 
Olson responds by separating the two stories and 
discussing them individually.38 With respect to the Hebrew 
midwives, Olson points out that one must carefully distin-
guish between two different actions. The first action of the 
midwives was to disobey the Egyptian government. In this 
case the government was commanding something contrary to the 
law of God (that is, the death of the innocent male 
Israelites). The midwives were placed in a situation where 
they had to obey God rather than man.39 For this brave act 
they were commended by God. "So God was kind to the mid-
wives. . . . And because the midwives feared God, he gave 
them families of their own" (Exodus 1:20-21). 
3801son, 6-7. 
39Scripture teaches that, "Everyone must submit 
himself to the governing authorities, for there is no 
authority except that which God has established. The 
authorities that exist have been established by God. 
Consequently, he who rebels against the authority is 
rebelling against what God has instituted, and those who do 
so will bring judgment on themselves" (Romans 13:1-2). 
However, when the government misuses this delegated authority 
by commanding something contrary to God's will, then 
Scriptures also plainly teach that "We must obey God rather 
than men" (Acts 5:29). 
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The second action of the midwives was to lie when they 
were called to give an account of their actions. Olson says 
this lie was unnecessary. He explains, 
The commendation was for disobeying Pharaoh's command, 
which was a delegated authority misused by him. There 
are two separate actions here which must be distin-
guished. They disobeyed Pharaoh and were blessed for 
it. When called to account, they could (and possibly 
should) have acknowledged their disobedience (as Daniel 
and his companions did centuries later) .40 
Geisler attempts to answer this by writing, 
Olson wrongly concludes that the Bible does not commend 
the Hebrew midwives for deceiving Pharaoh when the text 
explicitly says following their deception that "because 
the midwives feared God, that He (God) established 
households for them (Ex. 1:21). It is sheer isogesis to 
claim that God blessed them in spite of their lie.41  
Once again in his latter work Geisler also reempha-
sizes that, "Nowhere in the text does God ever say they were 
blessed only for their mercy and in spite of their lie. 
Indeed, the lie was part of the mercy shown."42  
Contrary to what Geisler claims, the Biblical text 
clearly shows that there were at least two separate actions. 
17The midwives, however, feared God (rettplirroi 
40O1son, 7. 
41Geisler, "Response to Olson," 85. 
42Geisler, Christian Ethics, 122. 
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trril tirriltfi) and did not do what the king of Egypt had 
told them to do; they let the boys live. 18Then the king 
of Egypt summoned the midwives and asked them, "Why have 
you done this? Why have you let the boys live?" 
19The midwives answered Pharaoh, "Hebrew women are 
not like Egyptian women; they are vigorous and give 
birth before the midwives arrive." 
"So God was kind to the midwives and the people 
increased and became more numerous. 21And because the 
midwives feared God, (ntnrrnm r11hrn INT") he gave 
them families of their own. (Exodus 1:17-20)43  
The first action, along with the rationale for doing 
it, is stated in verse seventeen, "The midwives, however, 
feared God ontwrilti ciltrprr rrol, and . . . they let the 
boys live." In verse eighteen Pharaoh calls on the midwives 
to give an account of their actions. "Why have you done 
this? Why have you let the boys live?" 
The second action of the midwives is then related in 
verse nineteen. They lie to the king in an attempt to 
justify their previous disobedience.44 "Hebrew women are not 
43A11 Hebrew references are taken from the Biblia 
Hebraica Stuttgartensia W. Rudolph et H. P. RUger et alii 
eds., Editio secunda emendata (Stuttgart: Deutsche 
Bibelgesellschaft, 1984). 
44It is possible that this might not have been a lie. 
If this statement by the midwives is true, then, there is no 
conflict of moral absolutes, see John Murray, Principles of 
Conduct (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans Publishing Co.k 1957), 141, 
and Olson, 6. 
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like Egyptian women: they are vigorous and give birth before 
the midwives arrive." The midwives did not say this because 
they feared God. They said this because they feared the 
wrath of Pharaoh. 
God's response, and the reason for his response, is 
then given in verses twenty and twenty-one. "So God was kind 
to the midwives. . . . And because the midwives feared God 
(rthx-rrnt rlYrbn wilv-s) he gave them families of their 
own." 
Verses seventeen and twenty-one both contain the 
phrase "The midwives feared God." That specific phrase, in 
verse seventeen relates the reason for the first action of 
the midwives, (that is, their saving the male children). 
That same phrase used in verse twenty-one explains why God 
blessed them with families. This identical phrase, used 
twice, clearly links God's blessings in verse twenty-one back 
with the saving of the male Israelite children in verse 
seventeen. It is the fear of God and the consequent saving 
of the children, (that is, their faith expressing itself 
through love45), that is commended. There is no commenda- 
45"For in Christ Jesus neither circumcision nor 
uncircumcision has any value. The only thing that counts is 
faith expressing itself through love" Galatians 5:6. 
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tion for the lie that they told to Pharaoh. This lie seems 
to have been a weakness on their part. Walter Kaiser writes, 
They (the midwives) are praised for outright refusal to 
snuff out male infant lives. Their reverence for life 
reflected a reverence for God. . . . The juxtaposition 
of the account of their lie to Pharaoh in Exodus 1:19 
with the statement that God dealt well with them in 
verse 20 might appear to imply an endorsement of their 
lie. But this suspicion cannot be sustained in the 
text, for twice it attributes the reason for God's 
blessing them to the fact that they feared ["believed"] 
God [vv. 17 and 21] .46 
Thomas Aquinas similarly notes that, 
The midwives were not in fact rewarded for their lie, 
but for the fear of God and the good-heartedness behind 
it; notice that Exodus says pointedly, "And because the 
midwives feared God he built them houses." The ensuing 
lie, however, was not deserving of reward.47  
Augustine also emphasizes this point when he writes that, "It 
was not their lie but their faith and fear of God as well as 
their mercy toward the Israelite babies which pleased the 
Lord."48  
"Walter Kaiser, Toward Old Testament Ethics (Grand 
Rapids, MI: Zondervan Corporation, 1983), 273. 
47Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologiae 60 vols. Black-
friars edition. (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Co., 1964), 2a 
2ae.110,3. "Ad secundum dicendum quod obstetrices non sunt 
remuneratae pro mendacio, sed pro timore Dei et benevolentia 
ex qua processit mendacium. Unde signanter dicitur Exod. I, 
Et quia timuerunt obstetrices Deum, aedificavit illis domos. 
Mendacium vero postea sequens non fuit meritorium." Ibid. 
48John Gerhard, Theological Commonplaces Trans. 
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Thus Olson is correct in insisting that there are two 
separate actions. Contrary to Geisler's claim, the duty to 
be merciful, which was fulfilled in the first action, in no 
way conflicted with the duty to tell the truth, which was 
left unfulfilled in the second action. This story does not 
disprove the second tenet of non-conflicting absolutism. 
With respect to Rahab (Joshua 2) Olson believes that 
the situation is somewhat different. In this case Joshua had 
sent two spies into Jericho. Rahab hid these two men on the 
roof of her house. When the king of Jericho asked for the 
spies she protected them by lying. "I don't know which way 
they went. Go after them quickly. You may catch up with 
them" (Joshua 2:5). Here it seems that Rahab did indeed show 
mercy to the spies by means of her lie. 
However, Olson suggests that there are two possible 
answers.49 In the first place it is possible that the king 
Richard Dinda page 332. Unpublished. Located in the 
Concordia Seminary library, St. Louis, Missouri MFCH 81-1. 
This is a translation of Ioannis Gerhardi, Loci Theologici 
Ed. Preuss edition 10 vols. (Berolini: Gustav Schlawitz, 
1863), 3:79. We have been unable to determine the specific 
location from which this quote was taken. "Non mendacium 
ipsarum, sed fidem et timorem Dei ac misericordiam erga 
Isradliticos infantes Domino placuisse." Gerhardi, 3:79. 
4901son, 7. 
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was misusing the authority that had been delegated to him by 
God. If this were the case then Rahab would have been under 
no obligation to comply with his command, to reveal the 
location of the spies. She, like the midwives, would be 
obligated to obey God, and show mercy, rather than to obey 
man, and be an accessory to murder.50 Olson maintains that 
if the Jericho government lost the legitimacy of its rule it 
had no right to the truth. In this way there would have been 
no moral conflict for Rahab. For delegated authority is not 
absolute. It cannot bind the moral agent in a dilemma of 
absolute obligations, when it contradicts the will of God. 
Secondly, Olson suggests that, if the Jericho govern-
ment was not misusing its delegated authority then Rahab 
should not have lied. She could have protected the spies by 
some other means. 
There certainly were other options. She could have 
asked a question, "Do you think that I would hide 
Israelite spies?" This might have been an adequate 
diversion without lying.51  
Olson claims that if this were the case, then Scripture's 
commendation of Rahab was only for her faithfulness and fear 
50See footnote thirty-nine above. 
5101son, 7. 
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of God, and not for her lie.52  
Walter Kaiser stresses a similar point when he writes, 
But the areas of Rahab's faith must be strictly 
observed. It was not her lying that won her this divine 
recognition; rather it was her faith — she "believed in" 
the Lord God of the Hebrews. . . . The evidence of her 
faith was seen in the works of receiving the spies and 
sending them out another way. . . . But her lying was an 
unnecessary accouterment to both of the above approved 
responses.53  
John Murray also emphasizes that one should not 
confuse the lying of Rahab with her good deeds. These must 
be distinguished. He explains, 
It is strange theology that will insist that the 
approval of her faith and works in receiving the spies 
and helping them to escape must embrace the approval of 
all the actions associated with her praiseworthy 
conduct.54  
Augustine also points out that Rahab performed good 
works that were not part of the lie. 
Rahab in Jericho received hospitably the men of God who 
were strangers, because she ran a risk in receiving 
them, because she believed in their God, because she hid 
52Ibid. Rahab's words do contain a beautiful 
confession of faith when she says "For the Lord your God is 
God in heaven above and on the earth below" Joshua 2:11b. 
53Walter Kaiser, Toward Old Testament Ethics, 272. 
54John Murray, Principles of Conduct (Grand Rapids, 
MI: Eerdmans Publishing Co., 1957), 138. 
159 
them carefully where she could, because she gave them 
most reliable counsel about another way of going back— 
for all these reasons may she be praised and 
imitated But, the fact that she lied is not 
wisely proposed for imitation, even if . . . God was 
mindful to reward those good deeds of hers and clement 
in pardoning this bad one.55  
The New Testament seems to support this same 
argument. It also separates Rahab's lie from the other 
actions of love which proceeded from her faith. The New 
Testament makes no mention of her lie. However, the letter to 
the Hebrews specifically commends her for her faith and for 
welcoming the spies. "By faith the prostitute Rahab, because 
she welcomed the spies, was not killed with those who were 
disobedient" Hebrews 11:31. James commends Rahab for giving 
lodging to the spies and for sending them off in another 
direction. "In the same way, was not even Rahab the 
55Augustine, "Against Lying," The Fathers of the 
Church 85 vols. edited by Roy J. Deferrari et alii., 
translated by Harold B. Jaffee it alii (New York: Fathers of 
the Church Inc., 1947-1991), 16:170. "Proinde Raab in 
Jericho, quia peregrinos homines Dei suscepit hospitio, quia 
in eorum susceptione periclitata est, quia in eorum Deum 
credidit, quia diligiter eos ubi potuit occultavit, quia per 
aliam viam remeandiconsilium fidelissimum 
dedit, . . . imitanda laudetur. Quad autem mentita 
est . . . non tamen imitandum sapienter proponitur: quamvis 
Deus illa bona memorabiliter honoraverit, hoc malum clementer 
ignoverit." Augustine, "Contra Mendacium," Migne P. L. 
40:542-43. 
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prostitute considered righteous for what she did when she 
gave lodging to the spies and sent them off in a different 
direction?" James 2:25. In these two verses any reference to 
Rahab's lie is conspicuously absent. Thus the New Testament 
distinguishes her lie from her commendable faith and conse-
quent good works. 
In his initial response to Olson, Geisler does not 
respond to Olson's first suggestion, that the Jericho govern-
ment may have lost the legitimacy of its authority and conse-
quently was not entitled to the truth. Nor does he consider 
the possibility, that one might distinguish between Rahab's 
lie and her faith active in her other works of love. In his 
initial response to Olson there is no discussion of Rahab at 
all. Such an omission is rather conspicuous by its 
absence.56  
In Geisler's latter book he writes, 
It was by means of the lie that Rahab's mercy was 
expressed and the spies were saved. . . . There was no 
formal separation between the lie and the act of mercy. 
And a mere formal distinction will not suffice as an 
explanation, since in actuality there was only one 
act.57  
56Geisler, "Response to Olson." 
57Geisler, Christian Ethics, 88-89. 
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Here again the possibility that there was no dilemma, because 
the Jericho government may have lost the legitimacy of its 
authority is completely ignored. His response to Olson is 
inadequate. Olson suggested that even if the government had 
not lost its divine legitimacy there is still no dilemma. 
Rahab's duty to be merciful to the spies did not conflict 
with her duty to tell the truth; since these were separate 
actions. Geisler responds simply with, "And a mere formal 
distinction will not suffice as an explanation since in 
actually there was only one act."58 The quotes given above 
from the New Testament, Augustine, John Murray and Walter 
Kaiser all show that there is much more here than a mere 
superficial distinction. 
For Rahab not only believed in the God of Israel, but 
that faith was put into loving action in a variety of ways. 
She welcomed the spies, gave them information about the mind-
set of the people (Joshua 2:10-11), sent the spies to her 
roof, and then directed them safely out her window. All of 
58Ibid. It is difficult to determine what Geisler has 
against "formal distinctions" since they are essential in the 
correct understanding of theology (for example, among the 
persons of the Trinity as well as between the two natures of 
Christ). However, in this context he seems to use the phrase 
to refer to some distinction that is trivial and superficial, 
such as, "Guns don't shoot people, people shoot people." For 
the sake of discussion we will accept his use of this phrase. 
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these can be more than merely formally distinguished from her 
lie. In the first place, her faith provided the motivation 
for the performance of these works of love. There is more 
than a mere superficial distinction between one's motivation 
and the act that is performed. In the second place, these 
actions listed above are clearly temporally distinct from her 
lie. Contrary to what Geisler claims there is more here than 
just one act. 
Once again Geisler's illustration does not serve his 
intended purpose. The story of Rahab does not illustrate a 
conflict between two moral absolutes. It does not refute the 
second tenet of non-conflicting absolutism. 
Geisler's fifth illustration with which he attempts to 
show a conflict between two moral absolutes, and thereby 
discredit the second tenet of non-conflicting absolutism, is 
the so called "moral conflict of the cross."59 Geisler 
claims that at Calvary one can clearly see a moral conflict 
between two absolute principles. "The two moral principles 
are: (1) The innocent should not be punished for sins he 
never committed (Ezek. 18:20), and yet (2) Christ was 
punished for our sins (Isa. 53; I Peter 2:24;3:18; II Cor. 
5:21).,60  
59Geisler, Options, 86. 
60Geisler, Options, 86. 
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Olson responds that there is no real conflict here 
because, in the first place, "Christ went voluntarily to the 
cross . . . [and] the victim of injustice is in no way 
violating any absolute principle of morality by voluntarily 
submitting to injustice. u61  In the second place, quoting 
Rakestraw, Olson adds, "The moral conflict of the cross is 
'completely outside the realm of practical Christian ethics 
and is unique in history. ,”62 
Geisler attempts to defend this fifth illustration 
against Olson's criticism by writing, 
Olson sees no moral conflict in the Cross because he is 
not looking deep [sic] enough. The Cross is not simply 
a conflict between justice and mercy. According to the 
Scripture God punished an innocent person (Christ) for 
the guilty . . . . Olson seems totally unaware of this 
point.63  
Both Olson and Geisler miss the main point concerning 
the conflict of Calvary. To be sure, from the human perspec- 
6101son, 7. 
62Olson, 7-8. This contains a quote from Rakestraw, 
47. 
63Geisler, "Response to Olson," 85. See also 
Christian Ethics, 119 where he repeats this same argument 
adding the following analogy, "This is like saying it was not 
immoral for Jim Jones to order the Jonestown suicide because 
his followers did it willingly!" Ibid. 
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tive, there appears to be a conflict at Calvary within God's 
will; however, it is a conflict between the law and the 
gospel. It is not a conflict within the law between two 
legal absolutes. Olson is incorrect when he assumes that the 
conflict is resolved simply because Christ willingly submit-
ted himself to die.64 Likewise, when Geisler says, "The two 
moral principles are: (1) the innocent should not be punished 
for sins he never committed . . . and yet (2) Christ was 
punished for our sins,"65 he is forgetting that the second 
principle he lists is not a legal moral principle at all; but 
rather, it is the foundation of the Gospel. Christ's death 
on Calvary cannot serve as an example of a legal conflict 
between two absolute moral commands. 
The sixth and final illustration Geisler gives, in an 
attempt to show a conflict of moral absolutes, and thereby 
refute the second tenet of non-conflicting absolutism, is a 
conglomeration of Bible stories which show a conflict between 
obedience to civil government and obedience to God. He 
writes, 
"However, we would agree with his statement, from 
Rakestraw, emphasizing that the uniqueness of the event 
places it outside the realm of Christian ethics. 
65Geisler, Options 86. 
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Sixth, there are numerous cases in Scripture in which 
there is a real conflict between obeying God's command 
to submit to civil government and keeping one's duty to 
some other (higher) moral law. For example, the Hebrew 
midwives disregarded Pharaoh's command to kill all male 
infants (Exod. 1); the Jewish captives disregarded 
Nebuchadnezzar's command to worship the golden image of 
himself (Dan. 3); Daniel disregarded Darius's [sic] 
command to pray only to the king (Dan. 6). In each case 
there was plainly no other alternative; those involved 
had to follow one or the other of the two commandments. 
Even the unqualified absolutists [that is, non-conflict-
ing absolutists] admit the unavoidability of the 
conflict, since he reduces one command (the civil one) 
to a lower level. This maneuver, however, does not take 
away from the fact that (1) both are commands from God 
with moral implications, and (2) the situation was 
personally unavoidable." 
Olson does not specifically respond to this sixth 
point of Geisler. Olson must have thought it was unnecessary 
to explicitly respond to this since he had already discussed 
that the divine command to obey delegated authorities is not 
absolute. When the civil government commands one to do that 
which is contrary to God's Word, one is no longer obligated 
to obey that government. One must obey God rather than man 
(Acts 5:29). A government which loses the legitimacy of its 
rule in this fashion cannot bind a moral agent in a dilemma 
of two moral absolutes. 
Geisler is aware of this. He mentions in the above 
"Ibid., 87. 
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quote that, "The unqualified absolutist . . . reduces one 
command (the civil one) to a lower level."67 Then he contin-
ues with, "This maneuver, however, does not take way from the 
fact that (1) both are commands from God with moral implica-
tions, and (2) the situation was personally unavoidable. ”68 
First, placing delegated authority on a secondary, 
non-absolute level, is not a "maneuver" of the non-
conflicting absolutists. it is plainly Scriptural. Second, 
the two responses which he gives to this, while factually 
true, add nothing to the discussion. Granted, the examples 
he gives show situations which were "personally unavoidable." 
They also contained conflicting "commands from God." 
However, as long as one of the two commands is not an 
absolute, there is no absolute moral dilemma. In the six 
illustrations which Geisler gives, in his attempt to show the 
existence of absolute moral conflicts, none of them have 
succeeded. 
The second tenet of non-conflicting absolutism, that 
claims "Divinely given moral absolutes never truly con-





examples show that such conflicts do indeed occur. Such con- 
flicts may be arranged into at least two different cate-
gories, bioethical conflicts and social conflicts. 
In bioethics one may note at least three different 
types of absolute moral conflicts. The first type is a con-
flict concerning the application of the fifth commandment, 
"You shall not murder" (Exodus 20:13).70 On some occasions a 
"Contrary to a minimalist interpretation of the law, 
which would apply each commandment in a very narrow sense, 
Jesus favors a maximal interpretation of the law which 
applies each commandment in the broadest possible way. This 
is exemplified in his interpretation of the fifth commandment 
when he says, "You have heard that it was said to the people 
long ago, 'Do not murder, and anyone who murders will be 
subject to judgment.' But I tell you that anyone who is 
angry with his brother will be subject to judgment. Again 
anyone who says to his brother, 'Raca,' is answerable to the 
Sanhedrin. But anyone who says, 'You fool!' will be in 
danger of the fire of hell." Matthew 5:21-22. Jesus also 
exemplifies this maximal interpretation of the law in his 
explanation to the sixth commandment. "You have heard that it 
was said, 'Do not commit adultery.' But I tell you that 
anyone who looks at a woman lustfully has already committed 
adultery with her in his heart." Matthew 5:27-28. 
Luther also emphasized this maximal interpretation of 
the fifth commandment in his Grosser Katechismus when he 
wrote, "Zum andern ist auch dieses Gepots schUldig nicht 
allein, der da Bases tuet, sondern auch, wer dem Nahisten 
Guts tuen, zuvorkommen, wehren, schUtzen und retten kann, 
dass ihm kein Leid noch Schaden am Leibe widerfahre, und tuet 
es nicht." Die Bekenntnisschriften Kirche (Gottingen: 
Vandenhoeck + Ruprecht, 1986), 608. 
Calvin also followed the maximal interpretation of 
this commandment in his Institutes where he writes, "In summa 
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conflict may occur between the lives of two individuals. 
This is illustrated in the case of the therapeutic abortion. 
An obstetrician who is confronted with an ectopic pregnancy 
may be forced to sacrifice the life of the embryo in order to 
save the life of the mother.71 Also pregnant women who have 
certain kidney problems can die of uremic poisoning if the 
pregnancy is not terminated.72  
ergo violentia omnis et iniuria, ac omnino quaevis noxa, qua 
proximi corpus laedatur, nobis interdicitur. Ac proinde 
iubemur, si quid in opera nostra ad tuendam proximorum vitam 
subsidii est, . . . depellendis noxis excubare; si quo in 
discrimine sunt, praebere manum auxiliarem." Ioannis Calvini 
Opera Quae Supersunt Omnia, ed. Guilielmus Baum, Eduardus 
Cunitz, and Eduardus Reuss, vol. 30 Corpus Reformatorum 
(Brunsvigae: C. A. Schwetschke et Filium, 1864), 294. 
This maximal understanding of the law is accepted by 
the author of this dissertation and assumed throughout this 
study. 
71There are approximately 75,000 ectopic pregnancies 
per year in the United States. Half of these are 
spontaneously aborted during the early stages of pregnancy. 
Induced abortions are performed on the other half to save the 
life of the mother. James Childress, "Ethics, Public Policy 
and Human Fetal Tissue Transplantation Research," Kennedy 
Institute of Ethics Journal 1 (June 1991): 97, citing Dorothy 
Vawter, et alii. "The Use of Human Fetal Tissue: Scientific, 
Ethical, and Policy Concerns." A Report of Phase 1 of an 
Interdisciplinary Research Project conducted by the Center 
for Biomedical Ethics, January 1990, University of Minnesota. 
72Thomas Garrett, Harold Baillie, and Rosellen 
Garrett, Health Care Ethics Principles + Problems (Englewood 
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Those who recognize the fetus as having a serious right 
to life must face and resolve not only the conflict of 
rights but the emotional turmoil and anguish of being in 
what is often a no-win situation . . . . No matter what 
choice is made, great evil follows. . . . This seems to 
be part and parcel of the human condition. . . . 
Regardless of what decision has been made, she ought to 
act with sorrow, knowing that a real good has been sac-
rificed. . . . no matter what you do, a great evil will 
result.73  
Due to the very structure of these situations the moral agent 
finds herself in a tragic, "no-win" situation. No matter 
which decision is made a life will be taken and the fifth 
commandment will be broken.74  
Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall, 1989), 148. "In other cases, the 
pregnancy might not lead to death but could threaten serious 
and permanent impairment of the woman's health. Thus, a 
woman with diabetes might lose her sight if the fetus is 
carried to term." Ibid. 
73Ibid., 149. "When something less than the woman's 
life is at stake, it seems simple to resolve the conflict 
since a serious right to life ought to take precedence over a 
right to some lesser good, such as one's eyesight . . . . 
This may be true in many cases, but in other cases such as 
analysis is simplistic . . . . the woman must consider the 
good of the family who might have a blind . . . mother if the 
fetus is carried to term." Ibid. 
74This conflict, and the others mentioned below, will 
evoke questions concerning the distinction between actions 
that are intended and actions that are unintended. This 
distinction is discussed below with respect to the theory of 
double effect in tenet number six of non-conflicting absolu-
tism. The reader may wish to consult that at this point. 
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The second bioethical conflict is between telling the 
truth and showing mercy. Scripture demands truthfulness.75  
Yet it also demands that we show mercy.76 If a merciful 
action is understood as that type of action exemplified by 
the good Samaritan,77 and if lying is understood as an inten-
tional deception,78 then there are situations when such 
merciful promotions of healing conflict with telling the 
truth. Such a conflict is especially prevalent in the 
75"You shall not give false testimony against your 
neighbor." Exodus 20:16. "Do not lie. Do not deceive one 
another." Leviticus 19:11. "Do not lie to each other." 
Colossians 3:9. "Therefore each of you must put off 
falsehood and speak truthfully to his neighbor." Ephesians 
4:25. 
76"For I desire mercy, not sacrifice." Hosea 6:6. 
"And what does the Lord require of you? To act justly and to 
love mercy and to walk humbly with your God." Micah 6:8. 
"Blessed are the merciful for they will be shown mercy." 
Matthew 5:7. "Be merciful, just as your Father is merciful." 
Luke 6:36. 
77After telling this parable Jesus asked, "'Which of 
these three do you think was a neighbor to the man who fell 
into the hands of robbers?' 
The expert in the law replied, 'The one who had mercy 
on him. 
Jesus told him, 'Go and do likewise.'" Luke 10:36-37. 
78Qua propter ille mentitur, qui aliud habet in animo, 
et aliud verbis vel quibuslibet significationibus enuntiat." 
Augustine "De Mendacio" Migne P. L. 40:488. 
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medical use of placebos.79 This is illustrated in the fol-
lowing example. 
A sixty-five-year-old retired army officer had several 
abdominal operations for gallstones, postoperative adhe-
sions, and bowel obstructions. Because of chronic 
abdominal pain, loss of weight, and social withdrawal, 
he voluntarily entered a psychiatric ward. Although he 
had had a very productive military, teaching, and 
research career, he was now somewhat depressed and 
unkept and had poor hygiene. Furthermore, he and his 
wife had curtailed their social activities because he 
could not control his pain without assuming awkward and 
embarrassing postures. He relied on six self-adminis-
tered injections each day of Talwin (Pentazocine), which 
he believed to be essential to control his pain. He 
quoted the early literature to support his claim that 
Talwin is nonaddictive; later studies, however, indi-
cated that it is addictive. Having used this medication 
for more than two years, he had so much tissue and 
muscle damage that he had difficulty finding injection 
sites. His goal for therapy was to "get more out of 
79"The therapeutic use of placebos merits special 
attention because it is common in medicine and usually 
involves deception or incomplete disclosure of information. 
A placebo (from the Latin for "I shall please") is a 
substance or procedure that the health-care professional 
believes to be pharmacologically or biomedically inert for 
the condition being treated. Studies indicate that placebos 
relieve some symptoms of approximately thirty-five percent of 
patients who suffer from such conditions as angina pectoris, 
cough, anxiety, depression, hypertension, headache, and the 
common cold . . . . Fundamental moral questions appear in the 
use of placebos without the patient's knowledge or consent, 
where the physician engages in nondisclosure, incomplete 
disclosure, or deception." Tom L. Beauchamp and James F. 
Childress, Principles of Biomedical Ethics, 3d ed., (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 1989), 93. 
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life in spite of my pain." 
This psychiatric ward included behavior therapy 
programs, daily group therapy, ward government, and 
social activities, and the staff ignored pain behaviors 
in order to avoid reinforcing them. Their positive 
procedures included relaxation techniques, covert 
imagery, and cognitive relabeling. Although the patient 
had voluntarily admitted himself to this ward, where 
adjustment in medication was a clear expectation, he 
refused to allow direct modification of his Talwin 
dosage levels on the grounds that his experience showed 
that the level of medication was indispensable to 
controlling his pain. After considerable discussion 
with colleagues, the therapists decided to withdraw the 
Talwin over time without the patient's knowledge by 
diluting it with increasing proportions of normal 
saline. Although the patient experienced nausea, 
diarrhea, and cramps, he thought that these withdrawal 
symptoms were actually the result of Elavil 
(Amitriptyline), which the therapists had introduced to 
relieve the withdrawal symptoms. While the therapists 
did not use Elavil to deceive the patient, it served 
that purpose, for he blamed it for his discomfort. The 
staff had informed the patient that his medication 
regime would be modified but had not given him the 
details. 
After three weeks of saline injections, the thera-
pists explained what had been done. At first, the 
patient was incredulous and angry, but he asked that the 
saline be discontinued and the self-control techniques 
continued. When he was discharged three weeks later, he 
reported that he experienced some abdominal pain but 
that he could control it more effectively with the self-
control techniques than previously with the Talwin. A 
follow-up six months later showed that he was still 
using the relaxation techniques and had resumed social 
activities and part-time teaching. 80 
80Ibid., 406-407. The conflict between truth and 
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In this case study the physicians knew that it was in 
the best interest of the patient to gradually withdraw him 
from the use of the pain killer, Talwin (Pentazocine), to 
which he had become addicted. They mercifully sought a way 
whereby he could control his pain and resume a more active 
life. However, they realized that intentional deception was 
necessary if they were to succeed. In this way they were 
confined within a dilemmatic situation. Either they would 
show mercy and help the patient, in which case it would be 
necessary to break God's absolute command against lying; or 
they would speak the truth to the patient and thereby fail to 
comply with God's absolute command to show mercy. There is 
no third alternative. There is no way to avoid sin in such a 
conflict situation.81  
mercy is not confined to the use of placebos. For an example 
of such a conflict that is not caused by placebos the reader 
may see case six in Beauchamp and Childress, Principles of 
Biomedical Ethics, 407-408. 
81In the field of bioethics the conflict between truth 
and mercy is often discussed in terms of patient autonomy 
(especially with respect to disclosure and consent) 
conflicting with beneficence, occasioning the problem of 
paternalism. For more information concerning this conflict, 
particularly with respect to the use of placebos the reader 
may wish to see A. Shapiro, "Attitudes Toward the Use of 
Placebos in Treatment," Journal of Nervous and Mental 
Disease, 130 (1960): 200-211, H. Brady, "The Lie that Heals: 
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A third type of bioethical conflict occurs when there 
is opposition between God's absolute law to show mercy and 
his absolute law not to kill. This may occur with the termi-
nally ill patient who is suffering unbearable pain. This is 
illustrated in the following case that came before the 
English courts in 1989. In this case "Baby C" had become a 
ward of the court. The judge asked one of the nation's fore-
most pediatricians to examine "Baby C." Below is an excerpt 
from his report. 
The records revealed that at birth she had a much more 
serious condition than the usual type of hydrocephalus. 
The detailed investigations which were done showed that 
there was not merely a blockage of cerebro-spinal fluid 
within the brain, but that the brain structure itself 
was poorly formed. . . . [C's] appearance is of a tiny 
baby. Although she is 16 weeks old, she is the size of 
a 4 week baby apart from her head, which is unusually 
large by way of being tall and thin-squashed because of 
sleeping on her side. She lies quiet until handled and 
then she cries as if irritated. Her eyes move wildly in 
an uncoordinated way and she does not appear to see. 
(Her pupils do not respond to light so it is most un-
likely that the mechanism for vision is present). She 
The Ethics of Giving Placebos," Annals of Internal Medicine 
97 (1982): 112-118, U. Knapp, and R. J. Michock;, "Placebos: 
Who's Being Fooled?" American Pharmacy 24 (1984): 4-5, Mary 
C. Rawlinson, "Truth-Telling and Paternalism in the Clinic: 
Philosophical Reflections on The Use of Placebos in Medical 
Practice," chap. in Placebo: Theory, Research and Mechanisms 
(New York: Guilford Press, 1985). Carol A. VanKirk and 
Edward D. Schreck, "Truth-Telling and Placebos: A Conflict of 
Duties," Listening 22 (Winter 1987): 52-64. 
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did not respond to very loud noises that I made, though 
the nurses said that she sometimes seems startled to 
their loud noises. However, my impression was that she 
did not hear, or had very poor hearing. She holds her 
limbs in a stiff flexed position. More detailed exami-
nation suggested that she had generalized spasticity of 
all her limbs as a result of the brain damage. The only 
social response she makes is the irritable crying when 
handled, though sometimes she can be pacified by strok-
ing her face. She does not smile and does not respond in 
any other way. The only certain evidence of her feeling 
or appreciating events is the report of her quietening 
when her face is stroked. Thus she does not have the 
developmental skills and abilities of a normal new born 
baby. It is inconceivable that appreciable skills will 
develop, bearing in mind that there had been no progress 
during the past four months. She has severe brain 
damage. She is very thin and has not gained weight 
despite devoted nursing care at [the hospital]. She is 
receiving regular small doses of the sedative Chloral. 
If she does not receive that she cries "as if in pain", 
though the carers are unsure where the pain originates. 
I do not believe that there is any treatment which will 
alter the ultimate prognosis, which appears to be 
hopeless. She has massive handicap as a result of a 
permanent brain lesion. Her handicap appears to be a 
mixture of severe mental handicap, blindness, probably 
deafness and spastic cerebral palsy of all four limbs. 
In addition, although given a normal amount of food, her 
body is not absorbing or using it in the normal way so 
that she is not growing. . . . In the event of her 
acquiring a serious infection, or being unable to take 
feeds normally by mouth I do not think it would be cor-
rect to give antibiotics, to set up intravenous fusions 
or nasal-gastric feedings regimes. Such action would be 
prolonging a life which has no future . . . . [One must 
bear] in mind the balance between short-term gain and 
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needless prolongation of suffering. 82 
In this case study the pediatrician mercifully 
suggests that the dying of baby C not be prolonged. He 
writes, 
In the event of her acquiring a serious infection, or 
being unable to take feeds normally by mouth I do not 
think it would be correct to give antibiotics, to set up 
intravenous fusions or nasal-gastric feeding regimes. 
Such action would be prolonging a life which has no 
future.83  
However, such a merciful action, which refuses to prolong the 
suffering of this terminally ill infant, also fails to "do 
him [her] good, prevent, resist evil, defend and save him 
[her], so that no bodily harm or hurt happen to him [her], ”84 
and is thus guilty of breaking the fifth commandment. 
On the other hand the physicians could obey the fifth 
commandment and "defend and save him [her] so that no bodily 
82A11 England Law Reports, Peter Hutchesson, ed. 
(London: Butterworths, 1989), 2: 785. 
831bid. 
84Luther, Concordia Triglotta "The Large Catechism" 
(St. Louis: Concordia Publishing House, 1921), 635. Luther 
adds, "Darumb heisset auch Gott billich die alle Murder, so 
in NOten und Fahr Leibs und Lebens nicht raten noch helfen, 
und wird gar schrecklich Urteil fiber sie gehen lassen am 
jUngsten Tage." Die Bekenntnisschriften 608-609. 
177 
harm or hurt happen to him [her] ..85  However, they would 
then fail to show mercy and would be prolonging the suffering 
of this terminally ill child." Once again, as with the 
other two examples given above, there is no third alterna-
tive. There is no way to avoid sin. Thus the Christian is 
confronted with an insoluble moral dilemma. 
Upon examining society at large, one may note at least 
two different ethical problems which often involve moral 
dilemmas. These are the problems of divorce and the just 
war. Helmut Thielicke discusses these problems within the 
context of "God's compromises with the world" and the 
distinction between God's proper will and his alien will 
('der aliena and der propria voluntas).87  
85Luther, Concordia Triglotta, 635. 
86This conflict between mercy and murder is usually 
discussed in bioethics in terms of withdrawing or withholding 
ordinary or extraordinary care and occasions the problem of 
euthanasia. For more bibliographical information on the 
bioethical problems discussed in this section the reader may 
wish to see, The Hastings Center's Bibliography of Ethics, 
Biomedicine, and Professional Responsibility (Frederick, MD: 
university Publications of America, Inc., 1984), and LeRoy 
Walters and Tamer Joy Kahn, eds., Bibliography of Bioethics 
published annually by the Kennedy Institute of Ethics 
(Washington DC: Georgetown University, 1975, Samuel 
Southard, ed., Death and Dying: A Bibliography Survey (New 
York: Greenwood Press, 1991). 
87Helmut Thielicke, Theological Ethics trans. John w. 
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Thielicke's distinction, between the proper will and 
the alien will of God, corresponds to the distinction, 
between God's primary will and his secondary will, that was 
made above. Thielicke identifies the primary will of God as 
being his proper will. That was the original "true will of 
God" ("eigentlichen" Willen Gottes) .88  However, due to the 
present sinful state of the world, it cannot tolerate this 
proper will of God. 
The world would be broken and consumed by the "true" 
will of God represented in the plan of creation. It 
would wither before the immediacy of the divine majesty. 
Hence God relativizes his own demand in order that man 
may live, in order that man may be granted the kairos of 
God's ongoing salvation history.89  
Thielicke explains that the motive behind this 
relativization of God's law is not a weakness on the part of 
God. This alien or secondary will of God is not improper 
Doberstein, vol. 1., Foundations (Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans 
Publishing Co., 1979), 567-77, 655-660. Theologische Ethik 
vol. 2. 1. (Tlibingen: J. C. B. Mohr, 1955), 190-201, 314-320. 
88Thielicke, Ethics, 1:567. Ethik, 2.1:190. 
89Thielicke, Ethics 1:569. "Die Welt wiirde am 
'eigentlichen' Willen Gottes, wie ihn der SchOpfungsentwurf 
reprasentiert, zerbrechen und verbrennen. Sie mUsste an der 
Unmittelbarkeit der gottlichen Majestat sterben. So 
relativiert Gott seine eigene Forderung, um den Menschen 
leben zu lassen und ihm den Rairos seiner weiterlaufenden 
Heilsgeschichte zu gonnen." Ethik, 2.1:192. 
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(uneigentlichen) in the sense of being depraved 
(depravierten). Nor does it essentially contradict the 
divine motive of the primary will. 
The motive behind the alien will of God is rather that 
of his condescending love. . . . For this reason the 
alien will cannot be regarded dynamically as compromise. 
It must rather be understood soteriologically as divine 
condescension. . . . 
Consequently, when we have to do with God's alien 
will, we are not dealing with an impropriety stemming 
from weakness. On the contrary, we are dealing with an 
expression of God's true being, with his patience and 
grace." 
In this way the distinction between the proper and the 
alien will of God does not present a division or a dichotomy 
within the essence of the divine nature itself. Thielicke 
explains that this distinction is analogous to the distinc-
tion between law and gospel. 
It is a movement like that between the Law and the 
Gospel, where again I cannot objectively see and fix the 
unity. Theologically I cannot make the unity of God an 
"Thielicke, Ethics, 1:657. "Das Motiv der voluntas 
Dei aliena ist vielmehr seine sich herabneigende, auf den 
Fortbestand, auf den Kairos des Emporers bedachte Liebe. Die 
voluntas aliena darf darum nicht dynamisch als Kompromiss, 
sondern sie muss soteriologisch als Kondeszendenz Gottes 
verstanden werden. . . . 
Es geht folglich in dem alienum des gottlichen Willens 
nicht um eine Uneigentlichkeit aus Schwache, sondern es geht 
um eine Ausserungsform seines eigentlichen Wesens, namlich um 
Geduld and Gnade." Ethik, 2.1:316. 
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objective matter in which the author of the Law and the 
author of the Gospel are seen to be identical; I can 
only believe in this unity.91  
One example of the condescension of God's secondary 
will may be noted in the divine attitude change concerning 
divorce. It is God's primary will that husband and wife live 
together.92 However, in an adulterous situation, God's 
secondary will graciously allows for divorce.93 In an 
abusive case where one's life is in danger, or where the 
lives of one's children are at stake, God's secondary will 
91Thielicke, Ethics, 658-59. "Es ist mit dieser 
Bewegung ahnlich wie mit der Bewegung zwischen Gesetz und 
Evangelium: auch hier kann ich die Einheit von beidem nicht 
gegenstandlich sehen und fixiern. Ich kann Gott theologisch 
nicht als eine Einheit konstruieren und gegenstandlich 
machen, in welcher der auctor des Gesetzes und des 
Evangeliums in seiner Identitat sichtbar ist; aber ich glaube 
ihn als diese Einheit." Ethik, 2.1:318. 
92"But at the beginning of creation God 'made them 
male and female.' For this reason a man will leave his 
father and mother and be united to his wife, and the two will 
become one flesh.' So they are no longer two, but one. 
Therefore what God has joined together, let man not separate. 
. . . Anyone who divorces his wife and marries another 
woman commits adultery against her. And if she divorces her 
husband and marries another man, she commits adultery" Mark 
10:6-9,11. "A wife must not separate from her husband" 1 
Corinthians 7:10b. 
93"I tell you that anyone who divorces his wife, 
except for marital unfaithfulness, and marries another woman 
commits adultery" Matthew 19:9. 
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may even demand a divorce. Thielicke explains, 
This alteration [in God's will] is most clearly seen 
when Jesus sets aside the divine permission of Mosaic 
divorce (Matt. 19:7; Mark 10:4). He points out that 
"from the beginning" of creation it was not so. Divorce 
does not correspond to the true [that is, primary] will 
of God or the true plan of creation but is simply a con-
cession of the divine patience to the "hardness" of 
men's hearts which sometimes makes divorce indispensable 
(Matt. 19:8: Mark 10:6).94  
God's secondary will may allow, or even require, a 
woman to get a divorce in order to save her life from an 
abusive husband; yet, at the same time his primary will 
94Thielicke, Ethics, 571. "Am deutlichsten tritt 
diese Alteration zutage, wenn Jesus zwar die gottliche 
Erlaubtheit des mosaischen Scheidebriefes einraumt, wenn er 
aber gleichzeitig darauf hinweist, dass "von Anfang der 
Schopfung" so nicht gewesen sei, dass es darum auch dem 
eigentlichen Willen Gottes und dem eigentlichen 
Schopfungsentwurf nicht entspreche, sondern nur eine 
Konzession der gOttlichen Geduld an die menschliche 
"Herzenshartigkeit" sei, die unter bestimmten Umstanden der 
Ehescheidung eben nicht entraten konne." Ethik 2.1:194. 
Thieliche continues by adding, "Warde aber das 
Schopfungsgebot, gemass dem Mann und Weib einander endgultig 
zugeordnet sind, ungebrochen aufrechterhalten, so wurde das 
in der Welt der Schwache und der aKkripwcapaia zu unertraglichen 
Zustanden fahren. Das radikale SchOpfungsgebot wiirde in 
dieser Welt und auf dieser Ebene nur Schrecken und Chaos 
stiften. Die Welt ist dem gottlichen Entwurf so entfremdet, 
dass sie an ihm zerbrechen und zugrunde gehen masste, wenn 
Gott nicht die Gnade seines sich akkommodierenden Eingehens 
aber das Recht seines urspriinglichen Anspruches triumphieren 
liesse." Thielicke, Ethik, 2.1:194. 
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condemns such action, because divorce, no matter how neces-
sary it may be, is still less than the perfection which God's 
primary will desires. She too must repent. For her divorce 
illustrates that she, by her very action of divorce, is 
participating in (and thereby sharing the guilt of) a 
marriage which is less than what God's primary will demands. 
The second example of a social problem that involves a 
moral dilemma is the problem of the just war. This also may 
be analyzed in terms of a conflict between the primary and 
secondary will of God. 
It is God's primary will that humankind live together 
in peace and harmony.95 Yet, God's secondary will may allow 
or even demand one to participate in a just war.96  
95The pacifists emphasize God's primary will when they 
mention such passages as, "Blessed are the peacemakers for 
they will be called sons of God" Matthew 5:9. "If it is 
possible, as far as it depends on you, live at peace with 
everyone (Ircirrow avepoinow)" Romans 12:18. "Finally my 
brothers, good-by. Aim for perfection, listen to my appeal, 
be of one mind, live at peace (dwrivekTe). And the God of 
love and peace will be with you" 2 Corinthians 13:11. "Make 
every effort to live in peace with all men Minim 61ASKETE yeTi 
Trcivrwv)" Hebrews 12:14a. All Greek references are taken from 
the Novum Testamentum Graece, Eberhard Nestle and Kurt Aland, 
eds. 26 edition (Stuttgart: Deutsche Bibelgesellschaft, 
1979). 
96Luther and the other advocates of the just war 
theory emphasize God's secondary will when they point out 
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With this duality in mind a Christian soldier may 
serve in the military with a clear conscience. For in this 
sinful world the vocation of the soldier is needed. It is an 
important service of love.97 However, that cannot be the 
that participation in a just war is not contrary to God's 
will. Luther writes, "Auff die weysse haben das schwerd 
gefuret alle heyligen von anfang der willt, Adam mit seynen 
nachkomen. Alsso furet es Abraham, da er Lot, seynes bruders 
son, erredtet und schlug die vier konige, Gen. 14. so er doch 
gantz und gar eyn Euangelisch man war. Also schlug Samuel, 
der heylige prophet den konig Hagag, .1. Reg: .15. Unnd 
Elias die propheten Baal, 3. Reg: .18. Alsso habens gefurt 
Mose, Josua, die kinder Israel, Samson, David und alle konige 
und fursten ym allten testament. Item Daniel und seyne 
gesellen Ananias, Asarias und Misael zu Babylonen. Item 
Joseph ynn Egypten und so furt an. 
Ob aber yemand wollt furgeben, das allte testament 
sey auff gehaben und gelt nicht mehr, darumb kunde man den 
Christen solch exempel nicht furtragen, Antwort ich: das ist 
nicht also. Denn S. Paulus .1. Cor: .10. spricht: "sie haben 
die selbige geystliche speysse essen unnd tranck getruncken 
von dem felss, der Christus ist, wie wyr, das ist, sie haben 
eben den selben geyst und glawben an Christum gehabt, den wyr 
haben, und eben so wol Christen gewessen als wyr. Darumb, 
woran sie recht than haben, dar thun alle Christen recht von 
anfang der wellt biss ans ende." Luther, W. A. 11:255-56. 
(L. W. 45:96-97.) 
97Luther writes, "Obs nu wol nicht scheinet, das 
wurgen und rauben ein werck der liebe ist, derhalben ein 
einfeltiger denckt, Es sey night ein Christlich werck, zyme 
auch eym Christen nicht zy thun: So ists doch ynn der warheit 
auch ein werck der liebe. Denn gleich wie ein guter artzt, 
wenn die seuche so bose und gros ist, das er mus hand, fus, 
ohr odder augen lassen abhawen odder verderben, auff das er 
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last word. For the soldier, by his very action in battle, is 
culpable and stands accused of participating in a situation 
that is less than what God's primary will demands. Thielicke 
writes, 
What is involved is that will of God which has voluntar-
ily restricted itself in face of the fallen world. This 
is why a Christian in the armed forces, while he may 
with a "good conscience" champion his cause so far as 
this is possible, risking his life for his country and 
den leib errette, so man an sihet das gelied, das er abhewet, 
scheinet es, er sey ein grewlicher, unbarmhertziger mensch. 
So man aber den leib ansihet, den er wil damit erretten, so 
findet sichs ynn der warheit, das er ein trefflicher, trewer 
mensch ist und ein gut, Christlich (so veil es an yhm selber 
ist) werck thut. Also auch wenn ich dem krige ampt zu sehe, 
wie es die bosen strafft, die unrechten wurget und solchen 
jamer anrichtet, scheinet es gar ein unchristlich werck sein 
und alley dinge widder die Christliche liebe. Sihe ich aber 
an, wie es die frumen schutzt, weib und kind, haus und hoff, 
gut und ehre und friede damit erhelt und bewaret, so sind 
sichs, wie kostlich und Gottlich das werck ist, und wercke, 
das es auch ein bein odder hand abhewet, auff das der gantze 
leib nicht vergehe. Denn wo das schwerd nicht werete und 
fride hielte, so muste es alles durch unfride verderben, was 
ynn der welt ist. Derhalben ist ein solcher krieg nicht 
anders denn ein kleiner, kurtzer unfriede, der eym ewigen 
unmeslichem unfriede weret, Ein klein ungluck, das eym 
grossen ungluck weret." Luther, W. A. 19:625-26. (L. W. 
46:96). 
"Denn das ist auch ein beruff, der aus dem gesetz der 
liebe her quillet." Luther, W. A. 19:657. (L. W. 46:131). 
"Und ynn solchem krieg ist es Christlich und eyn werck 
der liebe, die feynde getrost wurgen, rauben und brennen und 
alles thun, was schedlich ist, biss man sie uberwinde nach 
kriegs leufften." Luther, W. A. 11:277. (L. W. 45:125). 
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for his wife and children, can never simply "approve" of 
war. He knows that even a war which — given things as 
they are — is "just," must always stand in need of for-
giveness.98  
The social problems of divorce and the just war, as 
well as the bioethical conflicts examined above, illustrate 
that actual moral dilemmas do occur in modern society. There 
are times when the moral agent is confronted with two oppos-
ing laws of God in such a way that he must break one in order 
to keep the other. Contrary to the second tenet of non-
conflicting absolutism there are times when there is no third 
alternative and sin becomes unavoidable. 
The third tenet of non-conflicting absolutism stresses 
that there may be exceptions and qualifications to God's 
absolute commands, but such exceptions or qualifications are 
always part of the command itself. They are not projected 
onto the absolute command from the outside. Robert Rakestraw 
writes, "NCA does recognize qualifications and even excep-
tions, but these are always within the absolute itselfl They 
98Thielicke, Ethics, 655. "bass es namlich um den 
sich beschrankenden Willen Gottes angesichts der gefallen 
Welt geht. Darum kann auch der christliche Soldat, der im 
Rahmen des Moglichen mit gutem Gewissen seine Sache vertritt 
und der mit seinem Leben fur Vaterland, Weib und Kind 
einsteht, den Krieg nie einfach "bejahen." Er wird vielmehr 
um die VergebungsbedUrftigkeit selbst des rebus sic stantibus 
"gerechten" Krieges wissen." Thielicke, Ethik, 2.1:314. 
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are part of the absolute and are therefore not exceptions to 
the absolute."99  
Rakestraw illustrates this with the example that 
children are to obey their parents. He claims that built 
into this absolute principle is the exceptional clause, 
"except when they command that which is known to be contrary 
to God's revealed truth. .100  Rakestraw emphasizes that the 
moral agent must distinguish between two different 
"categories or kinds (not 'levels') of absolutes. .101  The 
first category concerns direct obedience to God; whereas, the 
second category concerns obedience to those "whose authority 
has been delegated to them by God. .102  This distinction is 
of the utmost importance. 
Examples of the first category include prohibitions 
against lying, murder, adultery, and the commands to be 
patient and kind to others. The second category 
99Rakestraw, 249. See also Olson, 8-9. 
100Rakestraw, 249. 
101Ibid. In order to avoid leaning toward 
hierarchicalism Rakestraw intentionally points out that these 
are not to be considered "levels"; however Olson, a modified 
non-conflicting absolutist has no problem using that term, 




includes such matters as obedience to parents, govern- 
mental officials, and local church leaders.103  
At this point non-conflicting absolutism emphasizes 
that there can never be moral conflicts between these two 
categories of authority because, "The absolute is defined in 
such a way that obedience is to be rendered [to the secondary 
category] only when human demands do not violate clear 
Scriptural prohibitions and instructions. '404  In this way 
any apparent conflict is easily resolved by simply remember-
ing that one is to obey God rather than man (Acts 5:29). 
Geisler criticizes this tenet by refusing to accept 
the fact that the absolute laws of Scripture can contain 
their own qualifications and exceptions. He maintains that 
any law ceases to be absolute if it has any kind of qualifi-
cation or exception whatsoever. Geisler writes, 
Unqualified absolutism does not need a thousand qualifi-
cations to kill it; it can die "a death by one qualifi-
cation." As Rant acknowledged, even one exception to a 
rule proves the rule is not genuinely universa1.105  
It is theoretically possible for an absolute rule to 
contain a qualification and still remain absolute. Such a 
103Rakestraw, 249-50. 
104Rakestraw, 250. 
105Geisler, Christian Ethics (Grand Rapids, MI: Baker 
Book House, 1989), 91. 
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qualification would only be a clarification of the absolute 
rule. In the example given above the absolute rule would not 
be "children obey your parents." The absolute rule would be 
"children obey your parents, unless they command that which 
is contrary to God's Word." Contrary to Geisler's claim, 
there is no reason to presume that this latter rule, that 
contains the exceptional clause, cannot be absolute.106 It 
would simply mean that there are to be no exceptions to the 
rule that "children are to obey their parents, unless their 
parents command that which is contrary to God's Word." 
Geisler's criticism does not negate this third tenet. 
There are, however, two major problems with this third 
tenet of non-conflicting absolutism. On the one hand, if the 
laws concerning obedience to God, and obedience to those with 
delegated authority, are both considered to be absolute, then 
non-conflicting absolutism dissolves into a kind of hierar-
chicalism as soon as it gives precedence to the former over 
the latter. It does not matter that Rakestraw goes out of 
his way to call them "categories" rather than "levels." When 
he gives precedence to one category over the other he has 
106It was mentioned above that by the term "absolute" 
we mean a rule that is more than prima facie. An absolute 
law (or rule) demands universal obedience in all times and in 
all places, without exceptions. 
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developed a hierarchy. As Geisler writes, 
The only way one can know which moral law should be 
qualified is if he has knowledge of which is higher and 
which is lower. But this is a form of graded absolutism 
[or hierarchicalism], not unqualified absolutism [or 
non-conflicting absolutism] .107 
On the other hand, non-conflicting absolutism could 
resolve the dilemma by reclassifying the laws concerning 
obedience to delegated authorities. If such laws were no 
longer viewed as absolute, but merely prima facie, then they 
could not create a moral dilemma with any absolute law. For 
the prima facie law would give way to any absolute law. If 
this option were chosen, then they would have to choose a 
different example with which to emphasize the role of quali-
fications and exceptions within absolute laws. This is 
precisely what Olson has done. He writes, "The qualifica-
tions (or better definitions) of murder . . . exclude capital 
punishment, self defense, and killing in war. N108 
However, the non-conflicting absolutists will look in 
vain for any Scripture passages (that is, any clear sedes 
doctrinae) where the fifth commandment is clearly revoked or 




killing in a just war. These three situations may be allowed 
by God. In some cases they may even be commanded by God, 
according to his secondary will. However, no where in 
Scripture is there ever the remotest reference that the fifth 
commandment is revoked or suspended because God, according to 
his secondary will, allowed or commanded capital punishment, 
self-defense, or a just war. It is an unscriptural human 
assumption to take for granted that such a suspension or 
revocation consistently occurs, or has ever occurred, in such 
situations. This third tenet, in the form it is presented by 
Rakestraw and Olson cannot be maintained without becoming 
hierarchical, or unscriptural. 
The fourth tenet in non-conflicting absolutism is that 
the moral agent is not responsible for whatever evil may come 
as a result of his obedience to the law. Rakestraw explains 
that, "The person who obeys a clear ethical absolute in a 
situation of apparent conflict is not morally accountable for 
whatever evil may be done by others in response to such 
obedience."109 Rakestraw gives the example of lying to save 
a person's life. He claims that in order to save a life one 
may speak a half-truth or deceive by speaking unrelated 
truths, but the moral agent must not lie. He explains the 
109Rakestraw, 251. 
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rationale behind this by quoting Erwin Lutzer. 
The Christian believes that his responsibility is obedi-
ence and that the consequences of moral action are then 
in the hands of God. If refusing to commit adultery or 
even telling the truth . . . causes others to die, this 
also is within the providence of God.110  
Geisler criticizes this point by emphasizing its 
failure to be concerned about sins of omission. Geisler 
writes, 
Unqualified absolutists believe there is no real moral 
dilemma in the case of lying or permitting murder. They 
believe there is only one moral obligation in this situ-
ation - to tell the truth. The only other duty, they 
say belongs to the person threatening to do the killing. 
He is responsible for what he does with the truth we 
give him. But is this over-looking the fact that there 
is also a duty to save innocent lives, to show mercy? 
In short is there a real conflict between truthfulness 
and mercifulness? In other words, the choice is really 
between an act of commission and one of omission. And a 
sin of omission can be just as much a sin as a sin of 
commission (James 4:17) .111 
Geisler makes a compelling point here. He could also 
have mentioned Luther's explanation to the fifth commandment 
in the Large Catechism, wherein he writes, "Therefore God 
110Rakestraw, 251-52, citing Erwin Lutzer, The 
Morality Gap (Chicago: Moody Press, 1972), 110. 
111Geisler, Christian Ethics, 89-90. "Anyone, then 
who knows the good he ought to do and doesn't do it, sins." 
James 4:17. 
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also rightly calls all those murderers who do not afford 
counsel and help in distress and danger of body and life, and 
will pass a most terrible sentence upon them in the last 
day. '412  In view of the importance of sins of omission, this 
fourth tenet of non-conflicting absolutism cannot be main-
tained. For the moral agent is not only responsible for his 
actions, but he is responsible for his inactions as well. 
The following tenet is directly related to this. 
The fifth tenet in non-conflicting absolutism can be 
viewed as the direct cause of the fourth tenet above. It 
holds that Christian ethics must be deontological. Rakestraw 
writes, 
NCA is primarily and essentially deontological. . . . 
NCA stresses duties rather than results. We follow a 
given norm first of all because it is good in itself to 
do so, not primarily because it appears that it will 
produce good effects.113  
Likewise, Olson also explains, "It is an absolute not 
to murder; but it is not an absolute to save a life. . . . We 
112Luther, Concordia Triglotta, 635. "Darumb heisset 
auch Gott billich die alle Murder, so in Noten und Fahr Leibs 
und Lebens nicht raten noch helfen, und wird gar schrecklich 




must not decide ethical matters on a teleological basis. '414 
This fifth tenet is mistaken on two accounts. In the 
first place, just as in the fourth tenet above, it minimizes 
the importance of sins of omission. Geisler observes, 
Olson contends that "it is an absolute not to commit 
murder; [yet adds in the same sentence!] but it is not 
an absolute to save a life" (p. 12). What significant 
moral difference is there between a sin of commission 
(which takes an innocent life), and one of omission 
(which willfully allows that life to be taken) ?115 
In the second place, this overemphasis on the deonto-
logical element does not give adequate attention to the tele-
ological element in Christian ethics that was noted to be so 
important in chapter two above. For these two reasons this 
fifth tenet must be rejected.116  
11401son, 12. 
115Geisler, "Response to Olson," 83, citing Olson, 12. 
In some cases, there may be a "significant moral difference" 
between actively taking a life and passively allowing a life 
to die (for example, when extraordinary treatment is withheld 
from the terminally ill); however, the difference does not 
lie in that the former action breaks an absolute law, 
whereas, the latter inaction does not. The entire fifth 
commandment is absolute, both in what it forbids and in what 
it commands. The difference lies in the degree, or in the 
extent, to which the moral agent is involved in the death. 
116The fourth and fifth tenets seem to illustrate that 
a lack of teleological awareness in ethics leads to a failure 
to recognize sins of omission. 
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The sixth and final tenet in non-conflicting abso- 
lutism is the principle of double effect. 
In cases of ethical conflict where it appears that a 
given action will produce two effects, one desirable and 
one undesirable, it may be permissible to perform the 
action as long as the undesirable effect is not directly 
intended. Such matters as wounding or killing a person 
in self-defense and surgery to save the life of an 
expectant mother, when the fetus will surely die as a 
result of the surgery, are typical cases in which the 
principle of double effect may be applicable.117  
Traditionally, the principle of double effect empha-
sizes that an act is morally justified if it meets four 
criteria. First, the action which causes the evil must be 
morally good. Second, the intention must be focused toward 
the performance of the good effect and not the evil effect. 
Third, "The good effect must precede or at least be simulta-
neous with the evil effect. 418  Fourth, the good effect must 
proportionately outweigh the evil effect. 
The importance of the intention of the moral agent, 
noted by Rakestraw and emphasized as the second of the four 
criteria of the theory of double effect mentioned above, was 
also stressed by Peter Abelard. He refers to the morality of 





In fact we say that an intention is good, that is, right 
in itself, but that an action does not bear anything 
good in itself but proceeds from a good intention. 
Whence when the same thing is done by the same man at 
different times, by the diversity of his intention, 
however, his action is now said to be good, now bad.119  
Thomas Aquinas discusses the intentions of the moral 
agent who effects two separate results from one causative 
action. 
A single act may have two effects, of which one alone is 
intended, whilst the other is incidental to that inten-
tion. But the way a moral act is to be classified 
depends on what is intended, not on what goes beyond 
such an intention, since this is merely incidental 
thereto.120  
This distinction later became one of the basic principles in 
the theory of double effect.121  
119D. E. Luscombe, ed. Peter Abelard's Ethics (Oxford: 
Clarendon Press, 1971), 53. "Bonam quippe intentionem, hoc 
est, rectum in se dicimus, operationem uero non quod boni 
aliquid in se suscipiant, sed quod ex bona intentione 
procedat. Vnde et ab eodem homine cum in diuersis temporibus 
idem fiat, pro diuersitate tamen intentionis eius operatio 
modo bona modo mala dicitur." Ibid., 52. 
120Aqu inas, Summa 2a2ae 64.7. "Dicendum quod nihil 
prohibet unius actus esse duos effectus, quorum alter solum 
sit in intentione, alius vero sit praeter intentionem. 
Morales autem actus recipiunt speciem secundum id quod 
intenditur, non autem ab eo quod est praeter intentionem, cum 
 
sit per accidens." Ibid.,40-42. 
121See Joseph Mangan, "An Historical Analysis of the 
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Principle of Double Effect," Theological Studies 10(1949): 
41-61. In traditional Roman Catholic moral theology the evil 
that is unintended in a conflict situation may be classified 
as part of the physical evil of nature (malum naturae sive 
physicum) if it meets the other criteria traditionally 
delineated in the theory of double effect. This category of 
physical evils also contains such evils as error, poverty, 
sickness, pain and death. This is distinguished from any 
evil that is intended. Such intended evil is a moral evil or 
sin (malum moral sive peccatum). The application of this 
distinction and the reevaluation of its place within the 
theory of double effect has lead to a very lengthy (25 year) 
and extremely complex debate between the "traditionalists" 
and the "proportionalists." The debate has its origin in 
Peter Knauer, "La determination du bein et du mal moral par 
le principe du double effet," Nouvelle reuvelle theologique 
87 (1965): 356-76. Put very simply, at the risk of 
distorting the position, the proportionalists, which include 
Lisa Cahill, Charles Curran, Joseph Fuchs, Louis Janssens, 
Richard McCormick, Franz Scholz, Bruno SchUller, Edward 
Vacek, redefine the malum naturae as a "premoral evil" 
(Fuchs), "nonmoral evil" (SchUller), or an "ontic evil or 
premoral disvalue" (Janssens). In the event of a moral 
conflict, they are willing to place an action in this 
category as long as the fourth and final criteria of the 
theory of double effect is met. That is, as long as there is 
"proportionate" (McCormick) or "commensurate" (Knauer) reason 
to substantiate the act. If the good effect outweighs the 
evil effect an action is considered justified. It need not 
meet the other three criteria of the principle of double 
effect. The Traditionalists, which included John Finnis, 
Germain Grisez, Paul Ramsey and Paul Quay emphasize the 
importance of all four criteria in the theory of double 
effect. They accuse the proportionalists of dissolving the 
theory of double effect into nothing more than an end 
justifies the means doctrine. For a more complete analysis 
of this debate the reader may wish to see the following: Lisa 
Cahill, "Teleology, Utilitarianism and Christian Ethics," 
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However, contrary to the Roman Catholic tradition, and 
the claims of the non-conflicting absolutists, the distinc-
tions made in the theory of double effect do not help resolve 
moral conflicts. Nor do they absolve the moral agent from 
culpability. For any infraction of God's law is a sin, 
regardless of whether or not it meets any humanly devised 
Theological Studies 42 (1982): 601-629. Charles E. Curran 
and Richard A. McCormick, eds. Readings in Moral Theology No. 
1: Moral Norms and Catholic Tradition (New York: Paulist 
Press, 1979). Germain Grisez, "Critique of the 
Proportionalists Method of Moral Judgment," chap in The Way 
of the Lord Jesus vol. 1. (Chicago, Franciscan Herald Press, 
1983), 141-71. Bernard Hoose, Proportionalism: The American 
Debate and Its European Roots (Washington DC: Georgetown 
University Press, 1987. Louis Janssens, "Ontic Evil and 
Moral Evil," Louvain Studies 4 (1972): 115-56. Richard A. 
McCormick, Notes on Moral Theology 1965 through 1980 
(Washington DC: University Press of America, 1981), 1-13, 
305-32, 529-44, 638-52, 648-723. Richard A. McCormick, Notes 
on Moral Theology 1981 through 1984 (Washington DC: 
University Press of America, 1985), 1-16, 49-71, 110-113, 
165-73. Richard McCormick "Notes on Moral Theology," 
Theological Studies 46 (1985): 55-64. 47 (1989): 76-88. 50 
(1989): 9-11. Richard McCormick and Paul Ramsey eds. Doing 
Evil to Achieve Good: Moral Choice in Conflict Situations 
(Chicago, Loyola University Press, 1978). Ronald H. 
McKinney, "The Quest For an Adequate Proportionalist Theory 
of Value," Thomist 53 (January 1989): 56-73. Jean Porter, 
"Moral Rules and Moral Actions: A Comparison of Aquinas and 
Modern Moral Theology," The Journal of Religious Ethics 17 
(Spring 1989): 123-49. Paul M. Quay, "The Disvalue of Ontic 
Evil," Theological Studies 46 (1985): 262-86. Edward V. 
Vacek, "Proportionalism: One View of the Debate," Theological 
Studies 46 (1985): 287-314. 
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pre-established conditions. There are no conditions enumer-
ated in the Scriptures whereby an infraction of God's law 
need not be considered a sin. The invention of such 
preconditions is merely a human attempt to avoid the condem-
nation of the law.122  
God expects all of his moral laws to be fully obeyed. 
This point is made throughout the Scriptures. "You have laid 
down precepts that are to be fully obeyed" Psalm 119:4. By 
using the word "fully" (1W?) the psalmist stresses that each 
command is to be "exceedingly, greatly" or "very" much 
obeyed.123 Our Lord emphasized that even the smallest of the 
commandments were to be taught and obeyed. "Anyone who 
breaks one of the least (piay . . . TiaviXa&Twv) of these 
commandments and teaches others to do the same will be called 
122The history of this method of attempting to excuse 
ourselves from the condemnation of the law goes all the way 
back to the garden of Eden. When God asked Adam, "Have you 
eaten from the tree that I commanded you not to eat from?" 
The man said, "The woman you put here with me — she gave me 
some fruit from the tree, and I ate it." (Genesis 3:11-12). 
Here Adam attempts to avoid culpability by emphasizing 
certain aspects of the situation. For God, however, there 
were no excuses. 
123Francis Brown, S. R. Driver, and Charles A. Briggs, 
eds. Hebrew and English Lexicon of the Old Testament 
Corrected Impression edition (Oxford: The Clarendon Press, 
1952), 547. 
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least in the kingdom of heaven." Matthew 5:19a. The smallest 
of commandments are not to be ignored for the sake of more 
important issues. 
Woe to you, teachers of the law and Pharisees, you 
hypocrites! You give a tenth of your spices — mint, 
dill and cummin. But you have neglected the more impor- 
tant matters of the law — justice, mercy and faithful-
ness. You should have practiced the latter, without 
neglecting ( ril euWvat) the former (emphasis mine). 
Matthew 23:23. 
St. Paul also emphasized that condemnation comes as a 
result of breaking any of God's laws. "Cursed (hrmanipaTos) 
is everyone who does not continue to do everything (idatv) 
written in the Book of the Law" Galatians 3:10. James 
stresses that to violate one commandment is the same as 
violating all the commandments "For whoever keeps the whole 
law and yet stumbles at just one point (b'4300 is guilty of 
breaking all of it" James 2:10. 
Scripture offers no excuses for the violation of God's 
laws. The law does not contain such comfort. It stands firm 
in its absolute uncompromising demands. It threatens 
complete condemnation for all who disobey. This point is 
repeatedly made in the Lutheran Confessions when it empha-
sizes that "Lex semper accusat nos, semper ostendit iratum 
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Deum. .124  Luther also made this point when he wrote, 
No. What is demanded in God's commandments, whether it 
is small or great, must be observed. We must not judge 
importance according to works, but by the commandment. 
You must not determine whether the work . . . must be 
observed or relaxed, but only whether it is commanded. 
If it is commanded, there can be no relaxation, no 
matter what the situation may be, for Christ says: "Not 
an iota, not a dot, will pass from the law" [Matt. 
5:18]; it must all be accomplished. (emphasis mine)125  
Augustine also emphasizes that there can be no such 
thing as a "just sin" when, with respect to lying, he writes. 
He who says that there are some just lies must be 
regarded as saying nothing else than that there are some 
just sins, and consequently that some things which are 
unjust are just. What could be more absurd? . . . 
Therefore, let some be called great sins and others 
small sins, for such is the case, and not as the Stoics 
would have us think, who maintain that all are alike. 
to say that certain sins are unjust and certain ones 
just is equivalent to saying that certain iniquities are 
unjust and certain ones just. Yet, John the Apostle 
124Die Bekenntnisschriften, 218. Confer pages 167, 
185, 194, 199. 217, 221, 270. 
125Luther, "The Gospel For the Festival of The 
Epiphany," (1522) L. W. 52:265. "Nit alsso, lieber mensch. 
Es sey kleyn oder gross, was yn gottis gepotten ist 
begriffen, soll and muss gehallten werden. Man muss hie nit 
nach den wercken, sondern nach dem gepott richten; nitt mustu 
sehen, ob das werck . . . gahalten oder ungehalten ist, 
ssondern nur darauff, obs gepotten sey. Ists gepotten, sso 
ist keyn nachlassen mehr da, es sey wie es wolle, denn 
Christus sagt: Nit eyn iota odder tuttel sol von dem gesetz 
vorgehen, es muss alles geschehen." W. A. 10.1.1: 699. 
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says, "Everyone who commits sin commits iniquity also; 
and sin is iniquity [1 John 3:4]." Therefore sin cannot 
be just.126  
The use of the principle of double effect by the non-
conflicting absolutists, is a tacit recognition of the exis-
tence of conflict situations. Within a moral dilemma this 
theory may be helpful, if used correctly; however, it can not 
dissolve the conflict, excuse the lesser evil, or remove the 
culpability from the moral agent. This sixth and final tenet 
of non-conflicting absolutism cannot be maintained by anyone 
who wishes their doctrine to be Scripturally based. 
In conclusion, this examination of non-conflicting 
absolutism has shown that five of its six tenets are unten-
able. The first tenet, that is, the only one which is firmly 
grounded in Scripture, stressed that God has given many abso-
lute laws that are extensions of love. The second tenet 
126 Augustine, "Against Lying" vol. 16 The Fathers of 
the Church 15.31. 
"Nihil autem judicandus est dicere, qui dicit aliqua 
justa esse mendacia, nisi aliqua justa esse peccata, ac per 
hoc aliqua justa esse quae injusta sunt: quo quid absurdius 
dici potest? Unde enim est peccatum, nisi quia justitiae 
contrarium est? Dicantur ergo alia magna, alia parva esse 
peccata; quia verumest, nec auscultandum Stoicis qui omnia 
paria esse contendunt: dicere autem quaedam injusta, quaedam 
justa esse peccata, quid est aliud quam dicere quasdam esse 
injustas, quasdam justas iniquitates? cum dicat apostolus 
Joannes, Omnis qui facit peccatum, facit et iniquitatem; et 
peccatum iniquitas est. (I Joan. III, 4)?" Migne 40:539. 
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emphasized that these absolute laws never conflict. It was 
pointed out that, while Norman Geisler's criticism of this 
tenet is insufficient, other examples from bioethics and 
society do illustrate that such moral conflicts do occur. 
The third tenet emphasized that exceptions or qualifications 
may be contained within God's absolute commands. However, it 
was shown that such qualifications either turn non-conflict-
ing absolutism into hierarchicalism or rely on unscriptural 
assumptions concerning divine revocation of lesser evils. 
The fourth tenet held that the moral agent is not responsible 
for whatever evil may come as a result of his obedience. 
However, it was pointed out that this ignores the gravity of 
sins of omission. The fifth tenet stressed that ethics must 
be deontological. It was shown that this ignores the essen-
tial teleological aspect of ethics emphasized in chapter two. 
The sixth and final tenet of non-conflicting absolutism uses 
the principle of double effect. This was shown to contradict 
the Scriptural principle that the law always accuses. 
Therefore, non-conflicting absolutism must be rejected as a 
Biblical method of theological ethics. 
CHAPTER FOUR 
Hierarchicalisml 
The numerous absolute moral commands, that compose the 
deontological element in Christian ethics, are arranged by 
the hierarchicalists in a specific hierarchical order. They 
believe it is inevitable that there will be conflicts between 
higher and lower ranking commandments. When such conflicts 
occur the moral agent is to follow the higher law. In such a 
'This view is also called "graded absolutism," or "the 
theory of the greater good." Its major proponents are 
Charles Hodge, Systematic Theology reprint edition 3 vols. 
(Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 1989), 3:437-44, and Norman 
Geisler, Ethics: Alternatives and Issues (Grand Rapids: 
Zondervan Publishing House, 1971), 114-36. Geisler, The 
Christian Ethic of Love (Grand Rapids: Zondervon Publishing 
House, 1973), 73-75. Geisler, "Biblical Absolutes and Moral 
Conflicts," Bibliotheca Sacra 131 no. 523 (July - September 
1974): 219-28. Geisler, "In Defense of Hierarchical Ethics," 
The Trinity Journal 4(September 1975): 82-87. Geisler, 
"Conflicting Absolutism," Bulletin of the Evangelical 
Philosophical Society 2(1979): 1-7. Geisler and Feinberg, 
Introduction to Philosophy (Grand Rapids: Baker Book House, 
1980), 413-27. Geisler, Options in Contemporary Christian 
Ethics (Grand Rapids: Baker Book House, 1981), 81-101. 
Geisler, "A Response to Olson's Critique of Ethical 
Hierarchicalism," Evangelical Journal 4(Fall, 1986): 82-87. 
Geisler, Christian Ethics: Options and Issues (Grand Rapids: 
Baker Book House, 1989), 113-132. 
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situation, the hierarchicalists claim that, the moral agent 
incurs no guilt for not having performed the lesser good. He 
is inculpable and need not repent. A closer examination of 
the four basic tenets of hierarchicalism will show both its 
strengths and its weaknesses. 
The first tenet of hierarchicalism is the same as for 
non-conflicting absolutism. There are many absolute moral 
commandments in the Scripture. Each one is an expression of 
love. Geisler writes, 
The law of love summarized but does not antiquate the 
many moral laws contained in the Old Testament and which 
are restated in the New Testament. . . . In brief the 
love commandments do not replace the Ten Commandments; 
they only reduce them to their common essence, love. 
The two commandments of love merely summarize the many 
moral laws. . . . The laws spell out love in its many 
spheres. Each commandment is love put into operation in 
a given sphere of human relationship.2  
The hierarchicalists understand that the Biblical 
command to love does not contradict or replace the many other 
individual moral commandments that constitute the deontologi-
cal element in Christian ethics. The individual moral 
commandments in Scripture are just as authoritative and as 
absolute today as ever before. This tenet is in basic agree-
ment with the first part of this dissertation insofar as both 
2Geisler, The Christian Ethic of Love, 50-51. 
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agree that, love is a summary of the moral law. 
The second tenet of hierarchicalism is a direct 
contradiction of the second tenet of non-conflicting abso-
lutism. Hierarchicalism holds that there are inevitable 
conflicts that arise between the different absolute commands. 
The great length to which Geisler goes in order to illustrate 
this tenet, was examined above within the discussion concern-
ing the second tenet of non-conflicting absolutism. Although 
it was shown above that his examples were insufficient, other 
examples were given which adequately illustrate the validity 
of this tenet. Thus this tenet may be approved without 
repeating the discussion here. 
The third tenet of hierarchicalism emphasizes that 
God's moral laws can be ranked in a specific hierarchical 
order in which the higher laws take precedence over the lower 
laws. Geisler explains, 
Not all moral laws are of equal weight. Jesus spoke of 
the "weightier" matters of the law (Matt. 23:23) and of 
the "least" (Matt. 5:19) and the "greatest" commandments 
(Matt. 22:36). He told Pilate that Judas had committed 
the "greater sin" (John 19:11).3  
In one of his early works Geisler maintained that 
"both other Christian options [that is, non-conflicting abso- 
3lbid., 82. 
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lutism and conflicting absolutism] admit the truth of this 
same point."4 However, such unity was short lived. Later 
Olson criticized this tenet when he wrote, 
Geisler Does Not Show the Scriptural Basis for Putting 
All Absolutes in an Ordered Sequence. . . . Although he 
claims that a hierarchy of God's attributes is not 
essential to his system, such a hierarchy would be 
necessary to avoid the charge that his listing of norms 
is merely arbitrary. 
In God's acts of interventions in the world, no 
such hierarchy of attributes is discernible. Sometimes 
we see God's mercy coming to the fore; at other times we 
see God's holiness and justice . . . . How can a system 
be built upon such a dubious hierarchy? And we must 
insist that there be a parallel between such a dubious 
hierarchy of divine attributes and a hierarchy of norms—
otherwise it can be shown that those norms are not 
rooted in God's attributes. Then we are reduced to a 
subjective man-ordered hierarchy as critics of Geisler 
have pointed out.5  
Geisler makes a valid point in his initial explanation 
of a hierarchical ordering of the moral commands in 
Scripture. The following Scripture passages indicate the 
presence of some type of hierarchy: 
Anyone who breaks one of the least (µiow. . . TaV 
VaXiCITIOV) of these commandments and teaches others to do 
the same will be called least in the kingdom of heaven. 
(Matthew 5:19a) 
4Ibid., 83. 
5C. Gordon Olson "Norman Geisler's Hierarchical Ethics 
Revisited," Evangelical Journal 4 (Summer 1986): 9-10. 
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One of them, an expert in the law, tested him with 
this question: "Teacher, which is the greatest (µcAikri) 
commandment in the law?" Jesus replied, "Love the Lord 
your God with all your heart and with all your soul and 
with all your mind." This is the first (rrpoirn) and 
greatest (µcyck) commandment. (Matthew 22:35-38) 
Woe to you, teachers of the law and Pharisees, you 
hypocrites! You give a tenth of your spices — mint, 
dill and cummin. But you have neglected the more impor-
tant (Paputepa) matters of the law — justice mercy and 
faithfulness. (Matthew 23:23) 
Therefore the one who handed me over to you is 
guilty of a greater (Ratova) sin. (John 19:11)6  
Augustine also writes of some sins being worse than 
others. 
Some will ask whether in view of what we have been say-
ing any thief at all is to be ranked on a par with one 
who steals for the sake of mercy. Who would maintain 
this? But, of the two, the latter is not good because 
the former is worse. He who steals for lust is worse 
than he who steals for mercy. . . . But both are sins, 
although the one is so much less serious and the other 
so much more serious that theft committed for lust is 
considered less serious than debauchery committed to 
help someone. Within a given class, to be sure, those 
sins are less serious which appear to be committed with 
good intent. Nevertheless, they may be found to be more 
serious than the graver sins of another class. For 
example, avarice is more serious than stealing for mercy 
and debauchery than being wanton for mercy; yet, to 
commit adultery for mercy is more serious than to steal 
for avarice.? 
6Neither Olson nor Rakestraw discuss these passages. 
7Augustine, "Against Lying," The Fathers of the Church 
85 vols. edited by Roy J. Deferrari et alii translated by 
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Luther also emphasizes a hierarchy of God's laws when 
he writes about greater and lesser sins. 
This is why disobedience is a sin worse than murder, 
unchastity, theft, dishonesty, all that goes with them. 
There is no better way we can learn the difference 
between greater and lesser sins than from the order of 
God's commandments, although there are also distinctions 
within the works of each individual commandment. Who 
does not know that it is a greater sin to curse than to 
be angry, that to strike is worse than cursing, and that 
to strike father and mother is worse than striking any-
one else?8  
Harold B. Jaffee et alii (New York: Fathers of the Church 
Inc., 1947-1991), 16:145-46. "Dicet aliquis: Ergo aequandus 
est fur quilibet ei furi qui misericordiae voluntate furatur? 
Quis hoc dixerit? Sed horum duorum non ideo est quisquam 
bonus, quia pejor est unus. Pejor est enim qui 
concupiscendo, quam qui miserando furatur. . . . Sunt autem 
utraque peccata, quamvis alia leviora, alia graviora; ita ut 
levius habeatur furtum guod concupiscendo, quam stuprum quod 
subveniendo committitur. In suo quippe genere aliis ejusdem 
generis peccatis leviora fiunt, quae bono animo videntur 
admitti; cum tamen ipsa alterius generis peccatis ipso suo 
genere levioribus inveniantur esse graviora. Gravius est 
enim avaritia, quam misericordia furtum facere; itemque 
stuprum gravius est laxuria, quam misericordia perpetrare: et 
tamen gravius est adulterare misericordia, quam furari 
avaritia." Augustine "De Mendacio" J. P. Migne, ed. 
Patrologiae: Patrum Latinorum, 221 vols. (Parisiis, 1855-
1881), 40:529-30. Hereafter this work will be abbreviated as 
Migne P. L. 
8Luther, "Treatise on Good Works," 1520 L. W. 44:81. 
"Darumb auch ungehorsam grosser sund ist dan todschlag, 
unkeuscheit, stelen, betriegen, and was darinnen mag 
begriffen werden. Dan der sund unterscheidt, wilch grosser 
sey dan die ander, kundenn wir nit basz erkennen, dan ausz 
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Luther stressed this same point again when he wrote, 
"The first, second, third, fourth, fifth, sixth, seventh 
commandments follow each other in a precise order. It is a 
greater sin to kill than to fornicate or to commit adultery. 
It is worse to commit adultery than it is to steal."9  
One another occasion Luther also wrote, 
Now, the six [commandments] following, refer to our 
neighbor. See the wonderful and appropriate order. The 
prohibitions begin with the greatest and continue to the 
least. For the greatest offense is to kill a human. 
Then next is the violation of a spouse. Third, is to 
steal one's belongings. Those who are unable to be 
harmful in this way, harm with their speech. Thus, the 
fourth offense is to harm one's good reputation. If 
they cannot do any of these, they at least damage their 
neighbor in their heart, by coveting his possessions.10  
der ordnung der gebot gottis, wie wol ein iglich gebot fur 
sich selb auch unterscheidt in seinen wercken hat: dan wer 
weysz nit, das fluchen grosser ist dan zurnen, schlahen mehr 
dan fluchen, vatter unnd mutter schlahen mehr dan einen 
gemeinen menschen?" W. A. 6:250. 
9This is my own translation. "Das erste, ander, 
dritte, vierte, fUnfte, sechste und siebente Gebot gehen fein 
ordentlich auf einander. Grosser Sande ists todten denn 
huren und ehebrechen: schwerer ists ehebrechen denn stehlen." 
D. Martin Luthers Werke, Kritische Gesamtausgabe, Tischreden 
G. Sande (Wiemar, 1912-1921), 1 no.88. 
'0This is my own translation. "Iam sex sequentia 
respiciunt proximum. Et vide mirum et aptum ordinem. 
Incipit enim prohibitio a maiori usque ad minimum. Nam 
maximum damnum est occisio hominis: deinde proximum violatio 
coniugis, Tercium ablatio facultatis. Quod qui in its nocere 
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Franz Pieper makes this same point from a different 
perspective. 
As to their degree, Scripture itself distinguishes 
between grievous and less grievous sin . . . . Scripture 
clearly distinguishes degrees in sinning. . . . 
When we divide sins into peccata cordis, oris, 
operis (thoughts, words, deeds), we classify them, as a 
rule, according to degree. But that is not always the 
case. A secretly harbored implacability may be a more 
grievous sin than a word or deed prompted by a sudden 
burst of passion.11  
Thielicke emphasizes the importance of distinguishing 
different degrees of sin when he writes, 
He [the Christian] knows that here in this world there 
non possunt, saltem lingua nocent: ideo quartum est laesio 
famae. Quod si in its non prevalent omnibus, saltem corde 
ledunt proximum cupiendo quae eius sunt, in quo et invidia 
proprie consistit, de quibus videbimus." Luther, "Decem 
Praecepta Wittenbergensi Predicata Populo," 1518. W. A. 
1:461. 
"Francis Pieper, Christian Dogmatics, 4 vols., Trans. 
Theodore Engelder et al., (St. Louis, Mo: Concordia 
Publishing House, 1950-1953), 1:567-68. "Auf den Grad 
gesehen, unterschiedet die Schrift selbst zwischen schweren 
and weniger schweren SUnden. . . . Unterscheidet die Schrift 
klar Grade im SUndigen. . . . Die Einteilung der Stinden in 
peccata cordis, oris, operis ist in der Regel, aber nich in 
jedem einzelnen Fall eine Gradeinteilung. Eine im Herzen 
still gehegte Unversohnlichkeit kann eine schwerere SUnde 
sein als ein in plotzlich aufwallender Leidenschaft 
ausgestossenes looses Wort oder auch vollbrachtes Werk." 
Franz Pieper, Christliche Dogmatik, 4 vol. (St. Louis, MO: 
Concordia Publishing House, 1924), 1:678-80. 
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is no perfect righteousness, but he does not therefore 
draw the conclusion that everything is under the same 
condemnation and that everything is thus equally permis-
sible, as though there were no quantitative distinction 
between reprehensible and less reprehensible, between 
good and less good possibilities. . . . [the] ethical 
decision has in fact a great deal to do with the quanti-
tative problem and that scale of value cannot be elimi-
nated in the name of some abstract ("qualitative") 
alternative. The weighing of quantitative distinctions 
is certainly demanded.12  
12Thielicke, Ethics, 1:501. "Er weiss, dass hier 
keine Gerechtigkeitsgestalt zu haben ist — auch wenn er 
daraus night die Folgerung ziehen kann: also sei alles in 
gleicher Verdammnis und alles auch gleichermassen erlaubt, 
also gebe es auch kein quantitatives Abwagen zwischen 
verwerflichen und weniger verwerflichen, zwischen guten und 
weniger guten Moglichkeiten mehr fur ihn. . . . Dass die 
ethische Entscheidung es sehr wohl mit dem Quantitaten-
Problem zu tun hat und dass ihr eine Eliminierung der Werte-
Skala im Namen abstrakter ('qualitativer') Alternativen 
verboten ist. Darum ist das erwahnte 'Abwagen' sehr wohl 
gefordert." Thielicke, Ethik, 2.1:82 
This "abstract ('qualitative') alternative" to which 
Thielicke is referring is the justitia imputativa which is 
the believer's through faith in Christ. This must not be 
confused with the justitia effectiva. Thielicke explains the 
difference. "Wir sind erloste Kinder Gottes, aber es gibt 
unerloste Bereiche in uns. 
"Der Schein des Widerspruchs ergibt sich nur daraus, 
dass in beiden Satzteilen eine andere Optik gebraucht ist. 
Wenn ich namlich sage: 'Wir sind erloste Kinder Gottes', dann 
spreche ich von Gottes gnadigem Annehmen und von der wirklich 
Ereignis gewordenen Gemeinschaft mit ihm (justitia 
imputativa). Spreche ich aber von den unerlosten Bereichen 
in mir, so denke ich daran, dass ich nun meinserseits-indem 
ich den Blick von dem Handeln Gottes auf mein eigenes Handeln 
und Nachvollziehen zurlickwende, also auf die justitia 
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God's absolute laws are equal in their absolute demand 
for obedience and in their threat of complete condemnation 
for disobedience; yet, this equality does not preclude the 
existence of a hierarchy. Luther explains, 
Looked at from the point of view of the character of 
substance (which is not susceptible of degrees) one sin 
is no more a sin.than is another. However, one may be 
greater or stronger than another, just as one substance 
may be larger than another; and yet a fly is just as 
much a substance as is a man, and a weak man as a strong 
man.13  
In this third tenet the hierarchicalists make a 
compelling point when they insist on the possibility of 
ordering God's absolute commands. However, Geisler makes a 
false distinction when, in his response to Olson, he claims 
that the hierarchy of moral absolutes must stem from God's 
attributes and not from his essence. There is no such dis-
tinction. God's attributes constitute his essence. There is 
only one divine unity. Pieper explains, 
effectiva richte-noch im Verzuage damit bin, alle mein 
Lebensbereiche and ich-Sektoren auf diese Tatsache zu 
beziehen." Thielicke, Etik 1:220-21. 
13Luther, "Against Latomus" 1521 L. W. 32:202. "Nec 
unum magis peccatum quam aliud iuxta proprietatem 
substantiae, quae non suscipit magis neque minus, licet unum 
sit maius et fortius alio, sicut et substantia una maior quam 
altera, non enim minus substantia est musca quam homo, nec 
minus homo infirmus quam robustus." W. A. 8:88. 
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In God, essence and attributes are not separate, but the 
divine essence and the divine attributes are absolutely 
identical, because God is infinite and above space (I 
Rings 8:27) and time (Ps. 90:2, 4). Were we to assume 
that there are parts to God, we would ascribe finitude 
to the infinite God and thereby erase the difference 
between God and man. Therefore the Augsburg confession 
says: God is "without parts' (Trigl. 43, I, 3). On the 
basis of Scripture the Lutheran dogmaticians have main-
tained that objectively, that is, in God, essence and 
attributes are absolutely identical.14  
Yet, in spite of Geisler's confusion here, his point 
is still well taken when he states that the hierarchy does 
not exist in God, but only in his laws. The criticism of 
Olson does not refute this third tenet of hierarchicalism. 
The fourth and final tenet of hierarchicalism stresses 
that in a conflict situation the moral agent is to observe 
the hierarchical ordering of God's absolute moral commands 
and do the greater good. In performing the greater good, the 
moral agent incurs no guilt for failing to do the lesser 
good. Geisler explains, 
14Pieper, Christian Dogmatics 1:428. "In Gott sind 
Wesen und Eigenschaften nicht StUcke oder Teile, sondern 
schlechthin eins, weil Gott unendlich ist, erhaben fiber Raum 
(I Ron. 8, 27) und Zeit (Ps. 90, 2,4). Wollten wir StUcke 
oder Teile in Gott annehmen, so warden wir den unendlichen 
Gott verendlichen und so den Unterschied zwischen Gott und 
den kreaturen aufheben. Die Augsburgische Konfession sagt im 
ersten Artikel Von Gott (De Deo): 'ohne StUck." Pieper, 
Christliche Dogmatik 1:524. 
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God does not hold the individual responsible for person-
ally unavoidable moral conflicts, providing they keep 
the higher law. There are a number of ways of seeing 
the truth of this point. 
First, logic dictates that a just God will not hold 
a person responsible for [not?] [sic] doing what is 
actually impossible. And it is actually impossible to 
avoid the unavoidable. . . . 
Second, one is not morally culpable if he fails to 
keep an obligation he could not possibly keep without 
breaking a higher obligation. . . . 
Third, the Bible included many examples of persons 
who were praised by God for following their duty in 
conflict situations.15  
Here Geisler attempts to offer three ways of seeing 
the truth of this fourth tenet. However, none of these is 
convincing. The first way, which emphasizes logic, overlooks 
the fact that human logic does not "dictate" to God what he 
will or will not do. God's ways far surpass the ways of 
human understanding. As God explains through the prophet 
Isaiah, "For my thoughts are not your thoughts neither are 
your ways my ways, declares the Lord. As the heavens are 
higher than the earth, so are my ways higher than your ways 
and my thoughts than your thoughts." Isaiah 55:8-9. The 
second way Geisler mentions is merely a restating of his 
position and proves nothing. The third way Geisler mentions 
is an overstatement, relying on examples that have already 
15Geisler, Options, 87-88. 
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been examined and rejected above. It was shown that even 
though God is pleased insofar as a moral agent fulfilled a 
higher duty, God can also be simultaneously displeased inso-
far as the moral agent failed to fulfill a lesser duty. 
Geisler also attempts to explain that, because of the 
hierarchy, all the absolute moral commands of God are abso-
lute in a qualified sense. Geisler writes, 
If lower ethical norms can be transcended by higher ones 
without incurring guilt for not following the lower 
ones, then it follows that these lower norms are not 
universal in the broadest sense of the word. They are 
universal only in their context. They are valid on 
their particular relationship but not on all relation-
ships. . . . [Therefore] not all absolutes are abso-
lutely absolute. . . . In fact . . . ethical hierarchi-
calism is, a form of contextual absolutism.16  
Rakestraw answers that, with the above explanation, 
Geisler must not actually believe that moral absolutes are 
truly absolute. It makes no sense to say an absolute is not 
absolutely absolute. Rakestraw explains, 
If as we believe, an absolute is a universally-binding 
moral norm . . . then we must maintain that . . . we 
cannot disobey, lay aside, or transcend any of these 
divine absolutes. To say that an absolute is to be 
followed only within its own context or sphere, as H 
[hierarchicalism] does, is a way of [merely] theoreti-
cally retaining the absolute status of the moral 
norm. . . . The statement . . . "not all absolutes are 
16Geisler, Ethics: Alternatives and Issues, 132. 
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absolutely absolute" fatally weakens the binding charac-
ter of God's ethical norms and, in practice, shifts the 
locus of authority from the divine lawgiver to the moral 
agent.17  
Geisler responds to this criticism by explaining that 
these absolutes are still absolute in three ways, even though 
they are not universally binding. 
First, the lower command is not really broken when the 
higher command is followed. Just as a magnet does not 
break the law of gravity in attracting a nail . . . . 
The overriding duty to keep the higher law simply ren-
ders it unnecessary for us to perform the demands of the 
lesser command. 
Second . . . there are no exceptions to absolute 
moral laws, only exemptions from obeying them in view of 
higher ones. So its universalness is not contradicted 
by an exception. 
Third, the command remains absolute even when it is 
not followed. . . . God never ceases to manifest abso-
lutely what is absolutely right. However, in unavoid-
able clashes, God does not demand obedience to lower 
laws, nor does he exact personal culpability for failing 
to do so.18  
Geisler's response does not adequately answer the 
problem suggested by Rakestraw. In the first place, the anal-
ogy with the magnet misses the point, because the point of 
comparison lies in the nail, not in the magnet. When the 
nail is attracted upward by a magnet the nail certainly is 
17Rakestraw, 255, citing Geisler, Ethics: Alternatives 
and Issues, 132. 
18Geisler, Christian Ethics, 129. 
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breaking or violating (that is, failing to conform to) the 
law of gravity. Similarly, whenever God's laws are violated, 
or whenever the moral agent fails to conform to them, they 
are broken. Geisler cannot rightly claim that "the lower 
commandment is not really broken."19  
In the second place it does not help Geisler to insist 
on exemptions rather than exceptions. For Geisler, 
an exception would violate the universality and abso-
luteness of a moral law, whereas an exemption does not. 
If there is an exception, then the law is not abso-
lute. . . . An exception means that lying as such is 
sometimes right, under certain circumstances. Not so 
with an exemption. Lying as such is always wrong. . . . 
In an exception, the general rule is not binding on that 
particular case, and so there is no real conflict. . . . 
[Whereas] an exemption only eliminates the individual's 
culpability in not performing the demands of that lower 
law; it in no way changes either the basis or the nature 
of the law as an absolute in its domain.20  
In a certain sense this distinction is valid. Given 
these definitions it appears that non-conflicting absolutists 
would be more inclined to employ exceptions (that attempts to 
dissolve the conflict); whereas, hierarchicalists would 
utilize exemptions (that attempts to remove the culpability). 
It has been pointed out above that it may be possible 
19Ibid. 
20Geisler, Christian Ethics, 127-28. 
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for an absolute law to contain on "exceptional" phrase as a 
clarification.21 However, it has also been shown that there 
can be no exemptions from culpability. The moral agent bears 
the guilt for any violation of God's law, regardless of the 
circumstances. 
In the third place it has also been emphasized above 
that God demands obedience to all his moral laws, even the 
"lesser" ones.22  
With respect to this fourth and final tenet Geisler 
also appeals to the principle of double effect. 
Graded absolutism [hierarchialism] is similar to the 
principle of double effect, which states that when two 
results — a good result and an evil result — emerge from 
one act, the individual is held responsible only for the 
good one he intended, and not the evil one which neces-
sarily resulted from the good intention.23  
It was shown above, with respect to the sixth tenet of non-
conflicting absolutism, that any use of the principle of 
double effect, which attempts to remove culpability from the 
21The example given above was "children obey your 
parents, unless they command that which is contrary to God's 
Word." 
22This point was made above by emphasizing Psalm 
119:4, Matthew 5:19; 22:36; 23:23 and John 19:11. 
23Geisler, Christian Ethics, 126-27. See also 
Options, 96-97. 
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moral agent, contradicts the Scriptural principle that the 
law always accuses (lex semper accusat). This misuse of the 
principle of double effect was a major weakness in non-
conflicting absolutism. As Geisler uses it here, it is also a 
major weakness in hierarchicalism. Thus because of Geisler's 
non-absolute understanding of moral absolutes (that erringly 
allows for exemptions) and because of the misuse of the 
principle of double effect, this fourth and final tenet of 
hierarchicalism cannot be maintained. 
In order to summarize the discussion of hierarchical-
ism it is helpful to recall the following points. The first 
tenet is Scriptural in that it points out that God has given 
many absolute laws that are extensions of love. The second 
tenet of hierarchicalism stated that conflicts do occur 
between God's absolute moral demands. This tenet was exam-
ined in conjunction with the second tenet of non-conflicting 
absolutism. This second tenet of hierarchicalism was shown 
to be valid, in spite of the fact that Geisler did not choose 
the best examples to prove his point. The third tenet empha-
sized that God's moral absolutes can be ordered in a hierar-
chical fashion. This tenet was also shown to be in agreement 
with Scripture. The fourth tenet stressed that no guilt is 
incurred when a lower law is broken in order to keep a higher 
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law. This was shown to be incongruous with Scripture because 
it was a misuse of the principle of double effect. Therefore 
hierarchicalism is found to be in error in one of its four 
major tenets. It too must be rejected as a Biblical method 
of theological ethics. 
CHAPTER FIVE 
Conflicting Absolutism' 
The conflicting absolutists recognize that the numer-
ous moral commandments that compose the deontological element 
'This view has also been called "ideal absolutism" and 
"the lesser of two evils view." Its major proponents 
include: Edward J. Carnell, Christian Commitment (New York, 
NY: The Macmillan Co., 1957), 223-30. James Childs, "The 
Third Use of the Law and Constructive Ethics," Currents in 
Theology and Mission 2 (Fall 1975): 35-40. Walter Kaiser, 
"The Weightier and Lighter Matters of the Law: Moses, Jesus 
and Paul," chapter in Current Issues in Biblical and 
Patristic Interpretation, ed. Gerald F. Hawthorne (Grand 
Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 1975), 176-92. Erwin W. Lutzer, The 
Morality Gap (Chicago, IL: Moody Press, 1972), 98-113. 
According to his later writings Lutzer no longer holds this 
view. John W. Montgomery in John W. Montgomery and Joseph 
Fletcher, Situation Ethics True of False? (Minneapolis, MN: 
Bethany Fellowship, 1972). James I. Packer, "Situations and 
Principles," chapter, in Law, Morality and the Bible, eds., 
Bruce Kaye and Gordon Wenham (Downers Grove, IL: Intervarsity 
Press, 1978), 151-67. Franklin E. Payne Jr., Biblical/ 
Medical Ethics: The Christian and the Practice of Medicine 
Milford, MI: Mott Media, Inc., Publishers, 1985), 54-69. 
However, it is noted by Frame, 9 fn 2, that Payne no longer 
holds this view. Helmut Thielicke, Theological Ethics: 3 
vols. ed., William Lazareth, trans. John Doberstein (Grand 
Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 1979) 1:482-667. Translated and 
abridged from Theologische Ethik; 3 Bande (Tlibingen: J. C. B. 
Mohr, 1951-1964), 2.1:56-327. 
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in theological ethics can be arranged in a hierarchical 
order. They also insist that there will be times when there 
are conflicts between the higher and lower ranking 
commandments. When such conflicts occur the moral agent is 
to break the lesser of the two commandments, that is, do the 
lesser of the two evils. In such a situation the moral agent 
accepts his culpability, confesses his sin and looks to 
Christ for forgiveness. 
The main tenets of conflicting absolutism have already 
been implicitly mentioned in the criticisms of the other two 
methods above. It remains for this section merely to explic-
itly list them and to answer some of the more frequent objec-
tions which they evoke. 
The first tenet of conflicting absolutism is the same 
as that for non-conflicting absolutism and hierarchicalism. 
There are many absolute moral commands in the Scripture. 
Each one is an expression of love. James Childs writes, 
"They are absolutes that lay claim on me as definitions of 
how love behaves in various circumstances of life. . . . They 
are expressions of obligations which embody love defini-
tively."2 These numerous moral commands are important 
2Childs, 38. Childs prefers not to call the moral 
laws of Scripture "prescriptive absolutes." He fears 
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because they "inform agape and give expression to it."3 This 
is the only tenet that is held in common by all three methods 
under discussion. 
The second tenet of conflicting absolutism coincides 
with hierarchicalism in its fundamental disagreement with 
non-conflicting absolutism. Conflicting absolutism insists 
that unavoidable conflicts will exist among moral absolutes. 
This point was discussed under the second tenet of non- 
(without due cause) that such a label will lead to legalism 
and turn the Scriptures into a rule book. He would rather 
understand the moral laws of Scripture as "general absolutes" 
that require "prima facie" duties. However, he does not use 
the term "prima facie" in quite the same way it was defined 
and illustrated above in chapter one. For Childs moral laws 
"are more than just mere guides: that is, they are not 
subject to subjective reinterpretation or dismissed. . . . 
[B]y this term [prima facie] I mean more than that these 
norms are just a summary of the collective opinion of past 
ethical reflection on given questions . . . . In that they do 
embody love, they participate in its absolute character and, 
therefore, even accuse us in our failure while they provide 
direction." Ibid. Since this article was published Childs 
has revised some of his terminology. See idem, Christian 
Anthropology and Ethics (Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1978), 
177-78. Thus the difference between Childs' views and those 
of the author of this dissertation seem to be more semantic 
than substantive. 
3lbid. Perhaps this could lead to an understanding of 
love as the formal norm in ethics and the numerous moral laws 
as the concrete material norm in ethics, confer Louis 
Janssens, "Norms and Priorities in a Love Ethics," Louvain 
Studies 6 (Spring 1977): 207-238. 
224 
conflicting absolutism and need not be repeated here. 
The third tenet of conflicting absolutism agrees with 
hierarchicalism insofar as both methods hold that there are 
higher and lower laws among God's absolute moral command-
ments. Both hierarchicalism and non-conflicting absolutism 
emphasize that the moral commandments given in Scripture can 
be arranged in a hierarchical order.4 However, the two views 
are not identical. Geisler, representing the 
hierarchicalists, seeks to construct a hierarchy that is 
static and unchanging. For Geisler certain laws always take 
precedence over other laws. This has led him to construct 
the following hierarchy of duties: 
1. Love for God is to take precedence over love for man. 
2. Life-saving is to take precedence over telling the 
truth. ("A person not promoting non-loving activity is 
more worthy of the respect of love than one who is 
promoting non-loving activity.")5  
3. People must take precedence over things. 
4. Many people must take precedence over a few people. 
5. Actual people must take precedence over potential 
people. ("A fully developed person is of greater worth 
4The Scriptural substantiation for the hierarchical 
ordering of the moral commandments was given above in the 
discussion concerning the second tenet of hierarchicalism. 
It need not be repeated here. 
5Geisler, The Christian Ethic of Love (Grand Rapids: 
Zondervan Publishing House, 1973), 80. 
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than an embryo.")6  
6. Potential persons must take precedence over actual 
things. 
7. Complete persons must take precedence over incomplete 
persons. ("A person with complete mental and physical 
abilities is more valuable than one without."7)8  
The hierarchy of the conflicting absolutists is 
dynamic and flexible, depending upon the variables within the 
situation. The moral agent is to determine the lesser evil, 
not by consulting a prearranged list of duties, but, by ask-
ing, 'What best serves the need of my neighbor?" Or "How can 
I best express the love of God in this situation?" In this 
way the teleological element of love functions to determine 
the lesser of the two evils. The two methods of theological 
ethics, the deontological method and the teleological method, 
are brought together to create one complete hybrid system. 
6lbid., 83. Geisler latter changed his mind on this 
point when he became convinced that an embryo is an actual 
person, see Geisler, "A Response to Olson's Critique of 
Ethical Hierarchicalism," Evangelical Journal 4(Fall, 1986): 
86. 
7Geisler, The Christian Ethic of Love, 85. This 
statement is nonsensical without a detailed analysis of the 
following questions: More valuable to whom, one's friends 
and family, or society at large? By what criteria is such 
value determined? Are the criteria to be arranged in a 
hierarchical order? Who determines the criteria? Geisler 
discusses none of these questions. 
8Ibid., 76-87. 
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In one situation a particular commandment may take precedence 
over another commandment; however, in a different situation 
the order may be reversed. Thus the hierarchy must be flexi-
ble and dynamic not static. Franz Pieper points out this 
flexibility when he writes 
When we divide sins into peccata cordis, oris, operis 
(thoughts, words, deeds), we classify them, as a rule 
according to degree. But that is not always the case. 
A secretly harbored implacability may be a more grievous 
sin than a word or deed promoted by a sudden burst of 
passion.9  
Here Pieper shows that even though there is a hierarchy it is 
not static. Usually sinful actions are more grievous than 
sinful thoughts; however, in the particular situation where 
one has harbored an evil thought, perhaps over a long period 
of time, that could be more grievous than a sudden sinful act 
done on the spur of the moment. 
Thielicke also refers to this flexibility when he 
writes, 
9Francis Pieper, Christian Dogmatics, 4 vols., trans. 
Theodore Engelder et al., (St. Louis, MO: Concordia 
Publishing House, 1950-1953), 1:568. "Die Einteilung der 
Sunden in peccata cordis, oris, operis ist in der Regel, aber 
nicht in jedem einzelnen Fall eine Gradeinteilung. Eine im 
Herzen still gehegte Unversohnlichkeit kann eine schwerere 
Slinde sein als ein in plotzlich aufwallender Leidenschaft 
ausgestossenes bases Wort oder auch vollbrachtes Werk." 
Franz Pieper, Christlich Dogmatik, 4 vols. (St. Louis MO: 
Concordia Publishing House, 1924), 1:679-80. 
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Decisions cannot be made a priori. . . . 
To decide ethical questions in advance is possible 
only within the framework of an illusory natural law 
which pictures the world as an orderly construct, perme-
ated by eternal norms laid down at creation, the struc-
ture of which may be demonstrated. . . . The world then 
becomes a hierarchical cosmos, and in principle every 
case which arises and every decision which may be 
required can be prejudged morally by reason of the hier-
archy of values. This type of cosmic order presupposes 
a specific interrelationship between the original state 
and the fallen world, between creation and sin. . . . 
This relationship is determined by the fact that sin 
violates creation only in a very peripheral way. In 
Reformation thought, on the contrary, the world is seen 
to be so totally permeated by both creation and sin that 
we are prevented from. . . espousing the illusion of 
hierarchical cosmos of natural law. It is only logical, 
then, that on the Reformation view there can be no 
advance decisions. . . . decisions must be made within 
the framework of each existing situation. The ethics of 
Law is replaced by a kind of "situational ethics."10  
10Thielicke, Evangelical Ethics, 1:648, 650. "Es 
Keine apriorischen Vorweg-Entscheidungen geben konne. . . . 
Dass solche Vorweg-Entscheidungen immer nur im Rahmen 
eines Naturrechtsphantoms mOglich sind, das uns die Welt als 
ein geordnetes, von ewigen, der Schopfung entstammenden 
Normen durchzogenes und in seiner Struktur aufweisbares 
Gebilde erscheinen lasst. . . . Dann wird die Welt zum 
hierarchischen Kosmos und dann lasst sich im Prinzip jeder 
eintretende casus und jede von ihm geforderte Entscheidung 
infolge der mOglichen Rangstufung der Werte moralisch 
prajudizieren. Die so verstandene Weltordnung setzt eine 
ganz bestimmte Inbeziehungsetzung von Urstand und gefallener 
Welt, von Schopfung und Slinde voraus. . . . Diese Beziehung 
ist dadurch bestimmt, dass die SUnde nur in hochst peripherer 
Weise die Schopfung verletzt, wahrend fur das reformatorische 
Denken die Welt eine totale gegenseitige Durchdringung von 
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Thielicke's use of the phrase "situational ethics" 
should not be misconstrued. He does not use the phrase the 
same way Joseph Fletcher uses it in his popular book 
Situation Ethics." Joseph Fletcher has no respect for the 
third use of the law. It is an essential aspect of 
Fletcher's brand of situational ethics to reject any instruc-
tional use of the law. In this sense Fletcher can say he is 
allergic to the law.12 However, Thielicke has a very high 
regard for the instructional use of the law. He writes, 
'The Law is to be retained in the third place in order 
that the saints may know what works God requires for the 
exercise of obedience to him.' . . . It has . . . a 
regulative significance. . . . The Law does not make the 
new man, but it does exercise him and shows him the full 
range of relationships in which his newness is rele-
vant. . . . 
[St. Paul] stands in relation to the Law no longer 
as a servant but as a free man. He still respects it as 
Schopfung und Slinde zeigt, die es verbietet. . . der 
naturrechtlichen Illusion eines hierarchischen Kosmos zu 
kommen. Es ist darum nur logisch, dass von hier aus keine 
Vorweg-Entscheidungen moglich sind. 
. . . dann kann die Entscheidung immer nur im Rahmen 
der jeweils zustandigen Situation gefallet werden, dann gibt 
es also allein so etwas wie 'Situationsethik/ und kein 
'Gesetzesethos." Thielicke, Etik, 2.1: 305-308. 
11Joseph Fletcher, Situation Ethics (Philadelphia, PA: 
The Westminster Press, 1966). 
12Ibid., 152-53. 
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a declaration of the will of God.13  
Thielicke is not a "situational" ethicist in the same vein as 
Joseph Fletcher. When Thielicke mentions that, "Decisions 
cannot be made a priori, "14 and ethics must be, "situational 
ethics"15 he is referring only to conflict situations. 
Thielicke emphasizes this, when, after using the term 
"situation ethics" he writes, 
What this term means is best illustrated once again by 
the borderline situation of extreme conflict. . . . It 
thus makes good sense that we should conclude our dis-
cussion of the borderline situation with this investiga-
tion.16  
13Thielicke, Ethics, 1:134, 136. "'Lex retinenda est, 
ut sciant sancti, quaenam opera requirat Deus, in quibus 
obedientiam exercere erga Deum possint.' . . . In diesem 
Sinne hat es eine regulative Bedeutung . . . . Das Gesetz 
macht nicht den neuen Menschen, sondern es iibt ihn and zeigt 
ihm die BeziehungsfUlle, in der nun diese Neuheit des 
Menschen akut ist. 
. . . [St. Paul] verhalt Bich zu ihm nicht als Knecht, 
sondern als Freier. Er achtet es nach wie vor als eine 
Willenskundgebung Gottes." Thielicke, Ethik, 1:224-27. This 
quote contains the debated passage from Luther's "Second 
Disputation Against the Antinomians" 1538 W. A. 39.1:485. 
14Thielicke, Ethics, 1:648. 
15Ibid., 1:650. 
16Thielicke, Ethics, 1:650. "Was dieses Stichwort 
bedeutet, ist wiederum genauestens an der Konflikt-und 
Grenzsituation zu klaren. . . . Es ist deshalb sinnvoll, wenn 
wir mit dieser Untersuchung das Kapitel fiber die Konflikt- 
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Outside of a conflict situation God's will is clear, 
decisions can be made a priori, right and wrong can be easily 
distinguished. However, inside a conflict situation the 
Christian moral agent has no such certainty. The situation 
becomes more complex. No a priori decision can be made. 
From within the conflict situation the moral agent should 
attempt to consider every pertinent variable. For example, 
in a bioethical decision concerning the initiation or with-
drawal of extraordinary treatment, the moral agent should 
consider the tension among cost, risks, pain and benefits to 
the patient.17 Only after such factors have been prayerfully 
considered can one begin to construct the hierarchy based on 
the available options. The moral agent is then in a position 
to choose the lesser evil (or, that which most expedites 
love) for that situation. In this way love serves as the 
arbitrator between conflicting moral laws.18  
situation beschliessen." Thielicke, Ethik, 2.1: 308. 
17For more information on making this type of decision 
the reader may wish to see Robert Wier, Abating Treatment 
with Critically Ill Patients (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 1989) and Cynthia B. Cohen, ed., Casebook on the 
Termination of Life-Sustaining Treatment and the Care of the 
Dying (Briarcliff Manor: The Hastings Center, 1988). This 
also contains a lengthy bibliography. 
18James I. Packer writes, "We may agree with the 
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The fourth tenet of conflicting absolutism stresses 
that in a conflict situation the moral agent is to observe 
the hierarchical order and do the lesser evil. In performing 
this lesser evil, the moral agent does incur guilt for which 
he needs to repent and trust in Christ for forgiveness. It 
was emphasized above, in the critical response to the sixth 
tenet of non-conflicting absolutism (concerning the principle 
of double effect), that God demands all of his moral laws to 
be obeyed. There is never a time when an infraction of God's 
law does not constitute a sin. The argument given above 
along with the substantiating Scriptural references need not 
be repeated here. However, it may be added that this clearly 
distinguishes conflicting absolutism from both hierarchical-
ism and the situational ethics of Joseph Fletcher, both of 
which attempt to remove the lesser evil completely from the 
category of evil by calling it a lesser good. They thereby 
eliminate the recognition of culpability and the need for 
repentance. In doing this, situationalism and hierarchical- 
situationists that love for persons must arbitrate between 
the conflicting claims of moral principles, that doctrinaire 
decisions in such cases will not make the best of a bad job, 
and that unwillingness to face the situations full 
complexities and insensitivity to the variety of rules and 
claims that apply, will lead straight into ironclad Pharisaic 
legalism." James I. Packer, "Situations and Principles," 
164. 
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ism attempt to remove from God's law its terrifying and 
condemning thrust. In this way the second use of the law is 
seriously impeded. Isaiah wrote, "Woe to those who call evil 
good" (Isaiah 5:20). When evil goes unnoticed the moral 
agent fails to recognize his need for Christ. James I. 
Packer explains, 
We shall reject Fletcher's grotesque idea that in such 
situations adultery, fornication, abortion, suicide and 
the rest, if thought the best course (which arguably in 
Fletcher's cases they might me . . .), thereby become 
good: which valuation, as Fletcher himself emphasized, 
leaves no room for regret at having had to do them. 
Instead, we shall insist that evil remains evil, even 
when, being the lesser evil it appears the right thing 
to do; we shall do it with a heavy heart, and seek God's 
cleansing of our conscience for having done it.19  
In this respect Geisler is in the same position as 
Fletcher. Both seek to remove the evil, in a conflict situa-
tion, completely from the category of evil and transpose it 
into something good; whereas, the Scriptural solution to evil 
is Jesus Christ. 
Within a moral dilemma there is no guarantee that the 
Christian will chose correctly. Serious, dedicated, intelli-
gent Christians will have differing opinions over which act 
is truly the lesser evil in a particular dilemma. Yet, the 
midst of a moral dilemma is no place for timidity. Once the 
19Ibid. 
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situation has been recognized, the options considered and the 
guilt confessed, then action must take place even though it 
be sin. The sinful structure of the dilemma may even cause 
one to "hunger and thirst for righteousness" (Matthew 5:6). 
In such situations, one must have the courage to "sin boldly, 
but believe and rejoice in Christ even more boldly, for he is 
victorious over sin."20  
A Critique of the Most Common Objections  
to Conflicting Absolutism 
Some critics claim that conflicting absolutism is an 
absurd method because its emphasis on the lesser evil obli-
gates the moral agent to sin. Geisler writes, 
According to conflicting absolutism, in real moral 
conflicts we have a moral duty to do the lesser of two 
evils. That is, one is morally obligated to do evil. 
But how can there ever be a moral obligation to do what 
is immoral? It seems a morally absurd claim.21  
20Luther's Works, 55 vols., edd. J. Pelikan and H. T. 
Lehmann, American Edition in English Translation 
(Philadelphia: Fortress Press and St. Louis: Concordia 
Publishing House, 1958-1986), 48:282. Hereafter this work 
will be abbreviated as L. W. "Esto peccator et pecca 
fortiter, sed fortius fide et gaude in Christo, qui victor 
est peccati, mortis et mundi." D. Martin Luthers Werke, 
Rritische Gesamtausgabe, Brieswechsel, 18 Bande (Wiemar, 
1930-1985), 2:372. 
21Geisler, Christian Ethics: Options and Issues (Grand 
Rapids: Baker Book House, 1959), 103. 
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Conflicting absolutism does not obligate the moral 
agent to sin when there is a sinless alternative. However, 
it directs the moral agent to the lesser evil only when the 
alternative is a greater evil. In such conflict situations 
it remains consistent in categorizing evils as evils. 
This same objection was emphasized by Joseph Fletcher 
when he debated John W. Montgomery at San Diego State College 
on February 11, 1971. However, Fletcher did not grasp 
Montgomery's answer. 
Fletcher: "Aren't you in effect telling us that in your 
ethics we are sometimes morally obliged to do what is 
wrong, and does that make any sense in terms of ethical 
analysis? [Applause from audience] . . 
Montgomery: What I'm saying is that it may be necessary 
to choose a lesser of evils. But such a choice still 
remains an evil. 
Fletcher: And isn't the logical import of the lesser 
evil doctrine precisely that sometimes we might be 
morally obliged to do what is wrong? . . . . 
Montgomery: The point that I'm trying to make is that 
because something is a lesser evil doesn't somehow 
transmute it into a good. But that's what happens in 
situationalism. Lesser evils disappear from the class 
of evils; and a person sticks in his thumb and pulls out 
a plum and is able to achieve moral vindication. I 
don't believe that this should be allowable within the 
framework of theological ethics.22  
22Fletcher and John W. Montgomery, Situation Ethics: 
True of False? A Dialogue Between Joseph Fletcher and John 
Warwick Montgomery (Minneapolis, MN: Bethany Fellowship, 
1972), 69-70. 
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On the one hand, the absurdity of which Geisler and 
Fletcher speak does exist. It is the absurdity of living in 
a sinful world.23 Yet, on the other hand, when there is no 
sinless alternative, it is not absurd for the moral agent to 
choose the lesser rather than the greater of two evils. 
A second criticism has been directed at both conflict-
ing absolutism and hierarchicalism concerning their insis-
tence that divine absolutes can conflict. Olson claims that 
Scripture proves that "the believer is never forced to choose 
between obedience to two absolutes since God will provide a 
way of escape."24 He quotes Paul's first letter to the 
Corinthians. 
No temptation (irEtpaquic) has seized you except what is 
common to man. And God is faithful; he will not let you 
23This absurdity was noted by the French 
existentialists. For example see Albert Camus Le Mythe de 
Sisyphe (Gallimard, 1942) Trans. as The Myth of Sisyphus 
(London: Hamish Hamilton, 1955) "The Linchpin of Camus' 
argument in The Myth of Sisyphus is the notion of the World's 
absurdity, and the world is called absurd . . . . Camus 
conceives the great yearning of the human spirit to be for 
some evidence of the world's being governed by principles of 
coherence and intelligibility•  To his dismay, 
however . . . . things do not dovetail into one another in 
such a way as to give us any sense of their being established 
order." Nathan A. Scott Jr., Mirrors of Man in Existentialism 
(New York, NY: Collins, 1978), 133-34. 
2401son, 10-11. 
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be tempted (TrEtpacreijvat) beyond what you can bear. But 
when you are tempted trrepaapt6)) he will also provide a 
way out so that you can stand up under it. 
(1 Corinthians 10:13) 
However, Geisler points out that, "First Corinthians 
10:13 is only a promise for victory in temptation — not a 
guarantee of intervention to avoid moral conflicts."25 This 
passage is referring only to standing firm against an indi-
vidual temptation. It says nothing concerning the conflict 
of two moral absolutes. Such a conflict is not to be 
confused with a temptation. A temptation is an enticement to 
follow Satan. Richard Trench points out "Perazein is applied 
to the solicitations and suggestions of Satan (Matt. 4:1; 1 
Cor. 7:5; Rev. 2:10) that always are made with a malicious 
hope."26 Also, Bauer, Arndt and Gingrich define "Trepaupos not 
only as temptation but also as "enticement to sin."27  
Such "solicitations," "suggestions" and "enticements" 
are completely lacking in the moral dilemma wherein one must 
25Geisler, Christian Ethics, 90. 
26Richard Trench, Synonyms of the New Testament, ed. 
Robert G. Hoeber (Grand Rapids, MO: Baker Book House, 1989) 
295. 
27Walter Bauer, A Greek-English Lexicon of the New 
Testament trans. William F. Arndt and F. Wilber Gingrich. 
Second Edition Revised and Augmented (Chicago, IL:University 
of Chicago Press, 1979), 640. 
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choose between two absolutes. Thus a moral dilemma is not a 
temptation. This passage from First Corinthians, used by 
not-conflicting absolutists to criticize conflicting abso-
lutism and hierarchicalism, is inapplicable to this situa-
tion. 
A third criticism directed against conflicting abso-
lutism is a Christological argument developed by the hi-
erarchicalists. Geisler claims that if moral conflicts are 
part of our existence in this world, and if Christ was in 
this world, then Christ must necessarily have faced moral 
conflicts wherein he was forced to do the lesser evil. 
However, Scripture clearly maintains that Christ was sinless 
(2 Corinthians 5:21 and Hebrews 4:15). Therefore the sin-
lessness of Christ illustrates that one is not culpable for 
doing the lesser evi1.28  
Geisler's argument has one major flaw. Moral 
conflicts are part of our existence in this world and Christ 
did come into the world, yet it does not necessarily follow 
that Christ had to face moral dilemmas. Surely it is possi-
ble that he was providentially spared from encountering moral 
dilemmas in order that he might retain the status as the 
"lamb without blemish or defect" (1 Peter 1:19). 
28Geisler, Christian Ethics, 106-110. 
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This is analogous to the relationship between Christ 
and original sin. Original sin (like moral dilemmas) is part 
of our existence in this world. Christ did come into the 
world. Yet that earthly existence did not necessitate his 
participation in original sin (nor does it necessitate his 
participation in moral dilemmas). 
Geisler responds to this answer by writing, 
It may be that God providentially spared Jesus from 
facing moral conflicts in order to preserve his sinless-
ness. But if this is the case, then the Christian may 
ask why he, too is not spared from them if he is 
faithful to God . . . . It would be special pleading to 
declare that the providential way out applies only to 
Christ but not to other servants of God who are faithful 
to his will.29  
Geisler assumes that if Jesus was providentially 
spared from moral dilemmas then it necessarily follows that 
Christians today should also be providentially spared from 
such conflicts. However the latter does not necessarily 
follow from the former. It takes no "special pleading" to 
call attention to Jesus' unique purpose on earth. His 
mission in this world was to be the sinless sacrifice offered 
on behalf of sinners (Hebrews 9:14, 10:10-14 and 1 Peter 
1:19). In order to accomplish this mission he was providen-
tially spared from original sin. He could also have been 
29Ibid., 107. 
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providentially spared from moral conflicts. A Christian 
today does not have the task of being the sinless redeemer of 
humanity. Therefore a Christian, unlike Christ, is not 
spared from original sin nor from moral dilemmas.30  
A fourth criticism directed against the conflicting 
absolutists is another christological argument. This criti-
cism claims that if Christ never encountered moral dilemmas, 
as conflicting absolutists maintain, then he cannot serve as 
a moral example for his followers. Whereas Scripture main-
tains that Christ is our moral example. Geisler writes, 
If Christ is our complete moral example then he must 
have faced morally conflicting situations in which both 
alternatives were sinful. But if Christ never sinned, 
then Christ never faced them. Hence we have no example 
from Christ to follow in some of life's most difficult 
moral decisions. But does not Hebrews say he was 
"tempted in every way, just as we are" (4:15)? Does not 
Paul exhort us to be followers of Christ (1 Cor. 11:1- 
2)? But how can we follow him in ethical dilemmas if he 
never faced them?31  
It is helpful to examine two points from the above 
quote. First, Geisler writes that Christ is "our complete 
30Geisler does not discuss the possibility that Christ 
could have used his divine wisdom to recognize and avoid 
situations that were likely to lead to moral dilemmas. 
31Ibid., 109-110. 
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moral example."32 On the one hand, Christ himself said that 
the example he established should be followed by others. He 
told his disciples, "I have set you an example that you 
should do as I have done for you" John 13:15. Paul also 
exhorts his readers to follow the example of Christ. "Follow 
my example as I follow the example of Christ" 1 Corinthians 
11:1. Peter also stresses this same point. "To this you 
were called, because Christ suffered for you, leaving you an 
example, that you should follow in his steps" 1 Peter 2:21. 
Such passages point out that Christians are to follow Christ 
in his exemplary love. Christ showed the world what real 
love is by his perfect obedience to the law. Thus, it is his 
love that is to emulated. "Be imitators of God, therefore, 
as clearly loved children and live a life of love, just as 
Christ loved us and gave himself up for us as a fragrant 
offering and sacrifice to God" Ephesians 5:1-2. 
On the other hand, this does not mean that Christ is 
our complete moral example in the sense that Geisler main-
tains. In many respects Christ did not set a moral example 
for the husband, for the soldier, or for the civil magis-
trate. This was not his purpose. There was a higher purpose 
to his life than merely setting moral examples for everyone 
321bid. 
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to follow. Certain aspects of Christ's life were intended to 
be, and should be understood as, unique to his person and 
work. Luther writes, 
You ask: Why did not Christ . . . bear the sword? 
Answer: You tell me, why did Christ not take a wife, or 
become a cobbler or a tailor . . . ? Christ pursued his 
own office and vocation. . . . For each one must attend 
to the duties of his own calling. 
Therefore, . . . Christ . . . had to manifest him-
self wholly in connection with the estate and calling 
which alone expressly served his kingdom. . . . This was 
and had to be Christ's peculiar function as the Supreme 
King in this kingdom. Since not all Christians, how-
ever, have this same function (although they are enti-
tled to it), it is fitting that they should have some 
other external office by which God may also be served.33  
Because of Christ's unique vocation not every aspect of the 
Christian's life can be found in Christ's life, nor can (or 
33Luther, "Temporal Authority: To What Extent If 
Should Be Obeyed," (1523) L. W. 45:100-101. "So sprichstu: 
Warumb hatts denn Christus . . . nicht gefuret? Antwort: 
sage myr, warumb hatt er nicht auch eyn weyb genomen oder ist 
ein schuster oder schneyder worden? . . . Christus hat seyn 
ampt und stand gefuret. . . . Denn eyn iglicher muss seyns 
beruffens und wercks wartten. 
Darumb . . . Christus . . . muste sich allerdinge 
beweyssen mit solchem stand und werck, die eygentlich nur 
alleyne zu seynem reych dieneten . . . Wilchs Christus 
eygentlich ampt gewessen ist unnd seyn muste als des ubersten 
konigs ynn dem selben reych. Nu aber nicht alle Christen das 
selb ampt haben (wie wol sie es haben mugen), ists billich, 
das sie sonst eyn anders eusserlich haben, da mit auch Gott 
gedienet mag werden." D. Martin Luthers Werke, Kritische 
Gesamtausgabe, 64 Bande (Weimar, 1883-), 11:258-59. 
Hereafter this work is abbreviated as W. A. 
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should) the Christian follow every aspect of Christ's life. 
Christ is our complete moral example insofar as he completely 
manifested the fullness of love through his perfect obedience 
of the moral law; however, he did not provide a multitude of 
examples upon which Christians are to base every aspect of 
their lives. Thus Christ can still serve as a moral example 
without having had to encounter moral dilemmas. 
The second point in Geisler's quote that deserves 
careful examination is his reference to Hebrews 4;15 empha-
sizing, "that Christ was 'tempted in every way, just as we 
are.'"34 Geisler's response to the non-conflicting abso-
lutists use of 1 Corinthians 10:13, given above in answer to 
the second criticism, applies here to his own use of Hebrews 
4:15. Geisler pointed out that a "temptation" is not the 
same as a "moral conflict." 
First Corinthians 10:13 stressed that God will enable 
Christians to withstand temptations (but it does not say 
anything about delivering Christians from moral dilemmas). 
Similarly Hebrews 4:15, that Geisler now mentions, stresses 
that Christ withstood every temptation (but it does not say 
anything about Christ confronting moral dilemmas). There-
fore, just as 1 Corinthians 10:13 cannot be properly used by 
34Geisler, Christian Ethics, 110. 
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the non-conflicting absolutists to show that Christians are 
delivered from moral dilemmas, neither can Hebrews 4:15 be 
properly used by Geisler to show that Christ faced moral dil-
emmas. It was shown above in answer to the second criticism 
that a moral conflict is not a temptation. 
Summary and Conclusion of Part Two 
To summarize the discussion on conflicting absolutism 
it is helpful to recall the following points. The first 
tenet stresses that there are numerous moral absolutes given 
by God which are summarized by love. This is in agreement 
with both non-conflicting absolutism and hierarchicalism. 
The second tenet stresses that due to the sinful condition of 
the world there are times when two or more of God's absolute 
laws will conflict with one another. This tenet contradicts 
the view of non-conflicting absolutism. It agrees with 
hierarchicalism, but it is not supported well by the argu-
ments the hierarchicalists gives. It is shown that one of 
the best ways to recognize this conflict is to have a 
thorough understanding of the distinction between God's 
primary will and his secondary will. The third tenet empha-
sizes that the absolute moral laws of God can be arranged in 
a hierarchical order. This tenet also conflicts with non- 
244 
conflicting absolutism. Hierarchicalism agrees with this 
tenet; however, it constructs a static hierarchy. The hier-
archy of conflicting absolutism is flexible and dynamic, 
based upon the needs of the neighbor in a given situation. 
The fourth and final tenet of conflicting absolutism stresses 
that in a conflict situation the moral agent is to observe 
the hierarchical order of God's commands and do the lesser 
evil. In performing this lesser evil the moral agent incurs 
guilt for which he needs to repent. This entire tenet is 
rejected by the non-conflicting absolutists due to the previ-
ous disagreement in the third tenet concerning the existence 
of any hierarchy of absolutes. The first half of this tenet 
is accepted by the hierarchicalists; whereas, the second half 
is not. When the hierarchicalists refer to the lesser evil 
as the greater good, for which no guilt is incurred, they are 
attempting to transmute an evil into a good and thereby 
disregard the serious nature of the threat of God's law. 
Thus, of the three methods discussed, conflicting absolutism 
is the only Scriptural alternative. 
CONCLUSION 
Part one examines both the deontological and teleo-
logical elements in theological ethics. It is shown in this 
first part that the basic method of normative theological 
ethics used in the Scriptures contains certain characteris-
tics found in rule deontology. That is, humankind has an 
unqualified duty to obey every absolute moral command from 
God. Yet, it is also emphasized that certain characteristics 
of rule teleology are found in the Scripture. In the event 
of a moral dilemma the end principle of love must be applied 
directly to the situation in order to determine the lesser of 
two evils. 
Part two examines that, contrary to the claim of the 
non-conflicting absolutists, such moral dilemmas are indeed 
real. Contrary to the hierarchicalists, such moral dilemmas 
cannot be dissolved by placing them in a hierarchical order. 
Nor does a good intention relieve the moral agent of 
culpability. Thus in the final analysis this dissertation, 
which seeks to construct a prolegomenon for normative 
theological ethics, proposes the following four steps the 
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moral agent is to consider in determining the moral option: 
1. The moral agent is to search the Scriptures in 
order to determine which duties are relevant to the situa-
tion. If there is only one absolute moral command of God 
that applies to the situation then this is to be followed, 
not as an end in itself, but, because such obedience is the 
means by which God would have his love flow through the moral 
agent and into the situation in order to help the neighbor in 
need. 
2. If more than one absolute moral command of God can 
be applied to the situation, the moral agent must determine 
the lesser evil. This can only be done by prayerfully exam-
ining all the variables involved in the situation. In a 
bioethical decision concerning the initiation or withdrawal 
of treatment this may include considering cost, benefit, 
pain, risk, and effectiveness of the treatment. Then the 
moral agent must prayerfully seek to determine that option 
which best serves the need of his neighbor. The moral agent 
may ask at this point, "How can I best express, or incarnate, 
God's love in this situation?" 
3. After the decision is carried out the moral agent 
is to recognize his culpability, repent and look to Christ 
for forgiveness. 
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4. The moral agent can thank and praise God that, even 
though there is no guarantee that the best option was chosen, 
he can still rest secure in the forgiveness that he has in 
Christ Jesus. 
These four steps are merely a proposed beginning 
toward the development of a Scriptural method of normative 
theological ethics. Future study still needs to be done to 
determine whether or not it is possible to establish a 
specific procedure by which the moral agent can determine the 
lesser of two evils within a given situation. If that is 
possible, what might such a method be? 
APPENDIX I 
BIBLICAL TESTIMONY CONCERNING THE PRESENT 
INVALIDITY OF THE OLD TESTAMENT 
CEREMONIAL AND POLITICAL LAWS 
Even in the Old Testament days God made it known that 
his way of dealing with his people would not be the same 
forever. "'The time is coming,' declares the Lord, 'when I 
will make a new covenant with the house of Israel and with 
the house of Judah. It will not be like the covenant I made 
with their forefathers'"(Jeremiah 31:31-32).1  
This change is made even more clear in the New 
Testament. Jesus himself spoke of contradicting the 
ceremonial laws when he said, "What goes into a man's mouth 
does not make him 'unclean,' but what comes out of his mouth, 
that is what makes him 'unclean'" (Matthew 15:11). 
God also showed to Peter in the vision of Acts 10:9-16 
that the ceremonial distinctions are no longer relevant. 
About noon the following day as they were on their 




journey and approaching the city, Peter went up on the 
roof to pray. He became hungry and wanted something to 
eat, and while the meal was being prepared, he fell into 
a trance. He saw heaven opened and something like a 
large sheet being let down to earth by its four corners. 
It contained all kinds of four-footed animals, as well 
as reptiles of the earth and birds of the air. Then a 
voice told him, "Get up, Peter. Kill and eat." 
"Surely not, Lord!" Peter replied. "I have never 
eaten anything impure or unclean." 
The voice spoke a second time, "Do not call 
anything impure that God has made clean." 
This happened three times, and immediately the 
sheet was taken back to heaven. 
Therefore, at the Jerusalem council, when the 
Judaizers said, "The Gentiles must be circumcised and 
required to obey the law of Moses" (Acts 15:5b) Peter clearly 
spoke out against such Old Testament ceremonial legislation 
by saying, 
God, who knows the heart, showed that he accepted them 
by giving the Holy Spirit to them, just as he did to us. 
He made no distinction between us and them, for he 
purified their hearts by faith. Now then why do you try 
to test God by putting on the necks of the disciples a 
yoke that neither we nor our fathers have been able to 
bear? No! We believe it is through the grace of our 
Lord Jesus that we are saved, just as they are. (Acts 
15:8-11) 
Paul also emphasizes the invalidity of the Old 
Testament ceremonial and political laws in his letter to the 
Galatians, in which he scolds the Galatians for turning to 
the Old Testament ceremonial laws. He emphasizes his point 
250 
by denying the importance of circumcision, one of the most 
important ceremonial regulations of all. 
It is for freedom that Christ has set us free. Stand 
firm, then and do not let yourselves be burdened again 
by a yoke of slavery. . . . For in Christ Jesus neither 
circumcision nor uncircumcision has any value. The only 
thing that counts is faith expressing itself through 
love. (Galatians 5:1-6) 
In a similar vein Paul wrote to the Colossians. 
Therefore do not let anyone judge you by what you eat or 
drink, or with regard to a religious festival, a New 
Moon celebration or a Sabbath day. These are a shadow 
of the things that were to come; the reality, however, 
is found in Christ. (Colossians 2:16-17) 
Likewise the author of the letter to the Hebrews 
writes, 
If perfection could have been attained through the 
Levitical priesthood (for on the basis of it the law was 
given to the people), why was there still need for 
another priest to come — one in the order of 
Melchizedek, not in the order of Aaron? For when there 
is a change of the priesthood, there must also be a 
change of the law. He of whom these things are said 
belonged to a different tribe, and no one from that 
tribe has ever served at the altar. . . 
The former regulation is set aside because it was 
weak and useless. (Hebrews 7:11-13, 18) 
And again he writes in reference to Jeremiah 31 
saying, "By calling this covenant 'new,' he has made the 
first one obsolete; and what is obsolete and aging will soon 
disappear" (Hebrews 8:13). 
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Thus the ceremonial and political laws, which were 
intended only for ancient Israel for a certain limited time, 
must be distinguished from the moral law that is intended for 
all people until Christ returns. 
APPENDIX II 
LUTHER ON THE PURPOSE OF GOOD WORKS 
In his Church Postil for the First Sunday in Advent 
based on Matthew 21:1-9 Luther explains that the purpose of 
all good works is to benefit the neighbor. The following 
English excerpts are from John Nicholas Lenker, ed The 
Precious and Sacred Writings of Martin Luther, 31 vol. 
(Minneapolis: The Luther Press, 1903-1910), 10:17-58. A 
German edition may be found in D. Martin Luthers Werke, 
Kritische Gesamtausgabe. 64 Bande. (Weimar, 1883—), 
10.1.2:21-62. 
"We receive Christ not only as a gift by faith, but 
also as an example of love toward our neighbor, whom we are 
to serve as Christ serves us. Faith brings and gives Christ 
to you with all his possessions. Love gives you to your 
neighbor with all your possessions. These two things 
constitute a true and complete Christian life . . . . 
"If you have ears to hear and a mind to observe, pray, 
listen and learn for God's sake what good works are and mean. 
A good work is good for the reason that it is useful and 
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benefits and helps the one for whom it is done; why else 
should it be called good! For there is a difference between 
good works and a great, long, numerous, beautiful works. 
When you throw a big stone a great distance it is a great 
work, but whom does it benefit?: If you can jump, run, fence 
well, it is a fine work, but whom does it benefit? Whom does 
it help, if you wear a costly coat or build a fine house? 
"And to come to our Papists' work, what does it avail 
if they put silver or gold on the walls, wood and stone in 
the churches? Who would be made better, if each village had 
ten bells, as big as those at Erfurt? Whom would it help if 
all the houses were convents and monasteries as splendid as 
the temple of Solomon? Who is benefited if you fast for St. 
Catherine, St. Martin or any other saint? Whom does it 
benefit, if you are shaved half or wholly, if you wear a gray 
or a black cap? Of what use were it if all people held mass 
every hour? What benefit is it if in one church, as at 
Meissen, they sing day and night without interruption? Who 
is better for it, if every church had more silver, pictures 
and jewelry than the churches of Halle and Wittenberg? It is 
folly and deception, men's lies invented these things and 
called them good works; they all pretend they serve God thus 
and pray for the people and their sins, just as if they 
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helped God with their property or as if his saints were in 
need of our work. Sticks and stones are not as rude and mad 
as we are. A tree bears fruit, not for itself, but for the 
good of man and beast, and these fruits are its good 
works . . . . 
"Hence direct all the good you can do and your whole 
life to the end that it be good; but it is good only when it 
is useful to other people and not to yourself . . . . 
"A man is to live, speak, act, hear, suffer and die 
for the good of his wife and child, the wife for the husband, 
the children for the parents, the servants for their masters, 
the masters for their servants, the government for its 
subjects, the subjects for the government, each one for his 
fellowman, even for his enemies, so that one is the other's 
hand, mouth, eye, foot, even heart and mind. This is a truly 
Christian and good work, which can and shall be done at all 
times, in all places, toward all people. You notice the 
Papist's works in organs, pilgrimages, fasting, etc., are 
really beautiful, great, numerous, long, wide and heavy 
works, but there is no good, useful and helpful work among 
them and the proverb may be applied to them: It is already 
bad . . . . 
"Thus faith blots out sin in a different manner than 
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love. Faith blots it out of itself, while love or good works 
prove and demonstrate that faith has done so and is present, 
as St. Paul says, 1 Cor. 13,2: "And if I have all faith, so 
as to remove mountains, but have not love, I am nothing." 
Why? Without doubt, because faith is not present where there 
is no love, they are not separate the one from the other." 
APPENDIX III 
LUTHER ON THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN LOVE AND THE LAW 
The following translation is from John Nicholas 
Lenker, ed. The Precious and Sacred Writings of Martin 
Luther, 31 vols. (Minneapolis: The Luther Press, 1903-1910), 
8:56-75. A German edition is found in D. Martin Luthers 
Werke. Kritische Gesamtausgabe. 64 &Uncle. (Weimar, 1883-), 
17.2:88-104. 
Fourth Sunday After Epiphany 
Text: Romans 13,8-10. 
"'Owe no man anything, save to love one another: for 
he that loveth his neighbor hath fulfilled the law. For 
this, Thou shalt not commit adultery, Thou shalt not kill, 
Thou shalt not steal, Thou shalt not covet, and if there be 
any other commandment, it is summed up in this word, namely, 
Thou shalt love thy neighbor as thyself. Love worketh no ill 
to his neighbor; love therefore is the fulfilment of the 
law .'. • . 
"We will look at the command to love, in the Law of 
God. Inumerable, endless, are the books and doctrines 
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produced for the direction of man's conduct. And there is 
still no limit to the making of books and laws. Note the 
ecclesiastical and civil regulations, the spiritual orders 
and stations. These laws and doctrines might be tolerated, 
might be received with more favor, if they were founded upon 
and administered according to the one great law-the one rule 
or measure-of love; as the Scriptures do, which present many 
different laws, but all born of love, and comprehended in and 
subject to it. And these laws must yield, must become 
invalid, when they conflict with love. 
"Of Love's higher authority we find many illustrations 
in the Scriptures. Christ makes particular mention of the 
matter in Matthew 12,3-4, where David and his companions ate 
the holy showbread. Though a certain law prohibited all but 
the priests from partaking of this holy food, Love was 
empress here, and free. Love was over the Law, subjecting it 
to herself. The Law had to yield for the time being, had to 
become invalid, when David suffered hunger. The Law had to 
submit to the sentence: 'David hungers and must be relieved, 
for Love commands, Do good to your needy neighbor. Yield, 
therefore, thou Law. Prevent not the accomplishment of this 
good. Rather accomplish it thyself. Serve him in his need. 
Interpose not thy prohibitions.' In connection with this 
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same incident, Christ teaches that we are to do good to our 
neighbor on the Sabbath; to minister as necessity demands, 
whatever the Sabbath restrictions of the Law. For when a 
brother's need calls, Love is authority and the Law of the 
Sabbath is void. 
"Were laws conceived and administered in love, the 
number of laws would matter little. Though one might not 
hear or learn all of them, he would learn from the one or two 
he had knowledge of, the principle of love taught in 
all . . . . Every word in this epistle lesson proves Love 
mistress of all law. 
"Further, no greater calamity, wrong and wretchedness 
is possible on earth than the teaching and enforcing of laws 
without love. In such case, law, are but a ruinous curse, 
making true the proverbs, 'summum jus, summa injustitia,' 
'The most strenuous right is the most strenuous wrong' and 
again, Solomon's words (Ec 7,17), 'Noli nimium esse justus,' 
'Be not righteous overmuch' . . . 
"In the conception, the establishment and the 
observance of all laws, the object should be, not the 
furtherance of the laws in themselves, not the advancement of 
works, but the exercise of love. That is the true purpose of 
law, according to Paul here, 'He that loveth his neighbor 
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hath fulfilled the law.' Therefore, when the law contributes 
to the injury rather than the benefit of our neighbor, it 
should be ignored. The same law may at one time benefit our 
neighbor and at another time injure him. Consequently, it 
should be regulated according to its advantage to him. Law 
should be made to serve in the same way that food and raiment 
and other necessaries of life serve. We consider not the 
food and raiment themselves, but their benefit to our needy 
neighbor. And we cease to dispense them as soon as we 
perceive them no longer add to his comfort. 
"Suppose you were to come across an individual foolish 
enough to act with no other thought than that food and 
clothing are truly good things, and so proceed to stuff a 
needy one with unlimited food and drink unto choking, and to 
clothe him unto suffocation, and then not to desist. Suppose 
to the command, 'Stop, you have suffocated, have already 
over-fed and over-clothed him, and all is lost effort now,' 
the foolish one should reply: 'You heretic, would you forbid 
good works? Food, drink and raiment are good things, 
therefore we must not cease to dispense them; we cannot do 
too much.' And suppose he continued to force food and 
clothing on the man. Tell me, what would you think of such a 
one? He is a fool more than foolish; he is more mad than 
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madness itself. But such is about the character of our 
ecclesiasts today, and of those who are so blind in the 
exercise of law as to act as if works were the only 
requisite, and to suffocate body and soul, being ignorant 
that they make works superior to love, and a maid to her 
matron. Such perversion prevails to an extent distressing to 
think of, not to mention hearing and seeing it, or more, 
practicing and permitting it ourselves . . . . 
"The commandment of love suspends every commandment, 
yet it perpetuates all. Its whole purpose is that we may 
recognize no commandment, no work, except as love dictates. 
"As life on earth apart from works is an 
impossibility, necessarily there must be various commandments 
involving works. Yet Love is supreme over these 
requirements, dictating the omission or the performance of 
works according to its own best interest, and permitting no 
works opposed to itself. 
"To illustrate: A driver, holding the reins, guides 
team and wagon at will. If he were content merely to hold 
the reins, regardless of whether or no the team followed the 
road, the entire equipage-team, wagon, reins and driver-
would soon be wrecked; the driver would be lying drowned in a 
ditch or a pool, or have his neck broken going over stumps 
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and rocks. But if he dextrously regulates the movement of 
the outfit according to the road, observing where it is safe 
and where unsafe, he will proceed securely . . . . Were he, 
in his egotism, to drive straight ahead, endeavoring to make 
the road conform to the movement of the wagon, at his 
pleasure, he would soon see how beautifully his plan would 
work. 
"So it is when men are governed by laws and works, the 
laws not being regulated according to the people. The case 
is that of the driver who would regulate the road by the 
movements of the wagon. True, the road is often well suited 
to the straight course of the wagon. But just as truly the 
road is, in certain places, crooked and uneven, and then the 
wagon must conform to the course and condition of the road. 
Men must adapt themselves to laws and regulations wherever 
possible and where the laws are beneficial. But where laws 
prove detrimental to men's interests, the former must yield. 
The ruler must wisely make allowance for love, suspending 
works and laws. Hence, philosophers say prudence—or 
circumspection or discretion as the ecclesiasts put it—is the 
guide and regulator of all virtues . . . . 
"Love is true discretion; love is the driver and the 
true discretion in righteous works. It always looks to the 
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good of the neighbor, to the amelioration of his condition; 
just as the discretion of the world looks to the general 
welfare of the governed in the adjustment of political 
laws . . . . 
"Faith is ever the actor, and love the act. The law 
requires the act and thus forces the actor to be changed. 
The Law is then fulfilled by the act, which, however, the 
actor must perform. Thus Paul rejects the fancies of the 
sophists, who in the matter of love would make a distinction 
between the external work and the inner affection, saying: 
'Love is an inner affection that loves our neighbor when in 
our heart we wish him well.' Its expression in works, 
however, they call the fruit of love. But we will not 
discuss this idea. Note, Paul terms love not only an 
affection, but an affectionate good act. Faith and the heart 
are the actor and fulfiller of the Law. Paul says, 'He that 
loveth his neighbor hath fulfilled the law.' And love is the 
act, the fulfilling; for he says, 'Love is the fulfilment of 
the law.' 
"Another question arises: How can love for our 
neighbor be the fulfilment of the Law when we are required to 
love God supremely, even above our neighbor? I reply: Christ 
answers the question when he tells us (Mt 22, 39) the second 
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commandment is like unto the first. He makes love to God and 
love to our neighbor the same love. The reason for this is, 
first: God, having no need for our works and benefactions for 
himself, bids us to do for our neighbor what we would do for 
God. He asks for himself only our faith and our recognition 
of him as God. The object of proclaiming his honor and 
rendering him praise and thanks here on earth is that our 
neighbor may be converted and brought into fellowship with 
God. Such service is called the love of God, and is 
performed out of love to God; but it is exercised for the 
benefit of our neighbor only. 
"The second reason why God makes love to our neighbor 
an obligation equal to love to himself is: God has made 
worldly wisdom foolish, desiring henceforth to be loved amid 
crosses and afflictions. Paul says (1 Cor 1,21), 'Seeing 
that in the wisdom of God the world through its wisdom knew 
not God, it was God's good pleasure through the foolishness 
of the preaching to save them that believe.' Therefore, upon 
the cross he submitted himself unto death and misery, and 
imposed the same submission upon all his disciples. They who 
refused to love him before when he bestowed upon them food 
and drink, blessing and honor, must now love him in hunger 
and sorrow, in adversity and disgrace. All works of love, 
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then, must be directed to our wretched, needy neighbors. In 
these lowly ones we are to find and love God, in them we are 
to serve and honor him, and only so can we do it. The 
commandment to love God is wholly merged in that to love our 
neighbors. 
"These facts restrain those elusive, soaring spirits 
that seek after God only in great and glorious undertakings. 
It stops the mouths of those who strive after greatness like 
his, who would force themselves into heaven, presuming to 
serve and love him with their brilliant works. But they miss 
him by passing over him in their earthly neighbor, in whom 
God would be loved and honored. Therefore, they will hear, 
on the last day, the sentence (Mt 25, 42), 'I was hungry, and 
ye did not give me to eat,' etc. For Christ laid aside his 
divinity and took upon himself the form of a servant for the 
very purpose of bringing down and centering upon our neighbor 
the love we extend to himself. Yet we leave the Lord to lie 
here in his humiliation while we gaze open-mouthed into 
heaven and make great pretensions to love and service to 
God . . . . 
"Love being the chief element of all law, it 
comprehends, as has been made sufficiently clear, all 
commandments. Its one concern is to be useful to man and not 
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harmful; therefore, it readily discovers the way . . 
"Love is the chief virtue, the fountain of all 
virtues. Love gives food and drink; it clothes, comforts, 
persuades, relieves and rescues. What shall we say of it, 
for behold he who loves gives himself, body and soul, 
property and honor, all his powers inner and external, for 
his needy neighbor's benefit, whether it be friend or enemy; 
he withholds nothing wherewith he may serve another . . . . 
"It is the nature of false, carnal, worldly love to 
respect the individual, and to love only so long as it hopes 
to derive profit. When such hope ceases, the love also 
ceases. The commandment of our text, however, requires of us 
free, spontaneous love to all men, whoever they may be, and 
whether friend or foe, a love that seeks not profit, and 
administers only what is beneficial. Such love is most 
active and powerful in serving the poor, the needy, the sick, 
the wicked, the simple-minded and the hostile; among these it 
is always and under all circumstances necessary to suffer and 
endure, to serve and do good . . . . 
"He [a Sovereign] is under obligation, according to 
this commandment, not to extend a measure of help, but to 
serve that neighbor with all he has and all he controls. If 
he loves him as God here commands him to do, he must give the 
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beggar preference over his crown and all his realm; and if 
the beggar's necessity requires, must give his life. He is 
under obligation to love his neighbor, and must admit that 
such a one is his neighbor . . . . 
"But how strange it would seem to us to behold kings 
and queens, princes and princesses, serving beggars and 
lepers, as we read St. Elizabeth did! Even this, however, 
would be a slight thing in comparison with what Christ has 
done. No one can ever equal him in the obedience wherewith 
he has exalted this commandment. He is a king whose honor 
transcends that of all other kings; indeed, he is the Son of 
God. And yet he puts himself on a level with the worst 
sinners, and serves them even to dying for them. Were ten 
kings of earth to serve to the utmost one beggar, it would be 
a remarkable thing; but of what significance would it be in 
comparison with the service Christ has rendered? The kings 
would be put to utter shame and would have to acknowledge 
their service unworthy of notice. 
APPENDIX IV 
UTILITARIAN CALCULATIONS VERSUS 
QUANTITATIVE AGAPISTIC ANALYSIS 
In part one, under the topic of act teleology, the 
utilitarian calculations of Jeremy Bentham are discussed. In 
the second part, included in the topic of choosing the lesser 
of two evils, a type of quantitative agapistic analysis is 
mentioned. That is, in a moral dilemma the moral agent is to 
weigh all the variables, consider all the pertinent options 
and make a quantitative decision as to which option best 
expresses, or incarnates, the love of God. Such a 
quantitative agapistic analysis should not be confused with 
the utilitarian calculations of Jeremy Bentham. There are 
three important differences. 
First the utilitarianism of Bentham, which seeks the 
greatest good for the greatest number, would weigh the 
importance of one human life against such an abstract social 
value as the quality of life. For the utilitarian an 
abortion may be considered moral if it increases the quality 
267 
268 
of the life of the parents. This would be especially evident 
if the child to be aborted were handicapped in such a way 
that it was determined to have very little happiness or 
quality to its own life. In this way utilitarian 
calculations err in reducing human worth to having merely an 
instrumental value. However, a quantitative agapistic 
analysis recognizes that each individual is infinitely 
valuable because it is a soul created, redeemed and 
sanctified by God. Such divine dignity (that is, alien 
righteousness) bestowed upon each individual gives them a 
worth that far transcends their social utility. 
The second problem with utilitarian calculation is 
that it views the good (that is, benefit, advantage or 
pleasure) of the moral agent as equal in importance to the 
good of those around him. This is contrary to the quantita-
tive agapistic analysis in which the focus is solely on the 
good of the neighbor. 
The third problem with utilitarianism is that, like 
hierarchicalism, it seeks to dissolve all moral dilemmas on 
one hierarchical scale. In the case of a conflict the moral 
option is chosen by virtue of its location on the scale. 
That is, the utilitarian would choose that option which best 
brings about the greatest good for the greatest number. In 
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this way every dilemma is believed to be solved. Contrary to 
quantitative agapistic analysis, it leaves no room for the 
recognition that sin is a necessary result of the moral 
dilemma. It fails to recognize both the need for repentance 
and the necessity of forgiveness in Christ Jesus. Thus 
utilitarian calculation is not the same as quantitative 
agapistic analysis. 
APPENDIX V 
EDMUND SANTURRI AND HELMUT THIELICKE 
ON THE QUESTION OF GENUINE 
MORAL DILEMMAS 
Edmund Santurri has written a detailed argument which 
attempts to disprove the existence of genuine moral dil-
emmas.' The capstone of his argument is a severe criticism 
of Helmut Thielicke's interpretation of "The Borderline 
Situation."2 This appendix is a defense of Thielicke's view 
against those criticisms of Santurri. 
Santurri begins by offering a fair, and generally 
impartial, summary of Thielicke's view. Thielicke's views 
concerning borderline situations (that is, moral dilemmas) is 
explained in chapter two above and need not be repeated at 
length here; however, the following quote highlights those 
basic elements with which Santurri disagrees. Santurri 
writes, 
'Edmund Santurri, Perplexity in the Moral Life: 
Philosophical and Theological Considerations 





As Thielicke sees it, only in such disruption [that is, 
the disruption of moral perplexity perceived as dilem-
matic] is the authentic structure of the world disclos-
ed, namely, its extreme disorder, its fallenness. Pre-
occupation with normal cases of moral experience, that 
is, those in which our general principles provide unam-
biguous guidance, tends to obscure this fact about the 
world. Only when our principles fail to serve in this 
manner do we come to experience in our moral lives what 
the Bible and Reformation theology teach — that the 
world is entirely broken by sin. . . . 
. . . What Thielicke objects to . . . is the 
operative presumption [of Thomistic natural law, with 
which Santurri agrees] that moral perplexity is purely 
and simply an epistemological problem. Such a presump-
tion reflects, according to him, a fundamental misunder-
standing of the significance of moral conflict, which is 
said to depict essentially a defect in the moral order 
itself rather than a defect in our perception of that 
order. In other words, moral perplexity is first and 
foremost for Thielicke an ontological rather than an 
epistemological problem. . . . Thus Thielicke resists 
any purely epistemological interpretation of moral 
conflict. . . . 
If moral conflict is merely a problem of epistemo-
logy, there is in principle a resolution to such con-
flict in every case despite our occasional failures to 
discern the conditions of such resolution, then the way 
is open for the agent to escape morally unscathed pro-
vided that she hits on the correct answer either by 
extended ethical reflection or by sheer luck. Yet for 
Thielicke admitting this possibility of a way out be-
trays a failure to take seriously the fact that this 
world is one in which the autonomous achievement of 
objective righteousness is impossible . . . . Thus 
Thielicke can say that belief in the adjudicability of 
moral conflict even as a matter of principle "is only a 
variation of that righteousness by the Law which feeds 
on the illusion that man is capable of satisfying the 
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claim of God."3  
The first objection Santurri raises concerns the 
relationship between Thielicke's and Santurri's understanding 
of sin. Santurri suggests that sin may be defined as "a 
moral violation willfully embraced" (emphasis mine).4 Thus a 
legal violation that is thrust upon the moral agent, by 
external circumstances, against his will, would not, 
according to Santurri, constitute a sin. A moral agent in 
the midst of such a perplexing situation would not be 
confronted with a true dilemma.5 However, it is pointed out 
in part two that it does not matter whether or not the moral 
agent intends to sin. Nor does it matter whether or not the 
moral agent is responsible for the creation of the dilemmatic 
situation. It is emphasized in part two above that sin is 
3lbid., 182-184. This contains a quote from Helmut 
Thielicke, Theological Ethics 3 vols. trans. John Doberstein 
(Grand Rapids: Eerdmans Publishing Co., 1979), 1:xviii. 
4Ibid., 191. 
5Thielicke addresses this problem by emphasizing 
collective responsibility or "communal guilt" (Gesamtschuld) 
for the situation itself. In that way guilt cannot be 
avoided, and a dilemmatic situation exists (Thielicke 1:602). 
However Santurri rejects such a concept as communal guilt 
"unless the guilt can be tied in one way or another to a 
specific dereliction of duty on . . . [each] individual's 
part." (Santurri, 194.) 
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any violation of God's moral law. There are no excuses. Any 
effort to justify one's sin, by arguing that it was 
unintentional, or that one is not the cause of the problem, 
is a weak attempt to become righteous by the Law. 
A second problem Santurri has with Thielicke's 
position is that the position seems to predicate to God an 
unwillingness to adjust to history. Santurri writes, 
The intriguing thing about Thielicke's position . . . is 
that it seems to make moral dilemmas partially a func-
tion of God's unwillingness to adjust entirely to 
history. If irresolvable conflict is the product of a 
system of moral principles whose content is designed 
only for a pre-lapsarian world and if these principles 
reflect God's commands, then dilemmas are partly the 
product of God's failure to modify these commands for 
the conditions of historical existence.6  
According to Santurri's view one is not to construe 
God as a being who is unwilling to adjust to history. Since 
6Santurri, 198. Santurri notes that, "Thielicke does 
allow, up to a point, for God's adjusting his commands to 
meet the exigencies of the fallen world . . . . For Thielicke 
these divine concessions never completely resolve the moral 
conflict. On the one hand, they do establish new moral 
directives that are genuinely obligatory. Violence in 
defense of the innocent, for example, is not simply 
permissible; it is required — to deny this is fanatical. On 
the other hand, the new directives cannot extinguish the 
binding force of the created order left behind; rather, they 
call for a 'compromise' of that order, a compromise that 
'stands in need of forgiveness' (TE 1:567). The upshot is 
that, while God adjusts his mandates for the fallen world, 
the accommodations are partial at best." Santurri, 198. 
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this construal is assumed by Thielicke's view, his view must 
be rejected. 
Santurri fails to recognize that God has made 
adjustments for nature's fall into sin. In his infinite 
wisdom he chose not to relax the legal demands of his initial 
will; rather, he became incarnate, suffered and died on the 
cross so that the world could have forgiveness for its 
failure to meet the perfect standards established by his 
primary will. Contrary to Santurri's view, moral dilemmas do 
not depend on a God who is unwilling to adjust to the fall of 
nature. They are only dependent on a God who refuses to 
adjust to the fall of nature by modifying his initial 
commands. God did make adjustments for sin. Yet his 
adjustment (that is, offering forgiveness through Christ) is 
much more gracious than a mere modifications of his original 
commands. In this way an adjustment is made, his original 
will remains completely unchanged and moral dilemmas become a 
necessary part of living in a sinful world. 
A third problem Santurri has with Thielicke's view of 
moral dilemmas is that it insinuates that God is 
inconsistent. Santurri writes, "To the extent that he 
requires sinful actions for the sake of the world's 
preservation, God also commands things that are simply 
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inconsistent with other things he commands."7  
In the first place it would be inconsistent of God if 
he would modify his original commands and make them less 
stringent.8 In the second place there is consistency, even 
in a moral dilemma, in so far as both commands are oriented 
toward the same goal or thkoc. Both commands seek to be the 
means by which God's love flows through the moral agent and 
into the life of the neighbor in need. Also, the dilemmatic 
situation is not due to any inconsistency on the part of God 
or his laws. It is due solely to the sinful structure of the 
fallen world. God and his laws have remained consistent; 
however, nature has not. It is man's sinful existence within 
a fallen nature that creates moral dilemmas. Thus Santurri 
is mistaken when he insists that moral dilemmas must be based 
7lbid., 199. In another portion of the book Santurri 
writes, "In the case of theological voluntarism, accepting 
the existence of dilemmas would mean attributing incoherence 
to the divine will, thereby admitting God's practical 
irrationality." Ibid., 5. 
8This is precisely what Santurri claims God has done. 
He writes, "Indeed, God may will any of these things [that 
is, something which conflicts with his original will], but in 
so doing he always overrides one or more of his [original] 
desires." Ibid., 207. Thus Santurri, just as Norman 
Geisler, makes the unbiblical assumption that the commands of 
God's secondary will preempt, or cancel out those of his 
primary will. Thus it is Santurri, and Geisler, who are 
guilty of ascribing inconsistency to God. 
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on inconsistent commands from God. 
Santurri's criticism of Thielicke's view of moral 
dilemmas is unfounded and cannot stand up to close scrutiny. 
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